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Disclaimer 
At this time, any standards or requirements that are 
proposed in this document are in draft form and should 
not be used for mission planning purposes without 
consultation with the launch provider or the auxiliary 
payload integrator. The author hopes that the reader will 
find the discussions contained in this document useful as 
he or she assess the risks associated with their particular 
mission. For updates regarding the release of standards 
and requirements related to the CubeSat Design 
Specification (CDS), visit the Cal Poly CubeSat 
Program’s website, http://cubesat.org/. 
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ABSTRACT 
Development of Safety Standards 
For CubeSat Propulsion Systems 
 
Liam J. Cheney 
 
The CubeSat community has begun to develop and implement propulsion systems. This 
movement represents a new capability which may satisfy mission needs such as orbital and 
constellation maintenance, formation flight, de-orbit, and even interplanetary travel. With the 
freedom and capability granted by propulsion systems, CubeSat providers must accept new 
responsibilities in proportion to the potential hazards that propulsion systems may present. 
The Cal Poly CubeSat program publishes and maintains the CubeSat Design 
Specification (CDS). They wish to help the CubeSat community to safety and responsibly expand 
its capabilities to include propulsive designs. For this reason, the author embarked on the task of 
developing a draft of safety standards CubeSat propulsion systems. 
Wherever possible, the standards are based on existing documents. The author provides 
an overview of certain concepts in systems safety with respect to the classification of hazards, 
determination of required fault tolerances, and the use of inhibits to satisfy fault tolerance 
requirements. The author discusses hazards that could exist during ground operations and through 
launch with respect to hazardous materials and pressure systems. Most of the standards related to 
Range Safety are drawn from AFSPCMAN 91-710.  Having reviewed a range of hypothetical 
propulsion system architectures with an engineer from Range Safety at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base, the author compiled a case study. The author discusses many aspects of orbital safety. The 
author discusses the risk of collision with the host vehicle and with third party satellites along 
with the trackability of CubeSats using propulsion systems. Some recommendations are given for 
working with the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE), thanks to the 
input of two engineers who work with the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). Command 
Security is discussed as an important aspect of a mission which implements a propulsion system. 
The author also discusses End-of-Life procedures such as safing and de-orbit operations. The 
orbital safety standards are intended to promote “good citizenship.” 
The author steps through each proposed standard and offers justification. The author is 
confident that these standards will set the stage for a dialogue in the CubeSat community which 
will lead to the formulation of a reasonable and comprehensive set of standards. The author hopes 
that the discussions given throughout this document will help CubeSat developers to visualize the 
path to flight readiness so that they can get started on the right foot. 
  
 
 
Keywords: CubeSat, propulsion, micropropulsion, safety, Range Safety, qualification, 
requirements, Cal Poly, CubeSat Design Specification, pressure vessels, orbital safety, 
nanosatellite, small satellite, P-POD. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this research project is to enable CubeSat developers to safety and 
responsibly incorporate propulsion systems into their designs. Through the development of safety 
standards, the Cal Poly CubeSat program wishes to establish norms by which the CubeSat 
community can build a reputation for safety in ground operations, orbital operations, and disposal 
of propulsive designs. This document serves two primary purposes. First, the document contains 
rationale behind each proposed safety standard. The author intends to submit these proposed 
standards to the CubeSat Standards Committee. Secondly, this document offers guidance to the 
CubeSat developer who wishes to achieve propulsive capabilities but cannot yet visualize the 
path to launch readiness. The CubeSat developer is encouraged to consider the validity of the 
assumptions that the author makes when assessing the level of safety of their particular mission. 
The author wishes to help illuminating the path to qualification and identify potential 
consequences of certain decision. The CubeSat developer can then better navigate their trade 
space and plan a realistic mission timeline. 
Throughout this study, the CubeSat program has engaged the expertise of authorities such 
as Range Safety and the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). In fact, the CubeSat program, 
with support from its subcontractor SRI International, successfully obtained approval to fly its 
first mission with a propulsive CubeSat on GEMSat which launched on December 5th (Pacific 
Time), 2013. The GRACE and ULTRASat missions, which are expected to launch in 2014 and 
2015, also include self-propelled CubeSats on their manifest. Work is underway to achieve an 
acceptable level of safety for these missions. The author, while working for SRI International, has 
interacted with the CubeSat providers and with Range Safety to help address the safety concerns 
for the propulsive CubeSats that are manifested on the GRACE and ULTRASat missions. The 
author hopes that the CubeSat community will benefit from the lessons learned during these 
campaigns. 
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The author began working with the CubeSat Program at Cal Poly in April, 2010. When 
the author began considering the blended M.S. program with the Cal Poly Aerospace Engineering 
Department, he scheduled a meeting with Roland Coelho to discuss thesis projects which could 
benefit the CubeSat Community. With an interest in propulsion, the discussion quickly led to the 
possibility of designing a micropropulsion system for CubeSat applications. After some research 
and planning, the author met with Professor Dr. Jordi Puig-Suari, who oversees the CubeSat 
Program at Cal Poly. After the author had presented the idea, Dr. Puig-Suari offered some very 
meaningful perspective. Dr. Puig-Suari has observed that many organizations have already begun 
work on micropropulsion systems. However, with many organizations designing propulsion 
systems, the community needed someone to investigate the related hazards so that those systems 
could eventually take flight. 
The CubeSat program at Cal Poly plays a unique role in the CubeSat industry. The 
program manufactures the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD), the original CubeSat 
deployment mechanism, and it organizes many launch opportunities for CubeSats. Cal Poly also 
publishes and maintains the CubeSat Design Specification (CDS). This standard is used 
throughout the industry to enable CubeSat developers to design their satellites with confidence 
that they will meet compatibility requirements for a flight-proven deployment mechanism. 
Suppliers who sell CubeSat parts and subsystems design to that specification. For example, many 
propulsion systems are designed to take one third of the volume (1U) of a 3U-sized CubeSat. In 
their stowed configuration, all CubeSat components are designed to fit within the envelope 
dictated by the dimensions of the P-POD. 
Cal Poly, which remains dedicated to the proliferation of CubeSats, is uniquely capable 
of addressing concerns that affect the entire CubeSat community. For this reason, Cal Poly has 
used the author’s Master’s Thesis research to explore the hazards associated with 
micropropulsion systems. Cal Poly currently supports CubeSat propulsion systems that wish to 
launch in the P-POD on a case-by-case basis and plans to eventually release official safety 
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standards, to be included with current requirements published in the CubeSat Design 
Specification (CDS). At that point, Cal Poly hopes to be able to support most propulsive CubeSat 
missions that comply with the standards. 
Background 
The CubeSat Class of Satellites 
The CubeSat was envisioned by Dr. Jordi Puig-Suari of Cal Poly and Dr. Bob Twiggs at 
Stanford University’s Space Systems Development Laboratory (SSDL). According to the 
CubeSat Design Specification (CDS), they collaborated in order to “reduce cost and development 
time, increase accessibility to space, and sustain frequent launches.” This project has spawned a 
cohesive international community of CubeSat developers composed of organizations such as 
universities, high schools, and private firms (CubeSat Design Specification Rev. 12, 2009). Even 
government agencies now have a strong presence in the CubeSat developer community. 
The CDS generally defines a CubeSat in three basic sizes. A standard 1U CubeSat is 
roughly a 10 cm cube with approximately 1.33 kg of mass or less. A 2U CubeSat essentially fits 
the envelope of two 1U’s. Finally, a 3U CubeSat fits the envelope of three 1U’s with dimensions 
of approximately 10 cm x 10 cm x 30 cm and a mass of approximately 4 kg or less. 
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Figure 1: A 1U CubeSat Satellite prior to integration to the P-POD (CubeSat Program 
Pictures, 2009). 
 
Figure 2: A view of the 3U envelope given in the CDS Rev. 12 (CubeSat Design Specification 
Rev. 12, 2009). 
Cal Poly manufactures the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD). The P-POD is a 
reliable deployment mechanism which contains CubeSats during ground operations through 
launch, then separates the CubeSats from the host vehicle at a safe time during orbital operations. 
Briefly, the P-POD is a box-shaped metal container with four sets of rails inside. At integration, 
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CubeSats slide along the rails through the open end of the P-POD and compress the deployment 
spring which is attached to the closed end. Then the P-POD door closes and is secured by a Non-
Explosive Actuator (NEA). The integrated P-POD can then be integrated to the host vehicle as a 
single unit. After launch, signals are sent to the NEA to release the P-POD door. The deployment 
spring then decompresses while pushing the CubeSats along the rails and out the open end of the 
P-POD. In this way, the CubeSats separate from the host vehicle with a relative velocity on the 
order of 1 to 2 m/s. 
 
Figure 3: Left: a closed P-POD. Right:  an empty P-POD, looking through the open door, with 
the spring decompressed (door not shown) (CubeSat Design Specification Rev. 12, 2009). 
 
The design of the P-POD and its flight heritage allows CubeSats to safely fly as 
secondary payloads on many launches. This has helped the CubeSat program to realize its goal 
frequent low-cost access to space for CubeSat providers. As stated in the CDS, “The primary 
responsibility of Cal Poly as the developer of the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD), is 
to ensure the safety of the CubeSat and protect the launch vehicle (LV), primary payload, and 
other CubeSats” (CubeSat Design Specification Rev. 12, 2009). The research described in this 
document is centered on this theme of achieving a level of safety for CubeSats such that the 
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primary mission is not significantly impacted by the presence of the CubeSats onboard, even 
those CubeSats containing propulsion systems. 
The Need for a Safety Standard 
Currently, CubeSats only have access to Earth orbit as secondary payloads. The CubeSat 
community then relies on the good will of the primary payload providers and the launch vehicle 
providers. The CubeSat class of satellites and the P-POD now enjoy some heritage due to safe 
deployments on past missions, and the community benefits from the tremendous support of 
several launch providers. However, in the event of a mishap, the community may find it very 
difficult to recover its good reputation. It is the opinion of the author that the effects of any 
significant mishap would be felt throughout the CubeSat community. Each CubeSat developer 
must commit themselves to safety in order to build on the reputation the entire CubeSat industry. 
As the CubeSat community is united in its vulnerability, developers must unite and 
commit themselves to safety in ground operations, launch, deployment, orbital operations, and 
disposal. Over the years, the CubeSat community has displayed a commendable spirit of 
camaraderie and cohesion. In order to promote common ground it is advantageous to establish 
certain norms of behavior as a proper response to certain potential hazards. 
Responsibility of the Cal Poly CubeSat Program 
The Cal Poly CubeSat program occupies a unique role in the CubeSat community. As 
manufacturer of the P-POD and organizer of many launch opportunities, Cal Poly has a role in 
supporting many CubeSat missions. This has placed Cal Poly in an appropriate position to 
maintain the CubeSat Design Specification (CDS). Cal Poly continually works to identify 
potential modifications of the P-POD design and the CDS that could improve safety and 
accommodate ever more capable CubeSat designs. Cal Poly has identified a strong desire 
throughout the CubeSat community to fly propulsion systems. 
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As Cal Poly strives to support the CubeSat community in safely expanding its capabilities 
to include propulsive designs, it has begun to scrutinize the P-POD design and the CDS. This 
document outlines the research that the author has conducted in order to assess the range of 
hazards posed by different types of CubeSat propulsion systems. The document also describes 
proposed safety standards that may eventually be published together with requirements given in 
the CDS. 
Overview of Hazards Associated with Self-Propelled CubeSats 
The hazards that will be discussed throughout this document do not include hazards that 
would only affect the CubeSat mission. Mission assurance is not the focus of this project. While 
the author recognizes the value in developing effective CubeSat propulsion systems, that task is 
already underway through the work of many CubeSat developers. This document fills a different 
need by exploring the hazards that could affect the personnel, launch vehicle, primary payload, 
and third parties such as orbiting spacecraft. Figure 4 summarize the hazards that will be 
addressed. 
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Figure 4: Overview of hazards. 
Potential Hazards to Personnel 
A major goal of any safety program is personnel safety. Production and use of even the 
most advantageous technologies must be limited when its life cycle can cause illness, injury, or 
death. This does not exclude all technologies that may lead to casualty. Personnel hazards may be 
permitted when no alternative exists, but those hazards must be adequately contained. 
During ground operations, personnel safety is largely dependent on the toxicity of 
propellants and the potential for rapid release of physical or chemical energy. When hazardous 
materials are used, or when fluids are stored at high pressures, much scrutiny is needed to assess 
the level of safety of the related pressure systems and components such as pressure vessels. The 
hazards that may be posed to personnel during ground operations are discussed in Chapter V 
RANGE SAFETY. 
Most potential personnel hazards for CubeSats exist before launch, during ground 
operations. However, when looking at the entire life cycle, the CubeSat developer must also 
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consider the hazards their system may pose to personnel after the mission ends. Specifically, 
depending on the material, some CubeSat components may survive reentry and present a non-
zero probability of casualty. This potential hazard is discussed in the section titled End-of-Life: 
De-orbit and Re-entry in Chapter VII. 
During orbital operations, risk of collision with manned spacecraft such as space stations 
and crew transport vehicles must also be addressed. This potential hazard is grouped with the 
hazards that are posed to other orbiting spacecraft in the section titled Collision with Third Party 
Satellites in Chapter VII. 
Potential Hazards to the Primary Mission 
CubeSats generally secure launch opportunities as secondary payloads on launch vehicles 
that were otherwise dedicated to a primary payload. While this allows for a reduced cost of access 
to space, the launch integrator must work with the CubeSat providers to ensure that the CubeSat 
missions do not present undue risk to the primary mission. Risks to the primary mission include 
risk to the primary spacecraft as well as risk to the launch vehicle since the primary mission 
depends on the launch vehicle. Risk to the primary mission includes risks that are present during 
launch and orbital operations, but also risks present during ground operations. Damage to the 
launch vehicle during ground operations may not always cause loss of the primary mission, but 
such an incident may cause the launch date to slip due to repairs and requalification. 
One obvious hazard related to many propulsion system architectures is the risk of 
explosion. Just as an explosion could cause casualties during ground operations, it could also 
damage hardware that is critical to the primary mission. Energetic materials or benign materials 
stored under pressure could carry the risk of explosion. Structural margins and failure modes play 
a major role in containment of hazardous and pressurized materials. These potential hazards are 
discussed in Chapter V RANGE SAFETY. 
Certain materials may damage hardware through contamination regardless of their 
toxicity or ability to explode. These materials may interact with incompatible materials that are 
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present on the primary spacecraft, the launch vehicle, the P-POD, or even other CubeSats. 
Contamination may cause effects such as corrosion and sensitivity degradation to onboard 
sensors. Optics may be especially sensitive to certain contaminants. This topic is also addressed 
in Chapter V RANGE SAFETY. 
Unlike other subsystems, propulsion systems carry the risk of collision with the host 
vehicle. Suppose that a CubeSat were to separate from the launch vehicle upper stage and after 
five seconds the propulsion system began firing. Depending on the separation velocity and 
direction and the performance of the propulsion system, the CubeSat could turn around and 
collide with the launch vehicle. For certain missions, the primary satellite may be at risk in 
addition to the launch vehicle upper stage. Some low-thrust CubeSats could not overcome the 
initial separation velocity in the short term, but others may be more capable. Certain measures 
can be taken to contain this potential hazard, as discussed in the section titled Collision with the 
Host Vehicle in Chapter VII. 
Potential Hazards to Third-Party Spacecraft 
CubeSats have always carried some risk of jeopardizing the missions of third party 
satellites. However, with the ability to augment their trajectory, self-propelled CubeSats have a 
greater ability to either reduce or exacerbate the potential hazards. CubeSats have always been 
capable of drifting into a collision course with another satellite. However, non-propulsive 
CubeSats can be more easily tracked in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and the spacecraft at risk can 
receive timely notification and take corrective action. Self-propelled CubeSats, on the other hand, 
may be able to change their trajectory rapidly and collide with other satellites before the 
conjunction can be predicted and before a collision avoidance maneuver can be executed. The 
situation become even more serious when the CubeSat is capable of intercepting a manned 
spacecraft. The risk of collision with third-party satellites is discussed in the section titled 
Collision with Third Party Satellites in Chapter VII. The topic of trackability is also discussed in 
Chapter VII. 
11 
 
Self-propelled CubeSats may be intentionally controlled so as to put other spacecraft at 
risk. The author does not suggest that any members of the CubeSat community would foster 
malicious intent, but that an unauthorized party may hijack a CubeSat. The discussion titled 
Command Security addresses this topic in Chapter VII. 
Finally, as with all satellite systems, CubeSats developers must strive to mitigate the 
growing problem of space debris. CubeSats with propulsion systems may carry extra risk due to 
their ability to collide with other satellites, as discussed above, and their tendency to store energy. 
Should a particle of space debris impact a CubeSat containing a pressurized fluid or energetic 
material, the impact could cause the pressurized components to burst or the energetic material to 
explode. The result could add more debris to the orbital environment and jeopardize other 
spacecraft. Sometimes a mission cannot be completed without a pressure system, but any pressure 
or propellant systems should be rendered inert at the earliest point possible. The topic of 
passivation is discussed in the section titled End-of-Life: Passivation in Chapter VII. That section 
also addresses the risk of casualty due to impact by components that fail to disintegrate during 
reentry. 
Propulsion Systems Available or Under Development 
Not every self-propelled CubeSat presents all of the hazard discussed in the previous 
section. To understand the spectrum of hazards presented by various micro-propulsion systems, 
one must familiarize themselves with the state of the art. This discussion introduces the reader to 
a collection of propulsion systems that are either under development, on the market, or could 
become available to CubeSat developers in the foreseeable future. 
Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES offers basic architectures for 
hypothetical systems which may resemble some of the systems discussed here. The author 
reviewed each case with an engineer from Range Safety at Vandenberg Air Force Base. For each 
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case, the author discusses the hazards to Range Safety which are presented by that particular 
system and offers an appropriate method for responding to those hazards. 
The discussion given here presents information which was gathered concerning the 
following types of micro-propulsion systems: 
 Cold Gas Thrusters   (Physical Propulsion) 
 Resistojet    (Physical / Electric Propulsion) 
 Mono-Propellant Thrusters  (Chemical Propulsion) 
 Electrospray   (Electric) 
 PPT    (Electric) 
 Ion Thrusters   (Electric) 
 MEMS Solid Rocket Motor  (Chemical) 
 Vacuum Arc Thruster   (Electric) 
This list is not intended to be exhausted. Certain types of systems were knowingly left out 
such as Field-emission Electric Propulsion (FEEP), Hall Effect Thrusters, and Colloid Thrusters. 
However, this discussion is intended to illustrate the variety of CubeSat propulsion systems under 
development. The reader is encouraged to search the references which are cited throughout this 
discussion. 
Some of the systems that were studied pose significant risk. For example, mono-
propellant hydrazine thrusters pose a serious health risk to the individuals involved in integration, 
testing and fueling. Some systems seem to pose relatively little risk. For example, Pulsed Plasma 
Thrusters (PPT) and Vacuum Arc Thrusters use inert solid propellants. Their design does not 
require the use of hazardous materials, nor does the design require a pressure vessel. 
Some familiar examples of propulsion systems are not highlighted here because the 
author has not found that they have been studied extensively for CubeSat applications. For 
example, bi-propellant systems carry all of the risks of a mono-propellant system with added risks 
related to their complexity and explosive nature. The author does not expect that bi-propellant 
systems will be employed in the near future. 
Initial findings demonstrate that several organizations have taken initiative to develop 
their own propulsion system. Some groups have even begun qualification testing of their system. 
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Propulsion systems with inert solid propellants appear to be the least hazardous. These 
include PPT’s and Vacuum Arc Thruster. Beyond the inherent risks associated with producing a 
change in velocity, V, and the risk of premature electric discharge, these systems do not pose 
any additional risks known to the author. Of the systems which require fluid propellants, those 
which utilize inert liquid (or two-phase) propellants are likely the least risky. Colloid Thrusters 
would only need to maintain one atmosphere of pressure. Some two-phase cold-gas thrusters 
require less pressure than single-phase systems. 
Cold Gas Thrusters (Physical Energy) 
Cold gas thruster propellants, with some exceptions, are not very toxic and are inert. The 
primary foreseeable risk is their reliance on pressurized propellant, which must be contained in 
pressure vessels. Research has been done to decrease propellant storage pressure, specifically for 
the purpose of reducing the risk to the primary satellite on the launch vehicle. This includes a 
study which examined the use of two-phase fluids such as Nitrous Oxide, Butane, and Refrigerant 
R134a. A two-phase fluid can be stored as a liquid-vapor mixture. This reduces the storage 
pressure required for high propellant masses while providing a vapor pressure which degrades 
relatively slowly. These are sometimes referred to as self-pressurizing cold-gas thrusters (Pahl, 
2010). 
Research has been conducted concerning the use of dual two-phase materials. One two-
phase material would offer itself as the propellant and one two-phase material would be the 
pressurant. The two materials would be separated by a membrane. This allows for more constant 
thrust throughout the thruster life (Burges, Hall, & Lightsey, 2012). 
Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES presents a case study for a hypothetical 
cold gas thruster using Nitrogen gas as a propellant. 
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Resistojet (Physical, Electric) 
To improve the performance of a cold gas thruster, one might add a heater to raise the 
energy of the propellant before accelerating it through the nozzle. This type of thruster is often 
referred to as a resistojet. This method can be used with conventional cold gas thrusters using 
gases such as Nitrogen, but they can also be used with two-phase propellants such as R-134a. 
Busek currently markets a resistojet system for CubeSat applications which uses 
ammonia as a two-phase self-pressurizing propellant, which fits within a 1U volume (Busek 
Space Propulsion and Systems, 2013). Vacco also markets a resistojet thruster which can be 
scaled for varying propellant tank sizes (Vacco, n.d.). 
Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES presents a case study for a hypothetical 
resistojet system using R-134a as a propellant. 
Monopropellant Thrusters (Chemical Energy) 
Mono-propellant thrusters normally provide better mass efficiency than cold-gas 
thrusters. Stellar Exploration has designed a hydrazine-based mono-propellant thruster which fits 
within the envelope of a 1U CubeSat, intended for use on a 3U CubeSat (Biddy, 2009). Aerojet 
Rocketdyne also markets a line of monopropellant systems which use hydrazine as well as some 
that use AF-M315E as a “green propellant.” Aerojet Rocketdyne advertises that these systems are 
capable of generating up to 539 m/s of V (Aerojet Rocketdyne, 2013). 
Hydrazine provides very good performance, but it is a known toxin. Hydrogen peroxide, 
which is generally less hazardous than hydrazine, can also be used as a monopropellant. As 
mentioned above, Aerojet Rocketdyne has developed monopropellant thrusters capable of using a 
less toxic “green propellant” known as AF-M315E. Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE 
STUDIES analyses hypothetical monopropellant systems using each of these propellants. 
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Electrospray (Electric) 
Electrospray propulsion systems use electric power to accelerate an ionic fluid propellant 
to produce thrust. Busek markets such a system which uses a collection of valves and conduits to 
manage the propellant (Busek Electrospray Thrusters, 2013). MIT has developed a system which 
uses capillary forces to contain the propellant (ion Electrospray Propulsion System for CubeSats 
(iEPS), 2013). 
Two examples of hypothetical electrospray systems are discussed in Chapter VI RANGE 
SAFETY CASE STUDIES. One case uses an ionic liquid called EMI-BF4 as the propellant while 
the other uses Gallium. While EMI-BF4 poses little risk, Gallium is very corrosive to Aluminum 
(Material Safety Data Sheet Gallium, 2010). 
Pulsed Plasma Thrusters, PPT (Electric) 
Pulsed Plasma Thrusters (PPT) offer many safety advantages when compared with other 
propulsion systems. PPTs use electric discharge to ablate and vaporize a solid propellant, often 
Teflon. The vaporized propellant is then accelerated using an electric field (Clyde Space, 2011). 
Pulsed Plasma Thrusters (PPT) can be scaled for low power consumption. The propellant, 
sometimes simply a block of Teflon, can be stored easily without a pressure vessel. Mars Space 
Ltd has invested resources toward qualifying their system for use on CubeSats. They have 
successfully performed qualification vibration testing. When their paper was presented at the 
Spring 2012 CubeSat Workshop, testing was underway which included EMC, thermo-vacuum 
and lifetime testing (PPTCUP - Pulsed Plasma Thruster for CubeSats (Pamphlet), 2012). Clyde 
Space and Mars Science jointly market a PPT system for CubeSats (Clyde Space, 2011). 
Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES presents a hypothetical Pulsed Plasma 
Thruster which uses Teflon as the propellant. 
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MEMS Solid Rocket Motor (Chemical Energy, MEMS) 
Researchers have tested a very small solid rocket propulsion system fabricated using 
Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) technology (Larangot, Conédéra, Dubreuil, Do Conto, 
& Rossi).While this system carries some of the same risks as normal solid rocket motors, the risk 
may exist on a smaller scale. 
Ion Thrusters (Electric) 
An ion propulsion systems uses electric fields to accelerate positively charged ions 
through a grid. As the propellant, designers normally prefer inert gases with high atomic weights 
such as Xenon. The propellant may be ionized through electron bombardment from an internal 
cathode or by a microwave source. After acceleration through the charged grid, the high speed 
ion beam is neutralized by electrons emitted by an external cathode. The high exhaust velocities 
that ion thrusters achieve can provide an excellent specific impulse compared with chemical 
systems. Therefore, ion thrusters can be very mass efficient with their propellants. 
Ion thrusters, along with many electric propulsion systems, do not rely on the chemical 
energy of the propellant. Instead, the energy used to propel the spacecraft comes from the power 
system. To avoid the hazards associated with storage of energetic materials, satellites using 
electric propulsion systems can launch in an inert state, then harness solar energy to power their 
propulsion system. 
Busek is currently working on such a system which uses microwaves to ionize the 
propellant (Busek RF Ion Thruster, 2013). Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES 
discusses a hypothetical Ion Thruster which uses Xenon as its propellant. 
Vacuum Arc Thrusters (Electric) 
A Vacuum Arc Thruster functions by evaporating a solid propellant using an electric arc, 
then allowing the plasma plume to expand into the vacuum of space. The expansion provides a 
propulsive momentum exchange. Some work has been done to constrain the exhaust using a 
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magnetic field. Rather than allowing the plume to expand radially in one hemisphere, the 
magnetic field would force the plume to expand more-or-less axially. This would improve mass 
efficiency by focusing the momentum of the exhaust closer to the desired thrust direction (Keidar, 
et al., 2005). 
A study has examined using a CubeSat’s Aluminum structure as a propellant (Schein, 
Gernhan, Rysanek, & Krishnan). Similar to Pulsed Plasma Thrusters, Vacuum Arc Thrusters 
conveniently rely on inert solid propellants and do not need pressure vessels. 
Objective 
As discussed in the beginning of this document, the goal of this research project is to 
enable CubeSat developers to safely and responsibly incorporate propulsion systems into their 
designs. Through the development of safety standards, the Cal Poly CubeSat program wishes to 
establish norms with which the CubeSat community can build a reputation for safety in ground 
operations, orbital operations, and disposal of propulsive designs. This document serves two 
primary purposes. First, the document contains rationale behind each proposed safety standard. 
The author intends to submit these proposed standards to the CubeSat Standards Committee. 
Secondly, this document offers guidance to the CubeSat developer who wishes to achieve 
propulsive capabilities but cannot yet visualize the path to launch readiness. The CubeSat 
developer is encouraged to consider the validity of the assumptions that the author makes when 
assessing the level of safety of their particular mission. The author wishes illuminate a path to 
qualification and the potential consequences of certain decision. The CubeSat developer can then 
better navigate their trade space and plan a realistic mission timeline. 
Scope 
Most CubeSats that will launch in the foreseeable future fly as secondary payloads. As 
miniaturized launch vehicles enter the scene, CubeSats may acquire access to space as primary 
payloads, or co-payloads. Many of the topics discussed in this study apply equally in both 
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situations. However, the author caters most directly to CubeSats that fly as secondary payloads. 
Regardless of their launch method, all CubeSats should respond appropriately to their 
responsibility to never create undue risk to human life, and to cooperate with norms of behavior 
to maintain orbital safety. 
Much of this study relies on deterministic analyses that the author has conducted to 
identify the feasibility that hazards exist under certain conditions. The author would have 
preferred to also conduct probabilistic analyses to determine the likelihood of those mishaps 
which are feasible. Unfortunately, such analysis would have taken too much time, given the 
computational resources available to the author. Fortunately, much can be learned from 
deterministic analysis. In some cases, safety envelopes are identified where the hazards do not 
exist. If CubeSat designs fall within those safety envelopes, probabilistic analysis is not necessary 
in order to adequately contain the hazards. 
Disclaimer 
At this time, any standards or requirements that are proposed in this document are in draft 
form and should not be used for mission planning purposes without consultation with the launch 
provider or the auxiliary payload integrator. The author hopes that the reader will find the 
discussions contained in this document useful as he or she assess the risks associated with their 
particular mission. For updates regarding the release of standards and requirements related to the 
CubeSat Design Specification (CDS), visit the Cal Poly CubeSat Program’s website, 
http://cubesat.org/. 
About this Document 
This document builds arguments for a set of proposed safety standards that the author 
believes could help CubeSat providers to respond appropriately to the hazards that their self-
propelled CubeSat designs may pose. In addition to that, the author hopes that CubeSat 
developers will find the discussions throughout the document useful in navigating their trade 
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space. The discussions throughout the document should help the CubeSat developer to visualize 
the path to flight readiness. 
The proposed standards are all contained in APPENDIX B Draft of Standards at the end 
of this document. Each standard is also included in Chapter VIII PROPOSED STANDARDS. In 
that chapter, each standard is presented along with a discussion which offers rationale for each. 
The rationales often reference discussions in other chapters of this document. 
After the Chapter I INTRODUCTION concludes, Chapter II begins with a discussion of 
the methodology the author used to form the draft of standards. This includes a discussion of the 
intentions of the CubeSat Standards community and discussions of the strategy the author used to 
conduct his analysis and research. 
Chapter III EXISTING STANDARDS begins a review of the various standards that 
already exist. These documents are published by authorities such as the Air Force, the FAA, 
NASA, and the Cal Poly CubeSat Program. 
Next, Chapter IV CONCEPTS IN SYSTEM SAFETY discusses essential topics in 
systems safety which will help the reader to understanding the discussions that follow. The 
chapter defines the various levels of hazard severity, the fault tolerances needed to adequately 
contain hazards at each severity level, and shows how to use inhibits to satisfy fault tolerance 
requirements. These concepts apply for all CubeSat missions, regardless of whether their satellite 
contains a propulsion system. 
Chapters V through VII analyze the hazards that CubeSat developers should consider 
when designing their propulsion systems. The research and analyses in these chapters provide a 
basis for some of the safety standards which are proposed in this document. The author hopes that 
the CubeSat provider will find these chapters very helpful when assessing the potential hazards 
that are relevant to their particular satellite, and when exploring ways to contain those hazards. 
Chapter V RANGE SAFETY discusses those potential hazards which may exist during 
ground operations, transportation, and launch up until the point when the CubeSat separates from 
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the host vehicle. Much of that chapter focusses on the relevant requirements given in 
AFSCPMAN 91-710, with a focus on pressure system safety and verification. 
Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES puts the concepts of systems safety and 
Range Safety into practice using a case study. Range hazards are difficult to characterize 
definitively. Each satellite presents a unique set of challenges that Range Safety must become 
comfortable with before that satellite can be approved to fly. Kevin Case, who works for Range 
Safety at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) met with the author to discuss each case and to 
provide his perspective. Each case introduces a hypothetical CubeSat propulsion architecture. The 
hazards of each architecture are identified with some discussion of the severity of each hazard. A 
hypothetical inhibit design is given for each case which is likely to adequately contains those 
hazards. Each case also includes a discussion of the analysis and testing that would be required to 
prove flight worthiness of the architecture. The author hopes that CubeSat developers can find 
similarities between their particular propulsion system options and some of the hypothetical 
systems. Perhaps one case will resemble their propellant choice while another case resembles 
their propellant containment method. The cases should help the developer to make preliminary 
estimates of how their particular systems may be treated by Range Safety. 
Chapter VII ORBITAL SAFETY discusses those hazards that may be present from the 
time a CubeSat separates from the host vehicle until the End-of-Life (EOL) and disposal of the 
satellite. Several analyses are given which assess the potential hazards of collision with the host 
vehicle after separation and collision with third party satellites. Concepts relating to trackability 
in orbit are discussed along with recommendations for helping the Joint Space Operations Center 
(JSpOC) to track CubeSats more easily and provide collision avoidance. Recommendations are 
also given for establishing contact with the JSpOC in order to establish a plan for assessing the 
hazard of collision with other objects before executing a maneuver. Chapter VII also discusses 
the concepts relating to EOL safing and satellite disposal operations, which are essential to the 
mitigation of orbital debris. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the approach the author uses to evaluate hazards, determine 
methods of reducing or controlling those hazards, and write the safety standards proposed in this 
document. 
Flow from Existing Standards 
Many of the hazards that a CubeSat propulsion system may pose have been previously 
evaluated by the wider aerospace industry. Rather than reinventing the wheel, many of the safety 
standards proposed in this document flow from existing standards. In fact, CubeSats will already 
be held to requirements given in some of the existing documents such as those relating to Range 
Safety. In those cases, the author attempts take those general standards and apply them 
specifically for CubeSats and determine the limits of applicability. In cases where the general 
standards do not apply well to CubeSat missions, alternatives should be sought which preserve 
the intent of the original requirements and achieve an equivalent level of safety. 
CubeSat Standards Committee’s Desires 
On May 23
rd
, 2013, the Cubesat Standards Committee met and discussed the possibility 
of eventually publishing standards to help guide CubeSat developers to incorporate propulsion 
systems into their designs in a safe and responsible manner. The author attended the meeting by 
teleconference. 
Swim-Lanes 
Much emphasis was given to the concept of defining “swim-lanes,” in which standards 
would be organized into tiered categories based on the feasibility of certain hazards. CubeSats 
which present different hazards would be subject to different requirements. For example, a 
CubeSat capable of generating 1 m/s of V would be subject to less stringent requirements 
compared to a CubeSat capable of generating 1 km/s of V, because the more capable satellite 
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could feasibly intersect the orbits of more satellite. The requirements specified for each “swim 
lane” would be appropriate to the severity of the potential hazards that exist. 
While the author notes the merit in defining “swim lanes” to distinguish the benign from 
the hazardous, he has not yet identified clear boundaries which can be used to group CubeSat 
designs into groups across multiple dimensions. Instead, many of safety standards which are 
proposed in this document depend on the existence of certain individual hazards, rather than 
multiple hazards. 
Positive Control 
The requirement for positive control was also emphasized at the CubeSat Standards 
Committee meeting, which relates to command security. A well-controlled satellite with poor 
command security could be hijacked and used as a weapon. This topic is discussed in the section 
titled Command Security in Chapter VII. 
Range Safety vs. Orbital Safety 
The Standards Committee noted that certain requirements pertain to safe launch and pre-
launch operations while other requirements pertain to on-orbit safety. The committee emphasized 
an interest in promoting “good citizenship” on orbit. This topic is discussed throughout Chapter 
VII ORBITAL SAFETY. 
Implementation 
The Cal Poly CubeSat program wishes to respond to the desires of the CubeSat Standards 
Committee by proposing a framework for defining safety standards for self-propelled CubeSats. 
The standards are divided in to Range Safety standards and Orbital Safety standards. The topic of 
Range Safety is discussed in detail in Chapters V and VI while the topic of Orbital Safety is 
covered in Chapter VII. Whenever possible, the author has identified boundaries to safety 
envelopes where particular hazards are not feasible. 
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Analysis 
The author conducted a collection of analyses which help to assess the feasibility of 
certain hazards under a range of conditions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research 
does not focus on modeling the probability of hazards. Probabilistic analysis often requires 
advanced computing resources. Instead, the author conducted deterministic analyses to determine 
the feasibility and the severity of each hazard. This allows for the formulation of safety zones 
where certain hazards do not exist. For the envelopes where hazards are feasible, future research 
may wish to explore the probability of mishap. Given the severity of the hazard, one could then 
determine envelopes of acceptable risk.  
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III. EXISTING STANDARDS 
As mentioned in Chapter II, many of the hazards that a CubeSat propulsion system may 
pose have been previously evaluated by the wider aerospace industry. Rather than reinventing the 
wheel, many of the safety standards proposed in this document flow from existing standards. This 
chapter introduces current standards which pertain to CubeSat propulsion systems. These 
documents are published by the Cal Poly CubeSat program, the Air Force Space Command, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). 
CubeSat Design Specification (CDS) 
First, it is worthwhile to consider the current revision of the CubeSat Design 
Specification (CDS), Revision 12, in order to identify the current requirements which may pertain 
to micro-propulsion systems. Table 1 lists some requirements from CDS which may restrict some 
forms of micro-propulsion. Note that these requirements are included in the current revision of 
the CDS, but may be adjusted in future releases in order to better accommodate propulsion 
systems. 
Many of the comments in Table 1 suggest that these requirements may need to be 
modified in order to allow certain propulsion systems to fly in the P-POD. That is why this 
project is important. We hope to help the CubeSat community to develop capabilities which may 
not be supported by the current revision of the CDS. Rather than deleting certain requirements, 
we wish to modify the requirements to accommodate new capabilities while maintaining an 
acceptable level of safety. 
Certain other requirements in the CDS may not explicitly rule out some propulsion 
systems, but would apply to propulsion systems. With examination of these topics throughout this 
project, some of these requirements may also need to be modified in order to support certain 
propulsion system designs.  
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Table 1: Potentially restrictive requirements from the CDS 
(CubeSat Design Specification Rev. 12, 2009). 
No. Requirement Text Comments 
2.1.2 “All parts shall remain attached to the 
CubeSats during launch, ejection and 
operation. No additional space debris 
shall be created.” 
This requirement may restrict certain 
propulsion systems which generate solid 
debris in the exhaust. 
2.1.3 “Pyrotechnics shall not be permitted.” 
 
This directly restricts chemical propulsion 
systems which operate by combustion. 
2.1.3 “No pressure vessels over 1.2 
standard atmospheres shall be 
permitted.” 
This requirement severely limits both 
physical and chemical systems which store 
propellant in pressure vessels. This does not 
limit the use of PPT’s. This requirement 
could be replaced by the proposed safety 
standards which pertain to pressure 
systems. 
2.1.5 “Total stored chemical energy shall 
not exceed 100 Watt-Hours.” 
 
This requirement could limit use of 
chemical propellants. This requirement 
could also be replaced by some of the 
proposed standards. 
2.1.6 “No hazardous materials shall be used 
on a CubeSat…” 
This requirement would limit the choices 
for propellant. Propellants such as 
hydrazine and hydrogen peroxide would be 
considered hazardous. This requirement 
could also be replaced by some of the 
proposed standards. 
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Table 2: Other applicable requirements from the CDS 
(CubeSat Design Specification Rev. 12, 2009). 
No. Requirement Text Comments 
2.1.3.1 “Pressure vessels shall have a factor 
of safety no less than 4.” 
This requirement is very conservative in 
comparison with the requirements in 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 which call for 
pressure vessel safety factors greater than 
1.5, or sometimes above 2.0. 
 
See the section titled Pressure Vessel 
Verification in Chapter V of this document. 
2.2.19 “Aluminum 7075 or 6061 shall be 
used for both the main CubeSat 
structure and the rails. If other 
materials are used the developer shall 
submit a DAR and adhere to the 
waiver process.” 
Some pressure vessels may require the use 
of other materials, but this requirement 
suggests that exceptions may be permitted 
if a waiver is granted. The CubeSat 
developer should be mindful of any 
possibility of casualty during reentry. 
 
See the section titled Tank Material and 
Orbital Debris Assessment Report in 
Chapter VII of this document. 
2.4.2 “All deployables such as booms, 
antennas, and solar panels shall wait 
to deploy a minimum of 30 minutes 
after the Cubesat’s deployment 
switch(es) are activated from P-POD 
ejection.” 
While propulsion systems are not 
deployables, this time restraint could be 
used as a model. Perhaps propulsion 
systems should not be activated until after 
the CubeSat has sufficiently separated from 
the host vehicle. 
 
See the section titled Collision with the 
Host Vehicle in Chapter VII of this 
document.  
 
2.4.5 “The orbit decay lifetime of the 
Cubesats shall be less than 25 years 
after end of mission life.” 
Propulsion systems may actually help 
CubeSats to satisfy this requirement. 
However, operators should be careful not to 
maneuver there satellite into a trajectory 
where they cannot effectively deorbit within 
25 years. 
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Future revisions of the CDS 
Deployer designs and the CubeSat Design Specification may impact the feasibility of 
launching a micro-propulsion system. New revisions of the CDS will allow CubeSat developers 
to use a tuna-can shaped space which extends into the pusher plate of the P-POD. In addition, 
“larger-than-3U” deployers may increase demand for propulsion systems, increase feasibility, and 
affect propulsion system configuration trades. For example, a larger spacecraft may make the use 
of multiple thrusters for attitude control more feasible. At the time of this publication, a 
provisional release of CDS Rev. 13 can be found at CubeSat.org. 
AFSPCMAN 91-710: Range Safety User Requirements 
The Range Safety User Requirements document, AFSCPMAN 91-710, is of supreme 
importance for CubeSat propulsion systems, and is cited frequently in Chapters V and VI of this 
document. According to the introduction in Chapter 1, the objective of AFSPCMAN 91-710 is to 
“establish and enforce Range User safety requirements to ensure that the public, launch area, and 
launch complex personnel and resources are provided an acceptable level of safety and that all 
aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws…” (AFSCMAN 91-
710 Vol. 1, 2004). AFSPCMAN 91-710 does not pertain to orbital safety after launch, but treats 
prelaunch and launch operations extensively. 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Volume 3 Launch Vehicles, Payloads, and Ground Support 
Systems Requirements is of particular importance to CubeSat missions, especially propulsion 
systems. Chapter 10  of that volume, titled Hazardous Materials, may apply to some propulsion 
systems while Chapter 12, titled Flight Hardware Pressure Systems and Pressurized Structures, 
pertains directly to many CubeSat propulsion systems. The document outlines the required 
design, analysis, and testing that are required to demonstrate an appropriate level of safety 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004) 
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All CubeSats, with or without propulsion systems, that launch from the Eastern and 
Western Range of the United States will submit a Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package 
(MSPSP) to Range Safety before receiving approval to fly. As described in Attachment 1 of 
Volume 3, the MSPSP is used to communicate the potential hazards of the CubeSat and the ways 
in which those hazards are contained in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). Traditionally, Cal Poly and its subcontractors have aided the 
CubeSat providers in working with Range Safety and the Launch Vehicle Provider to achieve an 
appropriate level of safety and obtain approval to fly from Range Safety. 
Chapter 3 of Volume 3 offers guidance for containing hazards that are not specifically 
outlined in other chapters. Specifically, the very short chapter provides guidance in identifying 
the number of inhibits that are required to contain hazards of various severity (AFSPCMAN 91-
710 Vol. 3, 2004). The topics that are addressed in Chapter 3 of AFSPCMAN 91-710 are 
discussed in this document, under Hazard Severity and Fault Tolerance in Chapter IV. 
Volume 6 pertains directly to the safety of ground and launch operations (AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Many of these requirements do not strictly apply to CubeSats since they are 
usually integrated to the P-POD prior to transportation to the range. It is the responsibility of the 
CubeSat provider to establish safety standards for use in their own facilities. Some requirements 
in Volume 6 do pertain to CubeSats containing hazardous materials, as is discussed in the section 
titled Pressure Vessel Verification in Chapter V. 
AFI 91-217: Space Safety and Mishap Prevention Program 
According to Section 1.1 of AFI 91-217, the document “implements space safety, 
mishap prevention and mission effectiveness guidance for AF space systems,” with coverage 
of topics such as re-entry, space control systems, and orbital safety. Chapter 5 of AFI 91-217, 
which pertains to Orbital Safety, covers collision avoidance, space debris, and End-of-Life 
(EOL) procedures among other things. Of particular interest is the discussion on collision 
29 
 
avoidance which describes the role played by the Joint Functional Component Command for 
Space (JFCC SPACE) through the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). 
Section 5.2 of AFI 91-217 discusses the maximum allowable probability of collision 
with other objects. For example, according to 5.2.1.3, satellites may not exceed a “probability 
of impact greater than 1 x 106 per spacecraft” for manned spacecraft. In comparison, the 
maximum allowable probability for collision with unmanned active spacecraft is 10 x 106 per 
object, according to 5.2.1.4 (AFI 91-217, 2010). 
Section 5.9 discusses Conjunction Assessment (CA) and Section 5.10 discusses Collision 
Avoidance (COLA) (AFI 91-217, 2010, p. 49). 
Section 5.9.1 reads, 
Consistent with mission capabilities and resource availability, 
conjunction assessments will be conducted for all active 
spacecraft against all satellite catalog objects within JSpOC 
established threat thresholds. These thresholds are typically 
identified by a miss distance, but other criteria may be used, as 
appropriate. (AFI 91-217, 2010, p. 49) 
CubeSat operators that wish to performpropulsive maneuvers should contact JFCC 
SPACE for assistance in performing a CA. Early on in the program, CubeSat providers should 
establish communication with JFCC SPACE by working with their launch integrator or launch 
provider to submit an Orbital Data Request (ODR) to ODR@space-track.org for services 
including Collision Avoidance and Conjunction Assessment. The ODR form and instructions can 
be found at https://www.space-track.org/documentation#/odr  (Orbital Data Request, 2013). The 
ODR submittal represents the first contact between the CubeSat program and JFCC SPACE. 
Once the ODR has been submitted, JFCC SPACE will contact the CubeSat operator and provide 
a point of contact when two-way communication becomes necessary (Quinonez, 2013). 
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The CubeSat operator may wish for guidance in discerning between significant levels 
ofV which require a CA and COLA, and benign levels ofV which do not. Section 5.9.2 of 
AFI 91-217 reads, 
Each spacecraft operator, in coordination with the wing 
Safety Office, JFCC SPACE and 14 AF/SE, will develop 
thresholds (eg. Very low Delta-V (∆V) maneuvers) within which 
no CA/COLA is required. (AFI 91-217, 2010, p. 49) 
The threshold at which a CA and COLA are required may depend on the mission. The 
CubeSat provider should work with their launch integrator, launch provider, and JFCC SPACE to 
set a threshold for their particular mission. 
According to Richard C. Diamantopoulos who works for Scitor Corporation in support of 
JFCC SPACE, customers of www.space-track.org are notified that “satellites are screened for 
collision avoidance using a 1 km (X, Y-axes) x 200 m (Z-axis) [ellipsoid] around the current 
[element set]. Any movement from a currently established [element set] in the Satellite Catalog 
without prior coordination with the JSpOC affects their ability to predict conjunctions and avoid 
collisions until the new [element set] is confirmed in the Satellite Catalog” (Diamantopoulos, 
Email Correspondence, 2013). 
The topic of trackability and collaboration with JFCC SPACE is discussed further in the 
section titled Trackability in Chapter VII. 
AFSPCI 10-1204: Satellite Operations 
The Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Instruction 10-1204 on Satellite Operations 
defines “organizational responsibilities” for “AFSPC-conducted satellite operations” (AFSPCI 
10-1204, 2009, p. 2). The document claims the Air Force Space Command’s responsibility for 
“all aspects of providing satellite capabilities to support various Department of Defense (DoD), 
National and civil agencies and is responsible for organizing, training and equipping the space 
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operations infrastructure” (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009, p. 2). The document may prove helpful to the 
CubeSat provider who wishes to identify the authority within Space Command that can aid in a 
particular issue. 
Due to the document’s emphasis on defining organizational responsibilities, it does not 
devote much space to technical discussions. However, in certain sections the document does 
provide brief technical rationale for the importance of the responsibilities it defines. 
Satellite Disposal 
Section 3.6 identifies that the objective of satellite disposal is “to reduce the potential for 
spacecraft collisions and frequency interference, to mitigate the creation of additional space 
debris and to open orbital slots to newer [Satellite Vehicles].” Furthermore, the same paragraph 
emphasizes the need to ensure that “every satellite maintains its disposal capability.” The 
paragraph continues, “This includes assured [Telemetry, Tracking and Commanding] and 
sufficient fuel to reach the disposal region” (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009, p. 11). Therefore, while a 
de-orbit plan must be in place before launch, the spacecraft operator must be watchful of the 
onboard resources to identify any need for early disposal. For example, suppose that a CubeSat 
requires 10 grams of propellant to accomplish a de-orbit maneuver at End-of-Life (EOL). If an 
anomaly should persist which consumes propellant for station keeping or momentum dumping at 
a higher rate than designed, the CubeSat operator may need to cut the mission short when the 
propellant level reaches 10 grams. 
Of satellite safing, Section 3.6.3.2.1 requires, “the [Space Wings] will deplete all 
spacecraft fuel to the maximum extent possible, disable all spacecraft battery charging systems, 
stabilize the spacecraft in a neutral thermal flight mode (slow spin for most) and, when 
appropriate, disable transmitters.” The paragraph concludes claiming that “safing the satellite 
takes precedence over all other disposal actions” (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009, p. 13). 
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FCC Policies 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) plays an important role in the CubeSat 
community. Non-government CubeSats apply for frequency licenses with the FCC. Before 
granting a license to transmit, the FCC requires the submittal of an Orbital Debris Assessment 
Report (ODAR), as discussed in the section titled End-of-Life: De-orbit and Re-entry in Chapter 
VII of this document. Non-government CubeSats may work through the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and their respective spectrum 
manager to obtain a transmission license, and may or may not be held to the same orbital debris 
mitigation requirements as non-government CubeSats. 
The FCC published a Public Notice on March 15, 2013, titled “Guidance on Obtaining 
Licenses for Small Satellites.” In it, the FCC describes its policy for small satellites which present 
a non-zero probability of casualty due to debris that survives reentry. This policy is also discussed 
in greater detail in the section titled End-of-Life: De-orbit and Re-entry in Chapter VII. 
NASA STD 8719.14: Process for Limiting Orbital Debris 
NASA offers requirements for “limiting orbital debris generation” in NASA STD 
8819.14. This document discusses the requirements associated with the Orbital Debris 
Assessment Report (ODAR), which can satisfy a requirement to supply orbital debris 
documentation to the FCC (NASA-STD-8719.14A: Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, 2012). 
This topic is discussed in greater detail in the section titled End-of-Life: De-orbit and Re-entry, in 
Chapter VII.  
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IV. CONCEPTS IN SYSTEM SAFETY 
This chapter discusses various concepts in system safety as they apply to CubeSat 
propulsion systems, including the proper response to hazards, hazard severity assessment, fault 
tolerance requirements, and the use of inhibits to satisfy fault tolerance requirements. 
In order to frame the discussion, consider the definition for safety as given in the NASA 
System Safety Handbook, 
Safety is freedom from those conditions that can cause death, 
injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to the environment. In any given 
application, the specific scope of safety must be clearly defined 
by the stakeholders in terms of the entities to which it applies 
and the consequences against which it is assessed. For example, 
for non-reusable and/or non-recoverable systems, damage to or 
loss of equipment may be meaningful only insofar as it translates 
into degradation or loss of mission objectives. (NASA/SP-2010-
580, 2011) 
This study does not attempt to provide guidance relating to mission assurance for the 
CubeSat missions themselves. While mission assurance is an important goal for any CubeSat 
developers, this document discusses safety of CubeSats in relationship to personnel safety and 
mission assurance for the primary mission that hosts the CubeSats as secondary payloads. 
Proper Response to Hazards 
The Eastern / Western Range Safety Document EWR 127-1 has been superseded by 
AFSPCMAN 71-710, but Appendix 1B of that volume offers a useful discussion relating to the 
proper response to hazards. In section 1B.1.1.5 titled System Safety Precedence, the document 
offers a hierarchy describing how to address hazards, thus proposing a certain philosophy for a 
safety program. The document proposes that once a hazard has been identified, the engineer 
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should first seek ways to design for minimal risk. A potential hazard would ideally be removed 
completely (EWR 127-1 Range User Handbook, 1999). For each potential hazard that is allowed 
to exist, the designer should be ready to demonstrate that no feasible alternatives exist that would 
meet the mission requirements. 
In such a case, the designer should minimize the severity of that hazard. When the hazard 
cannot be removed, the designer should incorporate safety devices to reduce the probability of the 
hazards. The art of incorporating safety devices into a system design is discussed in further detail 
throughout this chapter. Finally, warning devices should be incorporated into the design, 
wherever possible, to alert operators or affected personnel of a growing danger. Safety procedures 
and training may also be necessary to adequately respond to hazardous situations (EWR 127-1 
Range User Handbook, 1999) 
Hazard Severity and Fault Tolerance 
When a potential hazard exists, the proper response is proportional to the severity of the 
hazard. A designer may permit less severe hazards to occur more frequently, or with fewer safety 
controls, while more severe hazards must be contained more fervently to protect personnel and 
property. AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1 Figure 3.2 defines four levels of hazard severity based on 
the potential consequences which include personnel illness/injury, equipment loss, and unit 
downtime. A portion of that figure is reproduced in Table 3 below, combined with some 
information from Vol. 3 Chapter 3. With respect to personnel injury and illness, a negligible 
hazard “will not result in injury or occupational illness,” a marginal hazard “may cause a minor 
injury or minor occupational illness,” a critical hazard “may cause injury or severe occupational 
illness,” and a catastrophic hazard “may cause death.” To supplement these qualifications for 
hazard severity pertaining to personnel injury and illness, the reader should visit Table 3 which 
includes qualifications for these hazard severities in terms of equipment loss and unit downtime 
(AFSCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1, 2004). 
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Table 3: Definition and implications of hazard severity (AFSCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1&3, 2004). 
Hazard Severity* Potential Consequences* Requirements** 
Category 
Personnel 
Illness / Injury 
Equipment Loss ($) Unit 
Downtime 
Inhibits 
Required 
Fault 
Tolerance 
I Catastrophic 
 
May cause death. > 1,000,000 > 4 Months 
3 Dual 
II Critical May cause severe 
injury or severe 
occupational illness. 
200,000 
to 
1,000,000 
2 Weeks 
to 
4 Months 
2 Single 
III Marginal May cause minor injury 
or minor occupational 
illness. 
10,000 
to 
200,000 
1 Day 
to 
2 Weeks 
1 No 
IV Negligible Will not result in injury 
or occupational illness. 
< 10,000 < 1 Day 
-- -- 
* Based on AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1 Figure 3.2 
** Based on AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Chapter 3. These requirements apply when a hazard is not explicitly dealt 
with in AFSPCMAN 91-710 
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As mentioned in Chapter III of this document, the Range Safety document AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 3 Chapter 3 offers guidance for containing hazards that are not specifically outlined 
in other chapters of the document. Specifically, the chapter provides guidance in identifying the 
fault tolerance that is required to contain hazards of various severity levels (AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3, 2004). This information is useful for determining a sufficient level of control for many 
hazards. 
As summarized in the right-hand columns of Table 3, AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 
Chapter 3 requires a specific level of fault tolerance for each level of hazard severity. 
 Marginal hazards require containment, but no-fault tolerance, 
 Critical hazards require single-fault tolerance, and 
 Catastrophic hazards require dual-fault tolerance (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 
2004). 
This document addresses the feasibility of hazards rather than the probability of hazards. 
However, for completeness, it is helpful to consider the maximum allowable probabilities 
permitted by Range Safety for a range of hazard severities. According to AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Volume 1 Figure 3.2, a catastrophic hazard can be permitted if the risk extremely permissible, 
defined by a probability of occurrence less than 8 x 10
-5
. A waiver from Range Safety would be 
required if the catastrophic hazard is a remote probability, defined by a probability of occurrence 
of between 8 x 10
-5
 and 8 x 10
-4
. A critical hazard may be permitted with a remote probability, but 
requires a waiver if the hazard could occur occasionally, defined by a probability between 8 x 10
-4
 
and 8 x 10
-3
. A marginal hazard may be permitted with occasional occurrence, but a waiver would 
be required for probabilities greater than 8 x 10
-3
 (AFSCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1, 2004). 
Non-Credible Hazards 
Some organizations that host CubeSat launches stress the advantages of a dual-fault 
tolerant design. When a CubeSat provider demonstrates that system contains a potential hazard 
with dual-fault tolerance, that hazard is categorized as non-credible. The severity of that non-
credible hazard becomes unimportant because a dual-fault tolerant design can adequately contain 
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even a catastrophic hazard. Therefore, the task of assessing the hazard severity can be 
circumvented, which may permit significant cost savings and schedule security for the mission. 
Inhibits 
The reader may notice that Table 3 associates levels of fault tolerance with a required 
number of inhibits. An inhibit is a device that removes the potential for a hazard to occur. The 
device would need to fail in order for the hazard to propagate until that device is legitimately 
controlled to allow the hazard to propagate. Two or more inhibits are independent if they function 
in series with one another and if they do not rely on a common control. In contrast, a dependent 
inhibit might operate in parallel with another inhibit or it may rely on a common control. 
Addition of a dependent inhibit does not improve fault tolerance since a single failure could 
compromise two inhibits. 
By definition, for any two independent inhibits, there cannot exist a single-point-of-
failure that would result in propagation of the hazard. Therefore, two independent inhibits are 
single-fault tolerant. Similarly, three independent inhibits are dual-fault tolerant. 
As discussed earlier, AFSPCMAN 91-710 Volume 1 Figure 3.2 defines allowable 
probabilities for hazards of varying severity. The failure rate of inhibits should be low enough 
such that the total probability of the hazard propagating through all inhibits lies within the 
allowable probability tolerances for that hazard severity. 
When an electrical system can cause a hazard upon power-up, CubeSat designers often 
use switches as inhibits because they can interrupt the power path to the hazardous component. 
For example, a CubeSat designer may place a separation between the power source and a 
marginally hazardous radio transmitter. When the CubeSat separates from the P-POD, the switch 
closes and allows electrical power to flow to the transmitter. Unless the separation switch fails 
prematurely, electrical power cannot reach the transmitter before separation. To obtain single-
fault tolerance, a CubeSat designer might include two separation switches in series. To obtain 
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dual-fault tolerance, a designer may add yet another switch in series that is controlled by a ground 
command, for example. As a side not, according to the CubeSat Design Specification (CDS) Rev. 
12 Requirement 2.4.3, many CubeSat transmitters would also require a time delay of at least 30 
minutes before transmission may occur (CubeSat Design Specification Rev. 12, 2009). 
Now consider a pressure system containing a hazardous propellant. Unlike hazardous 
electrical systems, here the potential for a hazard to propagate is not directly tied to the electrical 
power path. Suppose a propellant is chosen that would cause a critical hazard if it leaked. In such 
an example, the CubeSat designer would need to implement a single-fault tolerant design that 
prevents inadvertent leakage of the propellant. The designer might use two valves connected in 
series to interrupt propellant flow to the nozzle, as shown in Figure 5. 
If the two valves were both controlled by one onboard computer, the computer may 
introduce a single point of failure. In order for the inhibits to remain independent, their controls 
must be independent. To accomplish this, the example shown below uses a latch valve controlled 
by a separation switch and timer in series with the thruster valve that is controlled by the 
computer system. Similar measures would need to be taken to prevent leakage through the fill and 
drain valves. For a discussions pertaining to fill and drain valves, see the section titled 
Implementation in Chapter V. That section also discusses dual-seat valves. An example inhibit 
architectures is shown for each of the cases described in Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE 
STUDIES. 
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Figure 5: Example inhibit diagram for critically hazardous propellant. 
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V. RANGE SAFETY 
As discussed in Chapter II METHODOLOGY, Range Safety and Orbital Safety will be 
treated separately. Most of the safety standards that will be proposed fall into one of these two 
realms because the hazards are unique for the two distinct phases of each mission. This chapter 
focuses on Range Safety while Chapter VII ORBITAL SAFETY discusses Orbital Safety. 
The topic of Range Safety pertains to those hazards that are present during ground 
operations at the Range through integration, launch, and deployment of the CubeSats. After 
separation from the host vehicle, the CubeSat enters the realm of Orbital Safety which, again, is 
discussed in Chapter VII. 
The majority of this chapter revolves around the requirements given in the Range Safety 
document, AFSCPMAN 91-710 Volume 3, which is introduced in Chapter III. Many thanks are 
due to Kevin Case who is a Range Safety Engineer for the Western Range at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base in California. He possesses extensive first-hand experience with helping CubeSats 
providers to achieve the level of safety necessary for launch. Kevin graciously shared some of his 
knowledge and perspective with the author, which helped the author to better understand the 
intent of the Range Safety document. In this chapter, the author wishes relay those lessons to the 
reader in order to help the reader to understand the intent of the requirements given in 
AFSCPMAN 91-710 Volume 3. Additionally, the chapter discusses whether, and how, certain 
sections of the Range Safety document apply to CubeSat propulsion systems. 
Hazardous Material 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Chapter 10 applies to any system that contains materials that 
are either flammable, explosive, energetic, toxic, or otherwise hazardous, on their own or in 
interaction with other materials in the expected environments under the environmental conditions 
expected from ground operations through CubeSat deployment. 
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Proper handling of hazardous materials is especially important to CubeSat propulsion 
systems since many potential propellants can be classified as hazardous materials. Chemical 
propellants, for example, store large amounts of energy which may be released in an explosion. 
Some propellants are very toxic and must be handled with extreme caution if they are to be 
handled at all.  
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 10.1 requires that “the least flammable material shall 
be used” and “the least toxic material shall be used” (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). This 
speaks to the intent that the designer should attempt to eliminate hazards. However, when a 
hazard cannot be eliminated completely, there must be adequate justification for the hazard. For 
example, if a CubeSat developer wishes to use a toxic propellant, they must be prepared to make 
an argument for how that propellant is the least hazardous propellant that allows for completion 
of mission objectives. 
For every potentially hazardous material, the CubeSat provider should become intimately 
familiar with the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) or Safety Data Sheet (SDS). The vender 
that provides the material should be ready to supply that document which outlines information on 
flammability, explosion hazards, toxicity, transportation limitations, etc.  
Material Compatibility 
When considering the hazards associated with a material, one must consider the hazards 
that arise when that material interacts with its environment. Gallium, for example, is fairly benign 
to touch, but in contact with Aluminum, it can severely weaken the alloy. It is important to 
consider how a material may behave when exposed to each material present on the CubeSat, the 
P-POD, other auxiliary payloads, the primary payload, the launch vehicle, ground support 
equipment, and the ambient air or moisture. As a secondary payload, a CubeSat provider may not 
possess the clearance to know what materials are present during ground operations and launch. 
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The CubeSat provider must collaborate with their launch integrator, their launch provider, and 
with Range Safety to identify potential material incompatibilities. 
The CubeSat developer should also consider the impact that their design may have on the 
primary mission. Certain materials, for example, could contaminate critical hardware present on 
other CubeSats, on the launch vehicle, or on the primary payload. Spacecraft optics can be 
especially sensitive to contamination. 
Toxicity 
Toxicity represents a major concern for Range Safety. The CubeSat provider should 
seriously consider the risks associated with toxic materials since the loss of one precious human 
life would define a catastrophe. Materials may cause damage to the body in many different ways. 
To list some examples, a material may cause skin and eye burns on the surface, materials may be 
absorbed through the skin into the body, vapors may be inhaled, or a material may even be 
ingested. In some cases, a material may release a toxic gas when exposed to another contaminant. 
The CubeSat provider should study resources such as the MSDS or SDS before selecting any 
potentially toxic material. 
Transportation 
The CubeSat provider should be aware that certain materials require special shipping 
provision. In fact, some materials are forbidden from air travel or on the road. Since propellant 
must be loaded prior to integration to the P-POD, the propellant would then be transported 
together with the P-POD to the range. Any special provisions that are necessary drive up cost to 
the CubeSat, the integrator, and the launch provider. 
Containment of Hazardous Fluids 
Hazardous materials, especially propellants, are often stored in sealed containers or 
pressure vessels. The following section, titled Pressure Systems, discusses the requirements 
related to the containment of hazardous and non-hazardous fluids alike. 
43 
 
Spills and Vapor Monitoring 
When hazardous materials are used, provisions must be made to detect leakage before a 
hazardous situation exists. AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.2.1.5 states that “vapor 
monitoring equipment shall be used for leak (sniff) checks and general atmosphere monitoring to 
determine the necessity for [personal protective equipment]. Vapor monitoring equipment shall 
be approved by Range Safety and is subject to approval by Bioenvironmental Engineering” 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). 
Pressure Systems 
Many propulsion system designs use pressure systems to contain a propellant. Even low-
pressure propellant reservoirs that contain propellant at atmospheric pressure on the ground 
experience a pressure differential when they reach the vacuum of space. AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3 Chapter 12 lists criteria defining those pressure systems that Range Safety considers 
hazardous, shown in the excerpt below. Note, however, that pressure systems that do not meet 
these thresholds may still present hazards that must be contained. 
Hazardous flight hardware pressure systems are defined as 
follows: 
(1) flight systems containing hazardous fluids such as 
cryogens, flammables, combustibles, and toxics; 
(2) systems used to transfer hazardous fluids such as 
cryogens, flammables, combustibles, and hypergols; 
(3) systems with operating pressures that exceed 100 psig; 
(4) systems with stored energy levels exceeding 14,240 foot 
pounds; and 
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(5) systems that are identified by Range Safety as safety 
critical. This chapter establishes minimum design, fabricaton, 
installation, testing, inspection, certification, and data 
requirements for flight aerospace vehicle equipment (AVE) and 
pressurized structures. (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004) 
If the pressure system does not exceed the pressure and energy levels described above, 
Range Safety may not hold the Range User, the satellite provider, accountable for every 
requirement in Chapter 12. In such cases, the requirements given in Chapter 12 will be used as a 
baseline and tailored to the specific hazards that may exist. At a minimum, Range Safety would 
require adequate demonstration of the design safety factor (by analysis or test), hazards analysis 
documentation, and leak checks for assembled flight hardware (Case, Email Corresspondence, 
2013a). 
Pressure System Fault Tolerance 
Consistent with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Chapter 3, Section 12.2 calls for single-fault 
tolerance against critical hazards and dual-fault tolerance against catastrophic hazards 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Hazardous Pressure System Components 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.5.2 gives requirements for hazardous pressure 
system components. 
Pressure Vessel Verification 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Volume 3 treats pressure vessels specifically in Sections 12.1 
through 12.3, as summarized in Figure 6. The design, analysis, and test requirements depend on 
the required verification approach and path. Depending on the methods used to design the 
pressure vessel, the satellite provider may be required to follow Verification Approach A or B 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
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Verification Approach B applies to pressure vessels which are designed using ASME 
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code or the DOT Pressure Vessel Codes (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 
3, 2004). It is expected that most CubeSat pressure systems will follow Verification Approach A, 
so Verification Approach B will not be discussed in detail here. 
Verification Approach A branches into Path 1 and Path 2, depending on the failure mode 
of the vessel and whether the fluid contained is hazardous. If the pressure vessel exhibits a leak-
before-burst (LBB) failure mode and leakage cannot create a hazardous situation, then the 
satellite provider may choose between path 1, shown branching to the left in Figure 6, or path 2, 
shown branching to the right (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
 In this case, the Range User is also free to choose path 2, shown branching to the right in 
Figure 6. If the pressure vessel exhibits a brittle failure mode, then the Range User must adopt 
path 2, shown branching to the right in the figure below Figure 6. Additionally, if leakage of the 
contents creates a hazardous situation, regardless of the failure mode, the vessel must adopt path 
2 as well (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004).  
Figure 6 is taken from Figure 12.1 of AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3. It summarizes the 
possible paths, described in Chapter 12.2, that a satellite provider may follow in order to verify 
their pressure vessel or reservoir (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Failure Mode 
The pressure vessel’s failure mode may be characterized as either leak-before-burst 
(LBB), or brittle fracture. As the name implies, a LBB vessel will leak or vent its contents before 
bursting while a brittle fracture vessel will hold pressure until it reaches the burst pressure. 
Leaking Hazard 
If the pressure vessel exhibits a LBB failure mode, it is important to determine whether 
the leaked contents create a hazardous situation. Material toxicity plays a major role in this 
determination. It is important to develop a leak contingency plan, if applicable. 
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Figure 6: Pressure vessel verification approaches, taken from AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 
Figure 12.1 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
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Table 4: Applicability of AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Ch. 12 requirements for pressure vessels 
and sealed containers (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
 Section(s) of 91-710   Criteria for Applicability 
G
en
er
al
 12.1 
12.10 
12.5.2 
All systems containing a pressure system. Also see 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Attachment 1 for additional 
guidance in preparing the MSPSP. 
12.1.5.3.1 Systems containing a pressure vessel or reservoir. 
M
et
al
li
c 
V
es
se
l 
12.2.1 and 
12.3.1 
System contains a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir 
12.2.2, and 
12.3.2 
Verification Approach A 
Path 1 
 
 
System contains a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir that 
exhibits a LBB failure mode AND leakage of the contents 
cannot create a hazardous situation. 
 
Acceptable Alternative: 
Ch. 12.2.3 
Ch. 12.3.3 
12.2.3, and 
12.3.3 
Verification Approach A 
Path 2 
System contains a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir that 
exhibits a brittle failure mode OR where leakage of the 
contents could create a hazardous situation.  
12.2.4 
Verification Approach B 
System contains a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir 
designed using ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code or 
the DOT Pressure Vessel Codes. 
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
 V
es
se
l 
12.2.5, and 
12.2.8 
System contains a Composite Overwrapped Pressure 
Vessel (COPV). 
12.2.6 
Verification Approach A 
Path 1 
System contains a COPV that exhibits a LBB failure mode 
AND leakage of the contents cannot create a hazardous 
situation. 
12.2.7 
Verification Approach A 
Path 2 
System contains a COPV pressure vessel or reservoir that 
exhibits a brittle failure mode OR where leakage of the 
contents could create a hazardous situation.  
S
ea
le
d
 C
o
n
ta
in
er
s 12.4.6.1 
Modified Path 1 
System contains sealed container that exhibits a LBB 
failure mode AND leakage of the contents cannot create a 
hazardous situation. 
12.4.6.2 
12.2.3 
Path 2 
System contains a sealed container that exhibits a brittle 
failure mode OR where leakage of the contents could create 
a hazardous situation.  
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Verification Approaches 
Within Verification Approach A, the satellite provider may follow one of two paths, 
depending on the fluid contained and the failure mode of the vessel.  
Table 4 summarizes most of the applicable sections for pressure systems and pressure 
vessels, the following discussion summarizes the verification requirements for several types of 
metallic pressure vessels and reservoirs. The discussion leaves out Composite Overwrapped 
Pressure Vessels (COPV) and as well as vessels that qualify for Verification Approach B. Many 
aspects of this discussion are summarized in Figure 6 and in Table 5. 
Metallic Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 1 
Table 5 summarizes the verification requirements for metallic pressure vessels that meet 
the criteria for Approach A Path 1 because they exhibit a LBB failure mode and a leakage of the 
contents cannot create a hazardous situation. If the CubeSat provider chooses, they may follow 
Path 2 instead (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
The requirements begin with a demonstration of the failure mode in order to verify that 
the pressure vessel meets the criteria to follow Path 1. Among the other analysis and testing that 
is required at the design level, the satellite provider calculates Factor of Safety and determines the 
loads and environments that will exist throughout Range operations. When following Path 1, the 
CubeSat provider may use a conventional design methodology to calculate the Factor of Safety 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Qualification testing, which includes a burst test, subjects a dedicated pressure vessel to 
destructive test levels. In fact, the burst test always renders the test article unusable. According to 
Section 12.2.2.7, with approval, one-of-a-kind pressure vessels may choose to test their flight 
article at proto-qualification levels instead of dedicating a vessel to destructive qualification 
testing (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Acceptance test and inspection, which includes Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) and 
a proof test, are conducted at lower levels than either qualification testing or proto-qualification 
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testing. The tests and inspections are designed to identify any problems due to workmanship on 
the flight article (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Table 5: Verification requirements for metallic pressure vessels following Verification 
Approach A Path 1, as given in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, especially Section 12.2.2 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Phase Section(s) Verification Requirement(s) 
Design 
 
12.2.2.1-3 Demonstrate LBB failure mode (analytically 
or by test) 
12.2.2.4 Factor of Safety and proof factor by 
conventional design 
Minimum burst factor 1.5 
12.1.5.3.1 and 
12.1.5.3.2 
Stress Analysis 
12.2.2.5 and 
12.1.5.4 
Fatigue-Life Demonstration 
12.1.6 Loads and Environments Determination 
Qualification 12.2.2.6 General Qualification Requirements 
12.2.2.6.6.1 Random Vibration 
12.2.2.6.6.2 Pressure Testing (Burst) 
Proto-Qualification 
Alternative to Qual. 
(Needs Approval) 
12.2.2.9 and 
12.1.5.4 
Proof at 1.5 x MEOP and conventional 
fatigue analysis showing a minimum of 10 
design lifetimes. 
Acceptance 12.2.2.7 and 
12.1.17 
General Acceptance Requirements 
12.2.2.7.3.1, 
12.1.17.4-5, and 
12.1.18.3 
Nondestructive Inspection 
12.2.2.7.3.2 and 
12.1.17.6 
Proof Test 
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Metallic Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 2 
Table 6 summarizes the verification requirements for metallic pressure vessels that meet 
the criteria for Approach A Path 2 because they exhibit a brittle failure mode or a leakage of the 
contents could create a hazardous situation. While the CubeSat provider may choose to follow 
Path 2 when they qualify for Path 1, they may not follow Path 1 in place of Path 2 unless they 
meet the requirements of Path 1 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Many aspects of Path 2 are similar to Path 1. In some cases, the required analysis 
methods differ. On other cases the parameters of the analyses or tests differ. 
For Path 2, there is no need to verify the failure mode because the CubeSat provider may 
choose follow Path 2 regardless of the failure mode. For this reason, a CubeSat provider may 
choose to follow Path 2 if they decide that the cost of determining the failure mode is not worth 
the benefits of following Path 1. Among the other analysis and testing that is required at the 
design level, the satellite provider calculates Factor of Safety and determines the loads and 
environments that will exist throughout Range operations. When following Path 2, the CubeSat 
provider must use the safe-life design methodology to calculate the Factor of Safety 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Qualification testing, which includes a burst test, subjects a dedicated pressure vessel to 
destructive levels. In fact, the burst test always renders the test article unusable. According to 
Section 12.2.3.6, one-of-a-kind pressure vessels may choose to test their flight article at proto-
qualification levels instead of dedicating a vessel to destructive qualification testing 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Acceptance test and inspection, which includes Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) and 
a proof test, are conducted at lower levels than either qualification testing or proto-qualification 
testing. The tests and inspections are designed to identify any problems due to workmanship on 
the flight article (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
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While section 12.2.3.1 calls for a Burst Factor no less than 1.5, CubeSat pressure vessels 
that meet the criteria for Path 2 are also subject to a requirement given in AFPSCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.8 which requires a safety factor of 2 during transport or ground handling 
operations. Since CubeSats cannot load propellant on the pad, this requirement applies to all 
CubeSat pressure vessels that exhibit brittle failure or contain a hazardous fluid (AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). 
Table 6: Verification requirements for metallic pressure vessels following Verification 
Approach A Path 2, as given in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, especially Section 12.2.3 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Phase Section(s) Verification Requirement(s) 
Design 12.2.3.1 
 
 
Vol. 6 11.5.1.3.8 
Safe-life design methodology used to 
establish the factor of safety and proof 
factor.  
 
Burst Safety Factor of 2 required during 
transport of ground handling operations. 
12.2.3.2 and 
12.1.15 
Safe-Life Demonstration 
12.1.5.3.1 and 
12.1.5.3.2 
Stress Analysis 
12.1.6 Loads and Environments Determination 
Qualification 
(Same as Path 1) 
12.2.2.6 
per 12.2.3.3 
General Qualification Requirements 
12.2.2.6.6.1 Random Vibration 
12.2.2.6.6.2 Pressure Testing (Burst) 
Proto-Qualification 
Alternative to Qual. 
(Needs Approval) 
 
12.2.3.6 and 
12.1.5.4 
Proof at 1.5 x MEOP and conventional 
fatigue analysis showing a minimum of 10 
design lifetimes. 
Acceptance 12.2.3.4 
Based on Path 1: 
12.2.2.7 
General Acceptance Requirements 
Nondestructive Inspection 
Proof Test 
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Sealed Container Non-Hazardous LBB 
Some low-pressure propellant reservoirs may be more accurately treated as sealed 
containers rather than pressure vessels. AFSPCMAN 91-710’s requirements, which pertain to 
sealed containers, are intended to catch pressurized or sealed components which are not strictly 
pressure vessels. For example, components such as battery cases and electrical boxes may be 
considered sealed containers. However, when the propellant can be stored at a low enough 
pressure, Range Safety might treat propellant reservoirs more like sealed containers than pressure 
vessels (Case, Case Study Meeting, 2013b). 
As outlined in AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.4.6.1, and summarized in Table 7, 
if a reservoir may be classified as a sealed container and exhibits a LBB failure mode where 
leakage of the contents cannot create a hazardous situation, the satellite provider may enjoy 
reduced verification requirements compared with the verification requirements for LBB non-
hazardous pressure vessels (Path 1). On the other hand, according to AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 
Section 12.4.6.2.1, a sealed container exhibiting a brittle fracture failure mode or containing a 
hazardous fluid, is required to follow the verification requirements of Section 12.2.3 for Path 2 
pressure vessels. Therefore, the verification requirements are only lightened for LBB non-
hazardous sealed containers (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
The section of Chapter VI titled Case 7: Electrospray, Gallium offers an example of a 
propellant reservoir which may be treated as a sealed container. In this example, however, the 
propellant is hazardous so the container would still be held to the requirements of a pressure 
vessel which contains a hazardous propellant. 
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Table 7: Verification requirements for Sealed Containers following Verification Approach A 
Path 1, as given in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, especially Section 12.4.6.1 (AFSPCMAN 91-
710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Phase Section(s) Verification Requirement(s) 
Design 12.2.2.1-3 
(Required by 12.4.6.1) 
Demonstrate LBB failure mode (analytically 
or by test). See possible exception described 
in 12.4.6.1.  
12.4.6.1.1 Minimum burst factor 1.5 
Qualification 12.4.6.1.2.1 Pressure testing 
Acceptance 12.4.6.1.3 Proof-pressure test to a minimum level of 
1.25 x maximum design pressure differential 
or MAWP 
Recertification and Refurbishment 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.4.4.1 discusses requirements for periodic 
recertification of components, such as hoses for example, during ground operations 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Similar requirements appear in Vol. 3 Section 12.1.18.4, 
12.2.2.8, and 12.2.3.5 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). Access to the CubeSat is impossible 
after integration. CubeSat designers would need to work with Range Safety to arrive at an 
acceptable level of safety. If, however, a CubeSat were to use components that had been stored 
for long periods of time prior to integration, they may need to consult these requirements. 
Implementation 
Depending on the propellant, some propulsion systems may require as many as three 
independent inhibits which prevent fluid from leaking. This could affect the mass budget for the 
CubeSat, however, there are some compact ways to implement multiple inhibits. Chapter VI 
RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES contains many examples of propulsion system architectures. 
The reader is encouraged to explore each case that is discussed. 
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Structural Failure Not Considered Single Point of Failure 
First, it is important to note, according to AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 11.2.1.3.2, 
that “structural failure of tubing, piping, or pressure vessels is not to be considered single failure” 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A properly designed pressure vessel can sufficiently contain 
a hazardous fluid. The ports, however, may require multiple independent inhibits, such as valve 
seals, to keep the propellant from leaking. 
Dual Seat Valves 
A dual seat valve can provide two independent inhibits by impeding fluid flow across two 
independent seals. While one control would be used to open both seals, that control could be 
sufficiently protected by a dual-fault tolerant circuit that prevents electrical power from reaching 
the actuator. The designer should be careful that the materials used allow for a good seal for both 
seats in the expected environmental extremes. For example, the developer should ensure that 
thermal expansion of one seal could not prevent the second seal from closing.  
Poppet and Cap Fill/Drain Interfaces 
In the fill / drain port, a designer may use a poppet and cap system to provide two 
independent inhibits. The poppet provides one seal to prevent fluid from flowing. If the cap is 
sealed, it can provide the second seal. During propellant loading operations, however, the cap is 
removed. Depending on the material, personnel may be required to wear Self Contained 
Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) suits during propellant loading operations. 
Omitted Sections from AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Certain requirements given in AFSPCMAN 91-710 do not apply to CubeSat propulsion 
systems. For example, AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.1.10.5 discusses requirements for 
vent lines for flammable and combustible vapors (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). CubeSats, 
however would not be allowed to vent. Neither could a vent line be run from the CubeSat without 
a P-POD redesign. 
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Other sections require access to the pressure system during ground operations. This, 
again, is not possible without a P-POD redesign. This may rule out hypergolic systems and very 
likely rules out cryogenic systems. 
It would be a challenging to prepare a CubeSat to fly with a monopropellant system. 
Hypergolic systems are a step farther than monopropellant systems in every hazard category. 
Cryogenic systems require a significant amount of maintenance that is not possible within the 
CubeSat specification. Cal Poly does not wish to limit progress in the CubeSat community. If a 
CubeSat developer believes they can find ways to safely implement hyperbolic or cryogenic 
systems, they should contact Cal Poly. For reference, Table 8 lists the sections of AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 3 which pertain to hypergolic and cryogenic systems. 
Table 8: Applicability of AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 requirements for some specific pressure 
system types (system level) (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
Section(s) Criteria for Applicability 
12.8 
12.5.2 
Hypergolic propellant systems 
12.9 
12.5.2 
Cryogenic systems 
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VI. RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES 
This section presents a collection of hypothetical top-level CubeSat Propulsion system 
designs. Each design has been evaluated, ad hoc, with support from Range Safety, to determine 
an acceptable path toward qualification. None of the designs are intended to be complete, ideal, 
nor are they guaranteed to be feasible. The designs are hypothetical pathfinders intended to help 
CubeSat developers grasp how their particular system may be treated until their specific design 
can be reviewed by Range Safety. The systems are based on the spectrum of designs the author 
would expect to see in a CubeSat developer’s trade space. 
If it were possible, one would prefer to draw a line between hazardous systems and non-
hazardous systems. However, the complexity and diversity of space hardware and propulsion 
systems prevent such a distinction from being drawn definitively. AFSPCMAN 91-710 
distinguishes between hazardous and non-hazardous materials, but there is no clear line drawn 
between the two. Neither is there a clear cut quantity at which materials become hazardous. Each 
design and each environment brings unique nuances and effective interpretation of safety 
requirements requires technical experience. That is why the hypothetical designs in this study 
were presented to Range Safety. Range Safety Engineer Kevin Case, who currently provides 
Range Safety support for CubeSat missions flying from the Western Range, reviewed each design 
and gave initial recommendations based on his expertise. 
Each design serves as a pathfinder. While each case cannot be taken as a template, they 
will help the CubeSat developer to estimate the approximate level of analysis and testing they 
will need to conduct and the number of inhibits their system may need to include. Rationale is 
given throughout the discussions so that the reader can better predict how their particular system 
may be regarded by Range Safety. 
After reading this discussion, the CubeSat developer should be better prepared to 
estimate the magnitude of work required to qualify their propulsion system. From there the 
CubeSat developer can better estimate the cost of their system. The developer will also 
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understand the path to qualification and where to begin. This discussion should help the CubeSat 
developer to better navigate their trade space by providing a substantive estimate of the work 
required to qualify competing propulsive designs. Many topics of this study also apply for non-
propulsive designs. For example, a CubeSat developer will benefit from reading this discussion if 
their system contains a pressure vessel or hazardous materials. 
The toxicology and other hazardous qualities that are discussed in this document should 
help to alert the reader to certain hazards. However, this document is not an adequate substitute to 
the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) or the Safety Data Sheets (SDS). Those documents must 
be studies before work with these materials can begin. In no way is this discussion intended to be 
a complete guide to the hazards associated with these hypothetical systems. 
Table 9: Summary of Hypothetical Cases. 
Propulsion Type Propellant Comments Case # 
Monopropellant 
Hydrazine Very hazardous 
propellant 
1 
Hydrogen Peroxide Hazardous propellant 2 
AF-M315E (Liquid HAN 
Solution) 
“Green” propellant 3 
Cold Gas Gaseous Nitrogen Inert propellant, low Isp 4 
Resistojet R-134a Two-phase propellant 
allows for dense 
propellant storage at low 
pressures. 
5 
Electrospray 
Ionic Fluid 
such as EMI-BF4 
Porous fluid containment 
system 
6 
Liquid Metal Gallium Gallium is very corrosive 
to Aluminum. 
7 
Ion Thruster Xenon Inert propellant, high Isp 8 
Pulsed Plasma Thruster 
(PPT) 
Teflon Inert solid propellant 9 
 
58 
 
Summary of Cases 
Table 9 summarizes each case that will be discussed. Clearly this list is not all-inclusive. 
However, the CubeSat developer should be able to sample the concerns that are discussed in each 
case in order to predict how their system will be treated by Range Safety. The case study 
originally included multiple propellant quantities for the monopropellant options. However, more 
research would be needed to demonstrate a decrease in hazard severity with lower propellant 
quantities. Since no distinction could be made between large amounts of propellant, the various 
propellant masses were consolidated into one. 
For each case the hazards associated with that hypothetical system are discussed. The 
hazard severity and fault tolerance requirement is estimated according to the criteria discussed in 
the section titled Hazard Severity and Fault Tolerance in Chapter IV of this document. In 
response to the fault tolerance requirements, inhibits are proposed according to the guidelines 
discussed in the section titled Inhibits in Chapter IV of this document. The sections described 
above repeatedly reference AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1 and Vol. 3. The Range Safety 
requirements, as discussed in Chapter V of this document, are applied to each system, with an 
emphasis on determining the pressure system verification requirements. 
Case 1: Monopropellant, Hydrazine 
A monopropellant propulsion system operates by exposing a liquid propellant to a 
catalyst bed. The catalyst bed supports rapid exothermic decomposition which produces a high 
pressure gas. The gas is expanded and accelerated through a nozzle and propelled away from the 
spacecraft. The momentum exchange from acceleration of the exhaust results in thrust. 
Monopropellant systems generate a significant amount of interest due to their promise of 
relatively high Isp compared with some other micropropulsion options. While monopropellant 
systems do not offer the same mass efficiency as bipropellant systems, they are free from many 
risks associated with hypergolic and cryogenic propellants. Monopropellant systems are also less 
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complex compared with bipropellant systems. Still, they harbor many potential hazards that must 
be addressed. 
This hypothetical monopropellant propulsion system uses an Iridium catalyst bed to 
decompose hydrazine (N2H4) propellant. The Iridium catalyst bed will decompose the hydrazine 
propellant at room temperature (Sutton & Biblarz, 2010, p. 259). The resulting exhaust gas is 
accelerated through a nozzle to create thrust. Aerojet markets such a system (Aerojet Rocketdyne, 
2013). 
Hazard overview 
Hydrazine is known as a very hazardous material. According to the Material Safety Data 
Sheet (MSDS), “severe over-exposure can result in death.” Hydrazine is a very hazardous irritant 
in cases of skin contact and very hazardous to ingest. It can also cause corrosion upon skin 
contact and irritation upon eye contact. Hydrazine can be hazardous upon inhalation and it “may 
react violently with water to emit toxic gases.” Hydrazine can permeate the skin (Hydrazine 
MSDS, 2013). 
Hydrazine can participate in very energetic reactions. This is one quality that makes it an 
excellent monopropellant and bipropellant. However, the performance comes with very serious 
potential hazards. According to the MSDS, hydrazine is “extremely explosive in presence of 
oxidizing materials” and “highly explosive in presence of metals” (Hydrazine MSDS, 2013). 
Table 11 summarizes the hazards for this case. Hydrazine is very toxic and capable of 
participating in energetic reactions. Either of these hazards may cause death, or significantly 
impact the mission timeline. Therefore, hydrazine must be contained with dual-fault tolerance to 
protect against a catastrophic hazard. 
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Table 10: Monopropellant Hydrazine Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Monopropellant 
Propellant: Hydrazine (N2H4) 
Propellant Mass: 1 kg 
Ignition Method: Iridium Catalyst Bed 
MEOP: 200 psig 
Pressurization: Single-tank blow-down 
Propellant Storage:  Metallic Pressure Vessel 
 
 
Figure 7: Monopropellant Hydrazine Case, Hypothetical System Schematic. 
 
Table 11: Monopropellant Hydrazine Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
Toxic Propellant Exposure Catastrophic May cause death 
Toxic Plume Exposure Potentially Catastrophic May cause death 
Energetic Plume Potentially Catastrophic May cause death or serious 
damage to critical hardware  
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Inhibits 
Table 12: Hydrazine Monopropellant Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
Toxic Propellant Exposure through Fill / 
Drain Valve 
1. Latch Valve 
2. Valve with Poppet Seal 
3.  Cap 
Toxic Exposure through Nozzle 1. Dual seat valve (seal #1) 
2. Dual seat valve (seal #2) 
3. Thruster valve 
~ Some decomposition at catalyst bed 
Energetic Plume 1. Dual seat valve (seal #1) 
2. Dual seat valve (seal #2) 
3. Thruster valve 
 
During processing at the range, hydrazine leak detection sensors will likely be used. 
However, it is important to understand that after integration to the P-POD and certainly after P-
POD integration to the launch vehicle, the CubeSat provider will not have access to their 
spacecraft in order to stop a leak. If a leak were to occur it is likely that the CubeSat would be de-
integrated, resulting in a significant impact to the mission. 
Fill / Drain Connection 
The Fill / Drain port uses three inhibits to prevent propellant leakage; 1) one latch valve, 
2) one Fill / Drain valve with a poppet, and 3) the sealing cap which fits over the Fill / Drain 
valve. These three seals protect personnel during most operations. During propellant loading 
operations, however, the cap is removed. For this reason, all personnel must wear Self Contained 
Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) suits during propellant loading operations. 
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Propellant Leakage through the Nozzle 
Propellant is prevented from leaking through the nozzle by three inhibits. The Dual Seat 
Latch valve provides two independent inhibits by impeding fluid flow across two independent 
seals. While one control would be used to open both seals, that control is sufficiently protected by 
a dual-fault tolerant circuit that prevents electrical power from reaching the actuator. The third 
inhibit is a single-seat Thruster Valve that is normally used to control the thruster during 
operations. The catalyst bed offers a fourth “soft” inhibit which would decrease the severity of 
toxic exposure in the case that propellant reaches the nozzle. 
The CubeSat developer may wish to save resources or complexity by removing a valve 
seal between the pressure vessel and the nozzle by counting the catalyst bed as an inhibit which 
prevents the hazardous propellant from leaking through the nozzle. This scenario is equivalent to 
a premature firing. The developer in that case must convince Range Safety that the catalyst 
operates efficiently enough such that a feasible amount of exhaust would not contain catastrophic 
concentrations of unreacted propellant or any toxic products of reaction. Furthermore, the 
developer would need to demonstrate that the maximum feasible amount of energy released 
during the decomposition reaction could not cause a catastrophic situation. (Case, Case Study 
Meeting, 2013b) 
If any propellant exists between the catalyst bed and the Thruster Valve, or between the 
Thruster Valve and the Latch Valve, the quantity would not likely present a catastrophic hazard in 
the event of leakage. Capillary forces should keep the propellant from leaking and the catalyst 
would help to passivate some of the propellant (Case, Case Study Meeting, 2013b). 
Premature Firing 
Premature firing may cause a catastrophic hazard by inducing a fire, explosion, etc. In 
this study, we assume that is the case. Even with the catalyst aiding decomposition, the propellant 
may not decompose completely and some of the hazardous propellant may remain in the exhaust. 
63 
 
As with propellant leakage, premature firing is inhibited by the Dual Seat Latch Valve and the 
Thruster Valve. 
The CubeSat developer may be able to demonstrate that the energy released during the 
worst-case feasible premature firing could not cause death or significantly impact the primary 
mission. If that were the case, the CubeSat developer could protect against premature firing with 
only single-fault tolerance. 
Pressure Vessel Requirements 
The metallic pressure vessel would be subject to a burst safety factor of 2 according to 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.8 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Regardless 
of the failure mode of the pressure vessel, it would be subject to Verification Approach A, Path 2 
due to the hazardous nature of the propellant. This verification approach is described in the 
discussion titled Metallic Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 2 in Chapter V. In 
summary, the CubeSat provider would be subject to stress analysis, a Fracture Mechanics Safe-
Life Demonstration (analysis or test), a Loads and Environments Determination (AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
To summarize the testing requirements, the flight model would be subject to 
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and a proof test at a level determined by Fracture Mechanics 
Safe-Life analysis with a minimum of 1.25 x MEOP (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A 
qualification model would undergo 
 Random vibration testing at qualification levels, 
 Cycle tests at qualification levels, 
 Burst test, and 
 Nondestructive Examination (NDE). 
Case 2: Monopropellant, Hydrogen Peroxide 
This monopropellant propulsion system uses a catalyst bed to decompose hydrogen 
peroxide (H2O2). The resulting exhaust gas is accelerated through a nozzle to generate thrust. 
Hydrogen peroxide is sometimes regarded as a “green” propellant because it carries less hazard 
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compared to propellants such as hydrazine. However, hydrogen peroxide does present some 
serious hazards that must be addressed. The next case, Case 3, will discuss another “green” 
propellant which carries less hazard than hydrogen peroxide. 
Case 2 resembles the monopropellant hydrazine system in Case 1 in many ways. 
However, some scenarios which are catastrophic for hydrazine become critical for hydrogen 
peroxide. This decrease in hazard severity generally allows for the elimination of one inhibit for 
each leakage mode. Hydrogen peroxide does present a new hazard of decomposition and thermal 
runaway during storage. 
Hazard Overview 
 “Concentrated hydrogen peroxide causes severe burns when in contact with human skin 
and may ignite and cause fires when in contact with wood, oils, and many other organic 
materials” (Sutton & Biblarz, 2010, p. 258). Under high concentrations, hydrogen peroxide 
constitutes at least a critical hazard due to its toxicity which requires a single-fault tolerant design 
to prevent leakage of the propellant. The energy that would be released during a premature firing 
could constitute a critical hazard, depending on the potential for energy release. 
Hydrogen peroxide is instable in storage, able to decompose with many contaminants 
acting as a catalyst. Care must be taken to avoid reaching temperatures near 448 K where 
hydrogen peroxide may explode (Sutton & Biblarz, 2010). Thermal runaway due to 
decomposition could cause serious pressure buildup. A pressure vessel burst could constitute a 
catastrophic hazard. 
The material’s instability during storage may present a significant risk for CubeSat 
propulsion systems which must remain inside the P-POD for extended periods of time before 
launch. In fact, a CubeSat may be required to sustain extended storage when a launch is 
postponed due to launch vehicle failures on other missions, a missed launch window, etc. 
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Table 13: Monopropellant Hydrogen Peroxide Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Monopropellant 
Propellant: Hydrogen Peroxide (H2O2) 
Propellant Mass: 1 kg 
Ignition Method: Catalyst Bed 
MEOP: 350 psig (Green Propellant Rockets, n.d.) 
Pressurization: Single-tank blow-down 
Propellant Storage:  Metallic Pressure Vessel 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Monopropellant Hydrogen Peroxide Case, Hypothetical System Schematic. 
Table 14: Monopropellant Hydrogen Peroxide Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
Toxic Propellant Exposure Critical Severe burns 
Energetic Plume Critical or Marginal 
(Potentially Catastrophic) 
Injury / Damage to Launch 
Vehicle 
Thermal Runaway 
Decomposition and Burst 
Critical or Catastrophic May cause death or impact 
mission significantly, 
depending on energy release 
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Inhibits 
Table 15: Monopropellant Hydrogen Peroxide Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
Toxic Propellant Exposure through Fill / 
Drain Valve 
1. Valve with Poppet Seal 
2. Cap 
Toxic Exposure through Nozzle 1. Latch valve 
2. Thruster valve 
~ Some decomposition at catalyst bed 
(May not be needed, but improves safety) 
Energetic Plume 1. Latch valve 
2. Thruster valve 
 
Fill / Drain Connection 
The Fill / Drain port uses two inhibits to prevent propellant leakage; 1) one Fill / Drain 
valve with a poppet, and 2) the sealing cap which fits over the Fill / Drain valve. These two seals 
protect personnel during most operations. During propellant loading operations, however, the cap 
is removed. For this reason, all personnel must wear Self Contained Atmospheric Protective 
Ensemble (SCAPE) suits during propellant loading operations. 
Propellant Leakage through the Nozzle 
Propellant is prevented from leaking through the nozzle by two inhibits and one “soft” 
inhibit. The Latch Valve provides one inhibit by impeding fluid flow across its seal. The Thruster 
Valve that is normally used to control the thruster during operations provides the second inhibit. 
The catalyst bed offers a third “soft” inhibit which would decrease the severity of toxic exposure 
in the case that propellant reaches the nozzle. 
The CubeSat developer may wish to save resources or complexity by removing one of the 
valves between the pressure vessel and the nozzle by counting the catalyst bed as an inhibit which 
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prevents the hazardous propellant from leaking through the nozzle. This scenario is equivalent to 
a premature firing. The developer in that case must convince Range Safety that the catalyst 
operates efficiently enough such that a feasible amount of exhaust would not contain critical 
concentrations of unreacted propellant or any toxic products of reaction. Furthermore, the 
developer would need to demonstrate that the maximum feasible amount of energy released 
during the decomposition reaction could not cause a critical situation. (Case, Case Study Meeting, 
2013b) 
If any propellant exists between the catalyst bed and the Thruster Valve, or between the 
Thruster Valve and the Latch Valve, the quantity would not likely present a critical hazard in the 
event of leakage. Capillary forces should keep the propellant from leaking and the catalyst would 
help to passivate some of the propellant (Case, Case Study Meeting, 2013b). 
Premature Firing 
Premature firing may cause a catastrophic hazard by inducing a fire, explosion, etc. 
Additionally, even with the catalyst aiding decomposition, the propellant may not decompose 
completely and some of the hazardous propellant may remain in the exhaust. Furthermore, the 
exhaust fumes themselves may present a hazard. As with propellant leakage, premature firing is 
inhibited by the Latch Valve and the Thruster Valve. 
Pressure Vessel Requirements 
The metallic pressure vessel would be subject to a burst safety factor of 2 according to 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.8 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Regardless 
of the failure mode of the pressure vessel, it would be subject to Verification Approach A, Path 2 
due to the hazardous nature of the propellant. This verification approach is described in the 
discussion titled Metallic Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 2 in Chapter V. In 
summary, the CubeSat provider would be subject to stress analysis, a Fracture Mechanics Safe-
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Life Demonstration (analysis or test), a Loads and Environments Determination (AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
To summarize the testing requirements, the flight model would be subject to 
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and a proof test at a level determined by Fracture Mechanics 
Safe-Life analysis with a minimum of 1.25 x MEOP (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A 
qualification model would undergo 
 Random vibration testing at qualification levels, 
 Cycle tests at qualification levels, 
 Burst test, and 
 Nondestructive Examination (NDE). 
Thermal runaway and gradual decomposition must be taken into consideration in the 
design of the pressure system. There may be a pressure at which the propellant will no longer 
decompose during storage. This maximum feasible pressure should be used as the Maximum 
Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP) for the vessel to ensure that decomposition during storage 
cannot cause the tank to burst, potentially creating a catastrophic hazard. Such analysis was not 
done in this simple case study, but should be addressed by any developer who wishes to 
implement a hydrogen peroxide monopropellant system. 
Case 3: Monopropellant, AF-M315E (Aqueous HAN Solution) 
This monopropellant propulsion system uses a catalyst bed to decompose AF-M315E. 
The resulting exhaust gas is accelerated through a nozzle to create thrust. Aerojet markets such 
systems (Aerojet Rocketdyne, 2013). AF-315E is an aqueous solution of hydroxyl ammonium 
nitrate (HAN), developed by Aerojet (Miket, 2013). The propellant is marketed as a “green” 
propellant which lends itself as a monopropellant. 
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Table 16: Monopropellant AF-315E Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Monopropellant 
Propellant: AF-315E (Aqueous HAN) 
Propellant Mass: 1 kg 
Ignition Method: Catalyst Bed 
MEOP: Unknown 
Pressurization: Single-tank blow-down 
Propellant Storage:  Metallic Pressure Vessel 
Vessel Failure Mode:  Leak-before-burst (LBB) 
 
 
Figure 9: Monopropellant AF-315E Case, Hypothetical System Schematic. 
Table 17: Monopropellant AF-315E Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
Toxic Propellant Exposure Marginal Severe burns 
Energetic Plume Critical or Marginal 
(Potentially Catastrophic) 
Injury / Damage to Launch 
Vehicle 
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Hazard Overview 
Largely, AF-315E is safe in comparison with hydrogen peroxide, and especially 
hydrazine. Dermal exposure can cause irritation or a rash in the form of dermatitis, but the 
material can be washed off. As long as the propellant remains as an aqueous solution, there is no 
inhalation hazard. The vapor pressure of the water greatly diminishes the vapor pressure of the 
HAN. If the material leaks, it can simply be mopped up. When dried out of solution, HAN exists 
as a salt and has no vapor pressure. Toxic poising can occur if the material is ingested, which may 
lead to vomiting. Any CubeSat developer considering the use of AF-M316E as a propellant 
should research the material further to identify, for example, whether the decomposition materials 
pose any risk (Case, Case Study Meeting, 2013b). 
The risk of poisoning due to ingestion can be avoided with sufficient training of 
personnel. All other hazards related to toxicity that are known to the author are marginal hazards. 
Inhibits 
Table 18: Monopropellant AF-315E Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
Toxic Propellant Exposure through Fill / 
Drain Valve 
1. Valve with Poppet Seal 
2. Cap 
Toxic Exposure through Nozzle 1. Latch valve 
2. Thruster valve 
~ Some decomposition at catalyst bed 
(May not be needed, but improves safety) 
Energetic Plume 1. Latch valve 
2. Thruster valve 
Fill / Drain Connection 
While only one inhibit may be needed to contain the marginal hazard, the Fill / Drain port 
naturally uses two inhibits to prevent propellant leakage; 1) one fill valve with a poppet, and 2) 
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the sealing cap which fits over the fill valve. These two seals protect personnel during most 
operations. 
Propellant Leakage through the Nozzle 
Propellant is prevented from leaking through the nozzle by two inhibits and one “soft” 
inhibit. The Latch Valve provides one inhibit by impeding fluid flow across its seal. The Thruster 
Valve that is normally used to control the thruster during operations provides the second inhibit. 
The catalyst bed offers a third “soft” inhibit which would decrease the severity of toxic exposure 
in the case that propellant reaches the nozzle. 
The CubeSat developer may wish to save resources or complexity by removing one of the 
valves between the pressure vessel and the nozzle by counting the catalyst bed as an inhibit which 
prevents the hazardous propellant from leaking through the nozzle. This scenario is equivalent to 
a premature firing. The developer in that case must convince Range Safety that any feasible 
amount of exhaust would not contain critical concentrations toxic products of reaction. 
Furthermore, the developer would need to demonstrate that the maximum feasible amount of 
energy released during the decomposition reaction could not cause a critical situation. (Case, 
Case Study Meeting, 2013b) 
Premature Firing 
Premature firing may cause a catastrophic hazard by inducing a fire, explosion, etc. The 
CubeSat developer would need to prove that the energy released during the worst-case feasible 
premature firing could not cause death or significantly impact the primary mission. In this study, 
we assume that is the case and treat premature firing as a critical hazard. As with propellant 
leakage, premature firing is inhibited by the Latch Valve and the Thruster Valve. 
Pressure Vessel Requirements 
The metallic pressure vessel would be subject to a burst safety factor of 1.5 according to 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.9 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Since 
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leakage of the propellant would not create a hazardous situation and the failure mode of the 
pressure vessel is Leak-before-burst (LBB), the pressure vessel is subject to Verification 
Approach A, Path 1. This verification approach is described in the discussion titled Metallic 
Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 1 in Chapter V. The CubeSat developer would 
need to demonstrate the failure mode analytically or by test. If the failure mode turns out to be 
Brittle Fracture, then the developer would need to satisfy Verification Approach A, Path 2 instead 
and achieve a burst safety factor of 2. 
In summary, under Path 1, the CubeSat provider would be subject to stress analysis, a 
Fatigue-Life Demonstration, and a Loads and Environments Determination (AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3, 2004). 
To summarize the testing requirements, the flight model would be subject to 
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and a proof test at a level dependent of the Burst Factor 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A qualification model would undergo 
 Random vibration testing at qualification levels, 
 Burst test, and 
 Nondestructive Examination (NDE). 
Case 4: Cold Gas, Nitrogen 
Compared with monopropellant thrusters, cold gas thrusters do not rely on the release of 
chemical energy. Rather, cold gas thrusters rely solely on the release of stored physical energy. 
For this reason, cold gas propellants are often inert gases stored at very high pressures. 
This cold gas propulsion system accelerates pressurized gaseous Nitrogen (N2) through a 
nozzle to generate thrust. At the quantities used on a CubeSat, gaseous Nitrogen is non-toxic. The 
pressure vessel stores the propellant under 5,000 psia in a 1U volume of 1 Liter. The pressure 
level is comparable to the range of pressures given in Rocket Propulsion Elements (Sutton & 
Biblarz, 2010, p. 266). Assuming a temperature of 20 °C and using the ideal gas law, this would 
73 
 
correspond to approximately 0.4 kg of stored diatomic Nitrogen gas. The metallic pressure vessel 
in this hypothetical system is assumed to have a Leak-before-burst (LBB) failure mode. 
Hazard Overview 
For cold gas thrusters the primary hazard is generally the high pressure contained by the 
pressure system. The requirements to contain this hazard are very well defined by AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol.3 Ch. 12. 
While gaseous Nitrogen is not toxic in the quantities that would be present in a CubeSat 
system, it can displace oxygen in the air (Case, Case Study Meeting, 2013b). If all of the 0.4 kg of 
Nitrogen propellant were to be released at once, it could fill a volume of approximately 1/3 m
3
 at 
standard atmospheric conditions. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that the storage and 
work areas are adequately ventilated to prevent asphyxiation in case a leak occurs. As long as the 
hazard is dealt with appropriately, this hazard should not be a major deterrence.  Liquid and 
gaseous Nitrogen are routinely used in large quantities for aerospace applications and many 
facilities are well equipped to deal with that hazard. 
If the jet through the nozzle is strong enough, contact could cause injury to personnel 
which constitutes a critical hazard. If that were the case, the system would need to be single-fault 
tolerant against premature firing. This would constitute a need for a second valve between the 
pressure vessel and the nozzle. The same would be true for the fill port. In the example given, the 
fill valve is already single-fault tolerant with two seals.  
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Table 19: Cold Gas Nitrogen Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Cold Gas 
Propellant: Gaseous Nitrogen (N2) 
Propellant Mass: 0.4 kg 
Ignition Method: None 
MEOP: 5,000 psia (~340 atm) 
Pressurization: Single-tank blow-down 
Propellant Storage:  Metallic Pressure Vessel 
Vessel Failure Mode:  Leak-before-burst (LBB) 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Cold Gas Nitrogen Case, Hypothetical System Schematic. 
 
Table 20: Cold Gas Nitrogen Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
High pressure jet Unknown Injury 
Displacement of oxygen in 
the air 
Catastrophic Could cause death by 
asphyxiation 
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Inhibits 
Table 21: Cold Gas Nitrogen Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
High pressure jet through fill port 1. Valve with Poppet Seal 
2. Cap 
High pressure jet through nozzle 1. Thruster valve 
 
High Pressure Jet through Fill / Drain Port 
Personnel exposure to a high pressure jet through the Fill / Drain Port is impeded by two 
inhibits; 1) one fill valve with a poppet, and 2) the sealing cap which fits over the fill valve. These 
two seals protect personnel during most operations. 
High Pressure Jet through Nozzle 
Personnel exposure to a high pressure jet through the nozzle is impeded by one inhibit; 
the thruster valve. As mentioned above, if this hazard constituted a critical hazard, the CubeSat 
developer would need to add one more valve between the pressure vessel and the nozzle. 
Pressure Vessel Requirements 
The metallic pressure vessel would be subject to a burst safety factor of 1.5 according to 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.9 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Since 
leakage of the propellant would not create a hazardous situation and the failure mode of the 
pressure vessel is Leak-before-burst (LBB), the pressure vessel is subject to Verification 
Approach A, Path 1. This verification approach is described in the discussion titled Metallic 
Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 1 in Chapter V. The CubeSat developer would 
need to demonstrate the failure mode analytically or by test. If the failure mode turns out to be 
Brittle Fracture, then the developer would need to satisfy Verification Approach A, Path 2 instead 
and achieve a burst safety factor of 2. 
76 
 
In summary, under Path 1, the CubeSat provider would be subject to stress analysis, a 
Fatigue-Life Demonstration, and a Loads and Environments Determination (AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3, 2004). 
To summarize the testing requirements, the flight model would be subject to 
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and a proof test at a level dependent of the Burst Factor 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A qualification model would undergo 
 Random vibration testing at qualification levels, 
 Burst test, and 
 Nondestructive Examination (NDE). 
Case 5: Resistojet, R-134a 
Resistojet propulsion systems, also known as electrothermal propulsion systems, have 
attracted the interest of many. For obvious reasons, Resistojets are often referred to as cold gas 
thrusters with heaters, or even “warm gas” thrusters. They function similarly to cold gas thrusters 
by accelerating a propellant through a nozzle without a chemical reaction occurring. They also 
incorporate some similar advantages as chemical thrusters which take advantage of an exothermic 
reaction and chemical changes in the propellant to prepare a high-energy gas that accelerates 
through the nozzle. Resistojets, however, do not utilize chemical energy to energize their 
propellant. They use electrical energy to heat the propellant and drive physical changes. The 
propellant increases in temperature and pressure, and in the case of R-134a, changes from liquid 
to gas. The result is a higher energy gaseous propellant that can be accelerated through the nozzle. 
By using electrical energy to add energy to the propellant, resistojets offer a significant 
increase in propellant mass efficiency compared with cold gas thrusters, while preserving most of 
the simplicity in design that is characteristic of cold gas thrusters. From the perspective of Range 
Safety, it is better to add energy to the propellant on orbit with a heater rather than store the same 
energy in instable chemical bonds that may react during ground processing. 
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R-134a, and several other fluids that are commonly used as refrigerants, offer benefits as 
two-phase material. These materials undergo a phase change between liquid and gas near room 
temperature. This advantageous quality allows the fluid to be stored in a relatively dense liquid 
form, then vaporized by evaporation or with the help of heaters before being accelerated through 
the nozzle. This quality allows for relatively low pressure requirements for the propellant tanks, 
comparable with the vapor pressure of the fluid. The vapor pressure also allows the two-phase 
propellant to “self-pressurize” even for two-phase cold gas systems that do not use heaters. 
The hypothetical case given here is an resistojet thruster which uses an electric heater to 
raise the pressure of R-134a, thus converting it from a liquid to a gas. The heated and pressurized 
gas is then accelerated through a nozzle to generate thrust. Busek markets such a system, as does 
Vacco, Many of the assumptions of this study are loosely based upon the Busek datasheets so that 
this discussion may be helpful for developers who consider similar products (Busek Space 
Propulsion and Systems, 2013). 
Hazards Overview 
At the pressures given, R-134a is a condensed liquid. If it were to leak, it would 
evaporate under atmospheric conditions. According to the MSDS for R-134a, “irritation would 
result from a defatting action on tissue” and “liquid contact could cause frostbite” to the skin or to 
the eyes. Upon evaporation, the vapors could displace oxygen, leading to asphyxiation and “at 
high levels, cardiac arrhythmia may occur” (Material Safety Data Sheet R-134A, 2008). 
Since R-134a vapor can displace oxygen in the air, care must be taken to ensure that the 
storage and work areas are adequately ventilated to prevent suffocation in case a leak occurs. As 
long as the hazard is dealt with accordingly, this hazard should not be a major deterrence.  
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Table 22: Resistojet R-134a Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Resistojet (Electrothermal) 
Propellant: Gaseous Nitrogen (N2) 
Propellant Mass: 0.3 kg 
Ignition Method: Electric heater heats propellant 
MEOP: 200 psia 
Pressurization: Single-tank blow-down 
Propellant Storage:  Metallic Pressure Vessel 
Vessel Failure Mode:  Leak-before-burst (LBB) 
 
 
Figure 11: Resistojet R-134a Case, Hypothetical System Schematic. 
 
Table 23: Resistojet R-134a Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
Propellant Leak Marginal May delay schedule, minor 
injury 
Premature Heating of 
Propellant and Firing 
Catastrophic Injury / Damage to Launch 
Vehicle 
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As with monopropellant systems, Resistojet exhaust plumes may be very hot, depending 
on the heating efficiency and the flow rate, among other factors. Furthermore, the MSDS claims 
that at high temperatures above 250 °C, “decomposition products may include Hydrofluoric Acid 
(HF) and carbonyl hilides” (Material Safety Data Sheet R-134A, 2008). Therefore, premature 
firing will be treated as a catastrophic hazard. 
In addition to the hazards discussed above, the CubeSat provider should ensure that their 
system adequately protects against contamination of optical systems on the launch vehicle. 
Depending on the criticality of the optics, this hazard may vary. 
Inhibits 
Table 24: Resistojet R-134a Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
Leakage through Fill / Drain Port 1. Valve with Poppet Seal 
2. Cap 
Leakage through Nozzle 1. Thruster valve 
Premature heating of propellant and firing 1. Thruster valve 
2. Electrical inhibit of heater power #1 
3. Electrical inhibit of heater power #2 
 
Propellant Leak through Fill / Drain Port 
Propellant leakage through the Fill / Drain Valve is impeded by two inhibits; 1) one fill 
valve with a poppet, and 2) the sealing cap which fits over the fill valve. These two seals protect 
personnel during most operations. 
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Propellant Leak through Nozzle 
Propellant leakage through the nozzle is impeded by one inhibit; the thruster valve. As 
mentioned above, if this hazard constitute a critical hazard, the CubeSat developer would need to 
add one more valve between the pressure vessel and the nozzle. 
Premature Heating of the Propellant and Firing 
Premature heating of the propellant is impeded by one physical inhibit and two electrical 
inhibit. The thruster valve prevents propellant from reaching the heater while two independent 
electrical inhibits prevent electrical power turning on the heater. In total, these three inhibits 
should sufficiently contain even a catastrophic hazard associated with heating the propellant. 
Pressure Vessel Requirements 
The metallic pressure vessel would be subject to a burst safety factor of 1.5 according to 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.9 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Since 
leakage of the propellant would not create a hazardous situation and the failure mode of the 
pressure vessel is Leak-before-burst (LBB), the pressure vessel is subject to Verification 
Approach A, Path 1. This verification approach is described in the discussion titled Metallic 
Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 1 in Chapter V. The CubeSat developer would 
need to demonstrate the failure mode analytically or by test. If the failure mode turns out to be 
Brittle Fracture, then the developer would need to satisfy Verification Approach A, Path 2 instead 
and achieve a burst safety factor of 2. 
In summary, under Path 1, the CubeSat provider would be subject to stress analysis, a 
Fatigue-Life Demonstration, and a Loads and Environments Determination (AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3, 2004). 
To summarize the testing requirements, the flight model would be subject to 
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and a proof test at a level dependent of the Burst Factor 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A qualification model would undergo 
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 Random vibration testing at qualification levels, 
 Burst test, and 
 Nondestructive Examination (NDE). 
Case 6: Electrospray, Ionic fluid 
Electrospray propulsion systems use electric power to accelerate an ionic fluid propellant 
to produce thrust. Busek markets such a system which uses a system of valves and conduits to 
manage the propellant (Busek Electrospray Thrusters, 2013). However, this example will 
resemble a system with a somewhat more exotic propellant containment approach that MIT has 
developed. This system uses capillary forces to contain the propellant within a porous substrate 
(ion Electrospray Propulsion System for CubeSats (iEPS), 2013). 
Busek claims that its ionic fluid offers a low vapor pressure which makes for light 
requirements on the propellant reservoir. They also claim that their propellant is “safe, non-toxic, 
non-volatile (Busek Electrospray Thrusters, 2013). This claim cannot be independently verified 
because Busek does not publish what propellant they use. However, those qualities are generally 
true of the ionic fluid EMI-BF4, which is commonly used in electrospray applications. 
For such a safe propellant with a low vapor pressure, the reservoir and valve system may 
only be needed for containment of the fluid rather than for protection against a hazard (Case, 
Case Study Meeting, 2013b). MIT is developing an electrospray propulsion system which uses 
capillary forces to contain the propellant with a porous substrate. They claim that “the propellant 
does not need to be pressurized and flows exclusively by capillarity forces. The lack of valves, 
pipes, pumps and pressurization enables very compact designs, compatible with CubeSat 
limitations and requirements” (ion Electrospray Propulsion System for CubeSats (iEPS), 2013). 
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Table 25: Electrospray Ionic Fluid Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Electrospray 
Propellant: Ionic Fluid such as EMI-BF4 
Propellant Mass: 0.010 kg 
Ignition Method: Electric acceleration of ionic propellant 
Propellant Storage:  Capillary forces of a porous substrate 
  
Table 26: Electrospray Ionic Fluid Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
Electric discharge Catastrophic Shock, EMI 
Propellant Exposure Potentially critical Skin irritation 
 
Overview of Hazards 
While generalizations cannot be made for all ionic liquids, EMI-BF4 is not very toxic. 
The MSDS claims that the fluid could be harmful if absorbed through the skin and it may cause 
skin irritation (Material Safety Data Sheet: 1-ethyl-3-methylimidazolium tetrafluoroborate, 2012). 
This situation may become critical, especially due to lost time in the primary mission schedule 
(Case, Case Study Meeting, 2013b). 
One important mode of failure would be dripping or spillage due to premature operation 
of the thruster. Since the propellant conducts well, this could lead to electrical shorts. Proper fault 
tolerance would be necessary to prevent electrical power from reaching the thruster. 
The thruster that MIT is developing operates at a 1000 V (ion Electrospray Propulsion 
System for CubeSats (iEPS), 2013). Electric discharge may cause an electromagnetic interference 
(EMI) or shock hazard. Electric discharge may also initiate a fire if it occurs in an incendiary 
environment created by external factors such as Launch Vehicle propellant loading operations. 
Three inhibits may be required to prevent electric power from reaching the thruster. 
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Inhibits 
Table 27: Electrospray Ionic Fluid Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
Premature electric discharge 1. Power source inhibit 
2. Power control inhibit #1 
3. Power control inhibit #2 
 
The hazards associated with premature operation and electric discharge are contained 
with three inhibits. One inhibit impedes power flow to the satellite while two more control 
switches prevent power from reaching the thruster. 
Propellant Containment 
As discussed earlier, the propellant of this hypothetical thruster is contained by capillary 
forces by a porous material. Analysis and testing would be required to demonstrate that the 
capillary force for the largest pore size is sufficient to overpower accelerations introduced by 
gravity, launch vibrations, qualification-level vibrations, and the shock environment, across the 
maximum and minimum expected temperatures. 
Case 7: Electrospray, Gallium 
This electrospray propulsion system uses electric power to accelerate liquid Gallium 
propellant to produce thrust. Gallium is solid at room temperature, but it melts at temperatures as 
low as the human body temperature. Functionally, to prevent liquid Gallium from freezing and 
causing a leak in a valve during the mission, all components would need to be heated. 
Due to the corrosion hazards associated with Gallium, a CubeSat provider would need to 
supply a very convincing argument to justify its use on a CubeSat. 
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Table 28: Gallium Ionic Fluid Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Electrospray 
Propellant: Gallium 
Propellant Mass: 0.100 kg 
Ignition Method: Electric acceleration of ionic propellant 
Propellant Storage:  Heated Sealed Container 
 
 
Figure 12: Gallium Ionic Fluid Case, Hypothetical System Schematic. 
Table 29: Gallium Ionic Fluid Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
Electric discharge Catastrophic Shock, EMI 
Exposure of Gallium to 
Aluminum 
Catastrophic Corrosion 
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Hazards Overview 
While Gallium is non-toxic, it is highly corrosive to Aluminum. Therefore, leakage of the 
propellant could cause a catastrophic hazard to the launch vehicle. Such a system would need to 
be isolated from any Aluminum parts by three inhibits. The thruster plume may also be corrosive 
to the launch vehicle. 
Before integration to the P-POD, and before delivery to the launch site, all traces of 
Gallium must be removed from the exterior of the satellite and from any part of the satellite 
where it does not need to be. 
Electric discharge may present electromagnetic interference (EMI) or shock hazards. 
Electric discharge may initiate a fire if it occurs in an incendiary environment created by external 
factors such as Launch Vehicle propellant loading operations. Three inhibits may be requried to 
prevent electric power from reaching the thruster. 
Inhibits 
Table 30: Gallium Ionic Fluid Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
Exposure of Gallium to Aluminum Parts 
through Fill / Drain Valve 
1. Heated Latch Valve 
2. Heated Valve with Poppet Seal 
3.  Heated Cap 
Exposure of Gallium to Aluminum Parts 
through Thruster 
 
1. Heated Dual seat valve (seal #1) 
2. Heated Dual seat valve (seal #2) 
3. Non-explosive pyro valve 
Premature electric discharge 1. Power source inhibit 
2. Power control inhibit #1 
3. Power control inhibit #2 
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Fill / Drain Connection 
The Fill / Drain port uses three inhibits to prevent propellant leakage; 1) one latch valve, 
2) one Fill / Drain valve with a poppet, and 3) the sealing cap which fits over the Fill / Drain 
valve. During propellant loading operations, the valves would need to be heated to prevent the 
Gallium from freezing and causing leaks across the valve seals.  
Leakage through the Thruster 
Leakage through the thruster is impeded by three inhibits. A dual seat latch valve with 
single-fault tolerant controls prevents the propellant from migrating past its two seals. A non-
explosive pyro valve is also used here to impede migration of the propellant to the thruster. These 
valves and the conduits connecting them would need to be heated during operations and during 
any flow tests. Care must be taken to ensure that molten Gallium cannot leak through the thruster. 
The conduits may need to be completely free of propellant. 
Premature Electric Discharge 
The hazards associated with premature operation and electric discharge are contained 
with three inhibits. One inhibit impedes power flow to the satellite while two more control 
switches prevent power from reaching the thruster. 
Propellant Containment 
The low vapor pressure of Gallium does not necessarily call for the use of a pressure 
vessel. However, the propellant containment system must be sealed. Therefore, the propellant 
reservoir will likely be treated as a sealed container. 
The metallic sealed container which contains a hazardous material would be subject to a 
burst safety factor of 2 according to AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.8 (AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Since leakage of the propellant could create a hazardous situation, the 
sealed container is subject to the same requirements as a pressure vessel carrying a hazardous 
material. This verification approach is described in the discussion titled Metallic Pressure Vessels 
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Verification Approach A Path 2 in Chapter V. In summary, the CubeSat provider would be 
subject to stress analysis, a Fracture Mechanics Safe-Life Demonstration (analysis or test), a 
Loads and Environments Determination (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
To summarize the testing requirements, the flight model would be subject to 
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and a proof test at a level determined by Fracture Mechanics 
Safe-Life analysis with a minimum of 1.25 x MEOP (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A 
qualification model would undergo 
 Random vibration testing at qualification levels, 
 Cycle tests at qualification levels, 
 Burst test, and 
 Nondestructive Examination (NDE). 
Case 8: Ion Thruster, Xenon 
An ion propulsion systems uses electric fields to accelerate positively charged ions 
through a grid. As the propellant, designers normally prefer inert gases with high atomic weights 
such as Xenon. The propellant may be ionized through electron bombardment from an internal 
cathode or by a microwave source. After acceleration through the charged grid, the high speed 
ion beam is neutralized by electrons emitted by an external cathode. The high exhaust velocities 
that ion thrusters achieve can provide an excellent specific impulse compared with chemical 
systems. Therefore, ion thrusters can be very mass efficient with their propellants. 
Ion thrusters, along with many electric propulsion systems, do not rely on the chemical 
energy of the propellant. Instead, the energy used to propel the spacecraft comes from the power 
system. To avoid the hazards associated with storage of energetic materials, satellites using 
electric propulsion systems can launch in an inert state, then harness solar energy to power their 
propulsion system. 
The hypothetical electric propulsion system used in this case study uses gaseous Xenon 
for a propellant. Busek is currently working on such a system which uses microwaves to ionize 
the propellant (Busek RF Ion Thruster, 2013).  
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Table 31: Ion Thruster Xenon Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Ion Thruster 
Propellant: Gaseous Xenon (Xe) 
Propellant Mass: 0.4 kg 
Ignition Method: Propellant ionized using microwave, then accelerated 
through a charged grid. 
MEOP: 1,000 psia (~68 atm) 
Pressurization: Single-tank blow-down 
Propellant Storage:  Metallic Pressure Vessel 
Vessel Failure Mode:  Leak-before-burst (LBB) 
 
Figure 13: Ion Thruster Xenon Case, Hypothetical System Schematic. 
Table 32: Ion Thruster Xenon Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
High pressure jet Unknown Burns or frostbite 
Displacement of oxygen in 
the air 
Catastrophic Asphyxiation 
Electric discharge Catastrophic Shock, EMI 
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Assuming a temperature of 20 °C and using the ideal gas law, approximately 0.4 kg of 
stored Xenon gas could be stored at 1,000 psia. The metallic pressure vessel in this hypothetical 
system is assumed to have a Leak-before-burst (LBB) failure mode.  
Hazards Overview 
Xenon is an inert noble gas. The propellant only becomes a hazards due to its storage 
pressure and its capacity to displace oxygen. According to the MSDS for Xenon Gas, “contact 
with rapidly expanding gases may cause burns or frostbite” and Xenon “acts as a simple 
asphyxiant” (Material Safety Data Sheet: Xenon, 2013). If all of the 0.4 kg of Xenon propellant 
were to be released at once, it could fill a volume of approximately 2/3 m
3
 at standard 
atmospheric conditions. Due to its high molecular weight, Xenon gas would sink in air. Care must 
be taken to ensure that the storage and work areas are adequately ventilated to prevent 
asphyxiation in case a leak occurs. As long as the hazard is dealt with accordingly, this hazard 
should not be a major deterrence. The hazards associated with asphyxiation and exposure to high 
pressure gas can be adequately contained with proper pressure vessel design, analysis, testing, 
and inspection. 
Other hazards associated with Ion thrusters are related to the electrical operation of the 
thruster and its power system. Premature electric discharge from the neutralizing cathode, or the 
internal cathode for certain ion propulsion systems, may present electromagnetic interference 
(EMI) or shock hazards. Electric discharge may initiate a fire if it occurs in an incendiary 
environment created by external factors such as Launch Vehicle propellant loading operations. If 
a microwave source is used in place of an internal cathode, it could cause EMI as well. Three 
inhibits may be required to prevent electric power from reaching the thruster. 
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Inhibits 
Table 33: Ion Thruster Xenon Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
High pressure jet through fill port 1. Valve with Poppet Seal 
2. Cap 
High pressure jet through thruster 1. Thruster valve 
Premature electric discharge 1. Power source inhibit 
2. Power control inhibit #1 
3. Power control inhibit #2 
 
High Pressure Jet through Fill Port 
Personnel exposure to a high pressure jet through the Fill Port impeded by two inhibits; 
1) one fill valve with a poppet, and 2) the sealing cap which fits over the fill valve. These two 
seals protect personnel during most operations. 
High Pressure Jet through Thruster 
Personnel exposure to a high pressure jet through the thruster is impeded by one inhibit; 
the thruster valve. As mentioned above, if this hazard constitute a critical hazard, the CubeSat 
developer would need to add one more valve between the pressure vessel and the thruster. 
Premature Electric Discharge 
The hazards associated with electric discharge and any other electrical hazards associated 
with the thruster are contained with three inhibits. One inhibit impedes power flow to the satellite 
while two more control switches prevent power from reaching the thruster hardware such as the 
microwave emitter and the neutralizing cathode. 
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Pressure Vessel Requirements 
The metallic pressure vessel would be subject to a burst safety factor of 1.5 according to 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.9 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). Since 
leakage of the propellant would not create a hazardous situation and the failure mode of the 
pressure vessel is Leak-before-burst (LBB), the pressure vessel is subject to Verification 
Approach A, Path 1. This verification approach is described in the discussion titled Metallic 
Pressure Vessels Verification Approach A Path 1 in Chapter V. The CubeSat developer would 
need to demonstrate the failure mode analytically or by test. If the failure mode turns out to be 
Brittle Fracture, then the developer would need to satisfy Verification Approach A, Path 2 instead 
and achieve a burst safety factor of 2. 
In summary, under Path 1, the CubeSat provider would be subject to stress analysis, a 
Fatigue-Life Demonstration, and a Loads and Environments Determination (AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3, 2004). 
To summarize the testing requirements, the flight model would be subject to 
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and a proof test at a level dependent of the Burst Factor 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). A qualification model would undergo 
 Random vibration testing at qualification levels, 
 Burst test, and 
 Nondestructive Examination (NDE). 
Case 9: Pulsed Plasma Thruster, Teflon 
A Pulsed Plasma Thrusters (PPT) offers many safety advantages when compared with 
other propulsion systems. A PPT uses electric discharge to ablate and vaporize a solid propellant, 
often Teflon. The vaporized propellant is then accelerated using an electric field. Clyde Space and 
Mars Science jointly market a system for CubeSats (Clyde Space, 2011). 
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The hypothetical PPT discussed in this example uses a spring to feed a solid Teflon 
propellant into the discharge area. The propellant is inert and does not require any pressure 
system. As the solid propellant is consumed, more is fed by spring into the discharge area. 
Table 34: PPT Teflon Case, Hypothetical System Parameters. 
Propulsion System Type: Pulsed Plasma Thruster (PPT) 
Propellant: Polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon) 
Propellant Mass: 0.010 kg (Clyde Space, 2011) 
Ignition Method: Electric discharge to ablate and vaporize propellant 
(Clyde Space, 2011) 
Propellant Storage:  Solid propellant 
  
Table 35: PPT Teflon Case, Hypothetical Hazards. 
Hazard Estimated Severity Potential Consequences 
Electric discharge Catastrophic Shock, EMI 
 
Table 36: PPT Teflon Case, Hypothetical Inhibits. 
Hazard Inhibits 
Premature electric discharge 1. Power source inhibit 
2. Power control inhibit #1 
3. Power control inhibit #2 
 
Hazards Overview 
The solid propellant, Teflon, is non-toxic, inert, and solid. Unlike most other propulsion 
system options, PPTs do not require a complex propellant containment system. The propellant, as 
a solid, can be secured mechanically. 
The only hazard that has been identified is associated with premature electric discharge. 
An electric discharge could produce electromagnetic interference (EMI) or it may initiate a fire if 
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it occurs in an incendiary environment created by external factors such as Lunch Vehicle 
propellant loading. Three inhibits may be required to prevent electric power from reaching the 
thruster. 
Inhibits 
The hazards associated with electric discharge are contained with three inhibits. One 
inhibit impedes power flow to the satellite while two more control switches prevent power from 
reaching the thruster. 
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VII. ORBITAL SAFETY 
As discussed in Chapter II METHODOLOGY, Range Safety and Orbital Safety are 
treated separately in this document. Most of the safety standards that are proposed fall into one of 
these two realms because the hazards are unique for the two distinct phases of the mission. This 
chapter focuses on Orbital Safety while Chapter V RANGE SAFETY, discusses Range Safety. 
The topic of Orbital Safety pertains to those hazards that are present after separation from 
the Launch Vehicle. All hazards that are present before that point fall into the realm of Range 
Safety. 
This chapter begins by addressing the risk of collision with other vehicles. The hazard of 
colliding with other spacecraft in orbit are discussed, with special attention given to the risk of 
collision with manned spacecraft such as the International Space Station (ISS). The ability to 
track a CubeSat is very important for preventing collisions on orbit. Before that discussion, 
however, close proximity operations are addressed. Immediately after separation from the host 
vehicle, the CubeSat propulsion system must be disabled until the CubeSat is unable to execute a 
maneuver and return to intercept the host vehicle. After the CubeSat has drifted far enough from 
the host vehicle, the two are no longer engaged in close proximity operations and general orbital 
operations safety standards should provide adequate protection against collision. 
Following the discussion of collisions, is a discussion of Command Security. A CubeSat 
operator may show a valiant effort to implement safe norms of behavior and meet orbital 
operations safety standards, but without proper Command Security, the spacecraft may be 
hijacked. If a third party with malicious intent could send propulsive commands to the spacecraft, 
they could jeopardize the safety of other spacecraft within range, which may include occupied 
spacecraft such as the ISS. 
The final topics of this chapter pertain to the safing and disposal of spacecraft. At the 
End-of-Life (EOL) of the mission, certain steps are often necessary to render the CubeSat inert in 
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order to prevent accumulation of orbital debris. Suppose that a propellant tank were left 
pressurized in orbit. If that tank were struck by a micrometeoroid, the impact could cause an 
explosion and generate new objects to jeopardize the safety of other spacecraft. This chapter 
discusses the concept of passivation. Another way to decrease the accumulation of space debris is 
to maneuver to a disposal orbit, de-orbit, or decrease the orbital altitude so that the CubeSat will 
re-enter the atmosphere within a reasonable timeframe. It is also important to consider the 
survivability of certain materials upon re-entry. Re-entry survivability analysis may help the 
CubeSat developer to make design decision, such as material selection, which decrease the 
feasibility or probability of casualty to human life on the ground.  
Collision with the Host Vehicle 
When a CubeSat separates from the P-POD, it projects away from the host vehicle with a 
separation velocity roughly on the order of 1 to 2 m/s. The separation velocity depends on the 
stiffness of the particular spring used and the mass of each CubeSats in the P-POD. For non-
propulsive CubeSats, that separation velocity has always provided sufficient separation such that 
the CubeSat cannot feasibly return and strike the host vehicle in the near term. CubeSats with 
propulsion systems, however, may possess the performance necessary to counteract the 
separation velocity and enter a collision course with the host vehicle. Apart from damaging the 
host vehicle and the CubeSat itself, such a collision may generate orbital debris which can 
jeopardize third-party spacecraft. 
One might suppose that if a CubeSat operator were to wait a certain amount of time 
before arming the propulsion system, the probability of collision could reduce significantly.  
Motivated by this possibility, the author originally set out to quantify the likelihood of such a 
collision. A model was created to calculate the probability of intercept after a range of delay 
times during which the CubeSat propulsion system is disabled. After a significant amount of 
work had been done, the author learned that the probability analysis would require a prohibitive 
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amount of processing time on the available hardware. Therefore, the author moth-balled the study 
and pursued other analyses to examine different hazards. However, after a hiatus which lasted the 
better part of a year, the author reviewed the model again with fresh eyes. This time, he noticed a 
trend in some of the plots he had generated. 
The trend did not help the author to quantify the probability of collision, but to determine 
envelopes of feasibility. After more analysis, the author found that the velocity change due to a 
propulsive burn, V, required to initiate a single-pass intercept maneuver increases linearly in the 
short term. The slope of this trend is the ratio of the separation velocity of the CubeSat in the 
direction tangential to the orbital velocity and the number of orbits since separation. This trend, 
which is shown for a baseline case in Figure 14 implies that a safety envelopes exists for which a 
single-pass intercept becomes infeasible. 
 
Figure 14: The short term velocity required for a single-pass intercept with the host vehicle 
increases approximately by the product of the tangential separation velocity and the number of 
orbits passed. Model Parameters: 600 km circular orbit after, separation velocity tangential +1 
m/s. 
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While some second order effects cause slight deviations, for the first 100 orbits the first 
order trend is independent of orbital eccentricity, altitude, true anomaly at separation, and even 
non-tangential velocity. In fact, the trend holds very well for separation velocities that are off-
tangent by 80 degrees. Only near 89 degrees do the second order effects play a major role. These 
independencies are demonstrated later in this discussion. 
Analysis 
Figure 15, plotted using the Clohessy-Wiltshire (CW) equations, illustrates the relative 
trajectory of the CubeSat with respect to the primary satellite in a case where an erroneous burn 
ends in collision with the host. Note that in the example shown, a primary payload (P) separates 
from the launch vehicle prior to CubeSat separation. The launch vehicle drifts along the blue-
colored trajectory from the origin, which remains fixed on the primary satellite (P). CubeSat 
separation occurs at the point labeled “C, Deploy”. The CubeSat then follows the green-colored 
trajectory for a delay time until a burn occurs at the point labeled “CS, Burn.” Finally, the burn 
puts the CubeSat in a collision trajectory, plotted in red, with the primary satellite.  
 
Figure 15: This plot of the relative position of a CubeSat with respect to the primary satellite 
illustrates a hypothetical mishap in which an erroneous burn causes collision with the primary. 
The origin is fixed at the location of the primary satellite. In the blue trajectory, the launch 
vehicle drifts until CubeSat deployment. In the green trajectory, the CubeSat drifts until a burn 
occurs. The red trajectory shows a collision with the primary satellite. 
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The following analysis simplifies the problem by neglecting any separation between the 
launch vehicle and the primary satellite. In other words, the analysis only considers the possibility 
of collision with the host vehicle from which the CubeSat deployed from. The host vehicle is the 
vehicle the P-POD remains attached to until deployment from the P-POD.  
In simple terms, the CubeSat separates from the host vehicle, and drifts for a certain 
amount of time. After that time has passed, model places the CubeSat in a trajectory that collides 
with the host vehicle. The V required to place the CubeSat in the intercept trajectory is recorded 
for a range of drifting times, and plotted. 
In less simple terms, the model begins before separation has occurred. Both the CubeSat 
and the host vehicle share an initial position. At time zero, the CubeSat separates from the host 
vehicle with a separation velocity of 1 to 2 m/s. An orbital propagator then uses Kepler’s 
equations to calculate the trajectories of both vehicles through the burn delay time of the longest 
test case. Each time step in this propagation becomes a starting condition for the Lamberts 
problem of each test case. 
For each test case, which is defined by a specific burn delay time, the model uses the 
Keplerian propagator to determine the location of the primary satellite after various flight 
durations. For each flight duration, the model uses a Universal Variables Lamberts solver to 
calculate a trajectory that would result in collision. If that trajectory dips below an altitude of 100 
km before intercept, the CubeSat is assumed to deorbit and that data point is suppressed. The 
model determines the minimum V that could feasible result in collision for each test case and 
the results can then be plotted as minimum V versus burn delay time, as shown in Figure 14. 
Assumptions 
Several assumptions are made in the analysis. First, all orbital propagations assume a 
two-body system with no orbital perturbations. For example, the dynamics neglect any effect of 
earth oblations, atmospheric drag, third-body effects with the sun and moon, etc. 
99 
 
The intercept trajectories predicted by the Universal Variables Lamberts solver assume 
impulsive burns. Any continuous burn would require slightly more V than an impulsive 
maneuver. A propulsion system that could generate an amount of V on the feasibility boundary 
would probably not actually achieve intercept. This lends conservativeness to the predications by 
erring on the side of safety. 
The Universal Variables Lamberts code used in this analysis can only predict intercept 
trajectories that result in a collision within one pass. While this provides very helpful information 
to those who wish to determine the short term risk of collision, future research that implements a 
multi-pass Lamberts solver would prove itself useful. With such an improvement, the analyst 
could identify even more conservative safety envelopes. 
The time of flight, TOF, between the impulsive burn and intercept is only calculated out 
to twice the host vehicle’s orbital period. Some test cases were run where the orbital period was 
allowed to extend as far as 12 times the orbital period. However, since the Lamberts solver is 
limited to single-pass trajectories, the optimum TOF never surpassed approximately 1.8 times 
host’s orbital period. For this reason, the code was limited to twice the host’s orbital period. This 
assumption saved a very significant amount of computation time. 
The model checks each intercept trajectory for intersection with the Earth. Any trajectory 
that passes below 100 km altitude is rejected because most satellites will quickly deorbit at that 
altitude. Certainly, at that altitude, atmospheric drag becomes non-negligible and thus violates 
other assumptions that are made. As is discussed later, the rejection of trajectories that result in 
re-entry do not play a major role in short-term close proximity operations. This is even more true 
for higher orbits. 
Model Parameters 
For each test run, several parameters were defined. First, the initial orbital position and 
velocity was assumed. These parameters were used to set the initial altitude and the eccentricity. 
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Secondly, the time since perigee was defined for the time of separation. This allows for 
investigation of the effects of true anomaly at separation. Finally, the separation velocity was 
defined in the in the normal in-plane, tangential, and out-of-plane directions. Unless otherwise 
mentioned, every case was run with a separation speed of 1 m/s. 
Lamberts Method, Universal Variables 
The variant of the Lamberts method used here utilizes Universal Variables. The method 
predicts possible trajectories connecting two special locations, given a time-of-flight. All 
trajectories are calculated using a Kepler’s equations. 
Model Validation 
The results that were obtained for close-proximity separation trajectories appeared 
justifiable. Velocity change in the tangential direction should affect the period of the orbit more 
than velocity change in any other direction. That change in orbital period should then contribute 
considerably to orbital drift. Consider a separation velocity that causes a 1-second decrease in 
orbital period. At orbital speeds on the order of 7 km/s, one might expect roughly 7 km of drift 
per orbit. In comparison, velocity change in the normal direction (towards or away from the Earth 
for circular orbits) primarily affects the eccentricity of an orbit with only a secondary effect on 
orbital period. Similarly, an out-of-plane velocity change primarily affects inclination rather than 
orbital period. 
While this thought process supported the results, the author chose to attempt another form 
of validation. Besides the neglect of orbital perturbations, the assumptions that were made in the 
model do not limit the delay time. Therefore, the model should give reasonable predictions after 
many orbits of burn delay time. The author considered the drifting as a long-term phasing 
maneuver. The tangential separation velocity changes the orbital period of the CubeSat, causing a 
gradual phase drift. After 360 degrees of drift, the trend should start over and repeat, as is shown 
in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16: The long-term analysis spanning 8000 orbits shows the repeating pattern. Model 
Parameters: 600 km circular orbit, separation velocity tangential 1 m/s. 
 
One might expect the pattern to appear symmetric about the point signifying 180 degrees 
of drift, for at that point the optimum trajectory would logically change directions. To test the 
model against these hypotheses, the author plotted the results for a 600 km circular orbit with 
delay times spanning 3000 orbits (~200 days). However, instead of symmetry about the point of 
180 degree phase difference (~1250 orbits), the V required increased until it reached a 
discontinuity near the point of 360 degree phase difference (~2500 orbits), as shown in the blue 
line of Figure 17. 
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After much examination, the author attributed the discontinuity to the following 
phenomenon. For certain test cases, the optimum time of flight for the intercept trajectory was 
correctly rejected by the model because the respective trajectory would have passed into the 
atmosphere of the earth, leading to a de-orbit condition.  
 
 
Figure 17: The long-term analysis spanning 3000 orbits shows the effects of the de-orbit 
condition which nullifies some of the points that would otherwise serve as optima. Model 
Parameters: 600 km circular orbit, separation velocity tangential - 1 m/s. 
 
Figure 18 shows the range of flight times from zero to twice the orbital period. Notice 
that the optimum flight, approximately 0.8 orbital periods by solution 1, is neglected due to the 
de-orbit condition. In his case, another local optimum is selected at approximately 1.8 orbital 
periods, also by solution 1. The case shown in Figure 18 occurs near the discontinuity in Figure 
17. 
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To verify the cause of the discontinuity, the author ran the model with no de-orbit 
filtering. After allowing trajectories to pass through the Earth, the results appeared much more 
continuous. Plotted in green next to the original results in Figure 17, the reader will notice that 
instead of an abrupt jump from over 1200 m/s to just below 100 m/s, the “no earth” validation 
case descends gradually, with many intermediate points, from a maximum of approximately 1000 
m/s down to the same point just below 100 m/s. Note that the close-proximity cases near 0 orbits 
and again near 2500 orbits agree for both cases. At that point, the true optimum intercept 
trajectories no longer pass through the Earth. 
 
Figure 18: The optimum TOF for this test case is correctly rejected by the model because the 
respective trajectory would have intersected the earth. Model Parameters: 600 km circular orbit 
after 2060 orbits of delay time, separation velocity tangential - 1 m/s. 
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The reader may notice that even the “no-earth” validation case is not perfectly symmetric 
about the point of 180 degree phase difference (~1250 orbits). Consider the fact that return 
trajectories will look different when the CubeSat is trailing the host in its orbit, compared to when 
the CubeSat is leading the host. For this reason, the trend is mirrored for opposite separation 
velocities, as shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19: The long-term trend shown here for a positive tangential separation velocity 
mirrors the trend for a negative tangential separation velocity. Model Parameters: 600 km 
circular orbit, separation velocity tangential + 1 m/s (blue), - 1 m/s (red). 
 
The long-term trends are mirrored for opposite separation velocities, rather than being 
identical. On the short term, however, the trends are nearly identical, as shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: In the near term, the separation velocity makes very little difference. Model 
Parameters: 600 km circular orbit, separation velocity tangential  1 and 2 m/s. The slope is 
normalized in comparison with the separation velocity. 
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Results 
Linear Trend for Close-Proximity Operations 
As was shown in Figure 14, the V required to return and intercept with the host vehicle 
after CubeSat separation, intV , increases linearly over time in the short term. The slope of the 
trend is the ratio of the separation velocity of the CubeSat in the tangential direction and the 
number of orbits since separation, orbitsN , 
orbitssep NVV  ˆint

 
where sepV

 is the separation velocity between the CubeSat and the host vehicle (~ 1 m/s) and ˆ  
is the unit vector pointing into the direction of orbital velocity. 
To put the trend in more temporal terms, 
burn
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
 
where orbitT  is the orbital period and burnt  is the time delay between CubeSat separation and the 
impulsive burn maneuver.  
If the CubeSat provider may find the following algebraic manipulation useful. It allows 
the CubeSat provider to use their system’s maximum V capabilities, max,CSV , to determine a 
safe delay time, safeburnt , , after which the propulsion system may be armed. 
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Table 37: Model parameters for each run. 
Orbit Separation Velocity 
Altitude (km) 
[peri. x apo.] 
True Anomaly 
at Separation 
Speed (m/s) In-Plane 
(degrees) 
Out-of-Plane 
(degrees) 
600 x 600 N/A +1.0 0 0 
600 x 600 N/A -1.0 0 0 
600 x 600 N/A +1.0 +80 0 
600 x 600 N/A +1.0 -80 0 
600 x 600 N/A -1.0 +80 0 
600 x 600 N/A -1.0 -80 0 
600 x 600 N/A +1.0 0 80 
600 x 600 N/A +1.0 0 -80 
600 x 600 N/A -1.0 0 +80 
600 x 600 N/A -1.0 0 -80 
300 x 845 0 +1.0 0 0 
300 x 845 94 +1.0 0 0 
300 x 845 180 +1.0 0 0 
300 x 845 265 +1.0 0 0 
300 x 300 N/A +1.0 0 0 
300 x 300 N/A -1.0 0 0 
600 x 600 N/A +2.0 0 0 
600 x 600 N/A -2.0 0 0 
 
Independencies 
Surprisingly, the linear trend discussed above varies very little due to changes in 
parameters such as orbital altitude, eccentricity, true anomaly at separation, separation speed, and 
separation direction. 
Figure 21 illustrates a common trend among every analytical run spanning a range of 
parameters. The varying parameters are shown in Table 37. The test runs vary orbital altitude, 
eccentricity, true anomaly at CubeSat separation, separation speed, and separation direction. 
Figure 21 shows the trends for delay times up to 100 orbits, which represents approximately one 
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week for Low Earth Orbit (LEO). For example, a 600 km circular orbit with a period of 96 
minutes completes 100 orbits after 6.71 days. A 300 km circular orbit with a period of 90 minutes 
will complete 100 orbits after 6.28 days. 
To compare model data to the trend, the trend may be converted to a unit equality, 
1
ˆ
int 


orbitssep NV
V

  
Figure 22 shows the results plotted in this way and can be compared with unity. This 
allows the reader to see the proportional variation of each run with respect to the trend. For the 
first few orbital periods, some of the result start high. This is because initially burnt  and orbitsN  are 
zero. The reader will also notice that deviation from the trend line increases with burnt . The trend 
is only valid for relatively short timespans, compared to the 2500 cycle which spans nearly six 
months of drift. The results on that time frame, shown in Figure 17, certainly would not fit the 
trend discussed in this section. However, for 100 orbits in approximately one week, the linear 
trend fits nicely for our purposes. After more than a week of drift, the CubeSat operator would 
not continue to operate in a close-proximity mode, but would adhere to the more general orbital 
safety standards. 
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Figure 21: For these ranges, slope is nearly independent of separation velocity, direction, inclination, and true anomaly at separation.  
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Figure 22: For these ranges the trend stays above ~90% of the predicted trend. Anywhere below can be considered a safe zone. 
111 
 
All of the results shown in Figure 22 remain above 90% of the unit equality given above. 
The results deviate more than 10% above the trend, but never more than 10% below. In other 
words, CubeSats that separate with the parameters matching the cases shown could safely initiate 
their propulsion system when the ratio of their performance and the performance needed to 
intercept the host drops below 90%. 
In this analysis, each variation from the baseline was treated separately. Future research 
may examine the worst case of combining variations. For example, suppose a CubeSat were to 
separate 80° from the tangential direction in an eccentric orbit. Similarly, suppose a CubeSat 
were to separate with 2 m/s at 80° from the tangential direction. 
Figure 22 and Figure 24 demonstrate that even when the separation velocity is offset by 
89° from the tangential direction, the results follow the trend remarkably well. Notice that the 
tangential component of the separation velocities, in these cases are only 0.86% of the total 
separation velocity. Still, the predominant trend is the same. One may claim, in this case that the 
linear trend is at least two orders of magnitude stronger than the secondary trends. Note also that 
the effects of the non-tangential velocities do not grow over time. Therefore, their proportional 
effect decreases at higher delay times as the effect due to tangential velocity increases. 
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Figure 23: Separation velocity 89 degrees offset from the tangential velocity, in-plane. 
  
Figure 24: Separation velocity 89 degrees offset from the tangential velocity, out-of-plane. 
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Examples 
Suppose a CubeSat propulsion system can deliver a constant acceleration resulting in 3 
m/s of V per orbital periods. Consider also that this propulsion system’s lifetime V is capped 
at 6 m/s and that the CubeSat separates from the host vehicle with a tangential separation velocity 
of 1 m/s. As shown in Figure 25, such a propulsion system could safely operate after four orbital 
periods have passed since separation. 
 
Figure 25: In this example, the CubeSat performance profile would allow the propulsion 
system to be safely armed four orbital periods after deployment. 
 
Alternatively, consider a CubeSat that can produce much more lifetime V, perhaps 120 
m/s, but it can only accelerate at 0.5 m/s per orbital period. If it separates from the host vehicle 
with 1 m/s tangential separation velocity, the CubeSat could not return to the host vehicle by its 
own propulsion in the short term, at least not within a single pass trajectory, as shown in Figure 
26. Despite its ability to produce twenty times more V than the previous example, it would not 
need to wait to operate its propulsion system beyond a reasonable time, possibly defined by the 
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need to reduce thruster plume impingement on the host vehicle or on other CubeSats. Therefore, 
for certain thrust to weight ratios, no wait is necessary to eliminate the feasibility of a single-pass 
collision trajectory with the host vehicle. 
 
Figure 26: In this example, the CubeSat performance profile would not require the operator to 
wait to enable the propulsion system beyond a reasonable timeframe necessary to reduce 
thruster plume impingement on the host vehicle. 
 
Collision with Third Party Satellites 
The freedom to exercise control over the trajectory of a satellite comes with a new level 
of responsibility in proportion to the new hazards that are created. With a spirit of “good 
citizenship,” CubeSat operators must work diligently with the larger space community to promote 
orbital safety. 
While the primary satellite provider might possess the authority to de-manifest a CubeSat 
that jeopardizes their mission, third party satellite operators normally have no voice in the matter. 
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The authorities that can currently influence a CubeSat mission are primarily concerned with 
safety during ground operations, launch, and separation. 
Some operators, however, impose orbital safety requirements on themselves. NASA 
missions, for example, are expected to follow NASA STD 8919.14 which discusses methods for 
limiting orbital debris and gives instruction for the Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR). 
Similarly Air Force missions are expected to adhere to AFI 91-217 which outlines the role of 
JSpOC in orbital safety, among other topics. See Chapter III, EXISTING STANDARDS, for a 
more in-depth look at these documents. 
AFI 91-217 sets limits on the probability of collision with space debris, active satellites, 
and manned satellites. According to AFI 91-217 Section 5.2.1, the probability of collision with 
active satellites should be less than 10 x 10
-6
, or 10:1,000,000, while the probability of collision 
with manned spacecraft should be less than 1 x 10
-6
, or 1:1,000,000. (AFI 91-217, 2010) 
This document does not make generalities to predict the probability of collision with 
operating satellites, manned vehicles, nor space debris. This discussion will not claim that the 
probability of collision while operating at certain altitudes, inclinations, and cross-sectional areas 
would comply with the Air Force’s instructions. The hazard must be assessed separately, during 
operations. While this study will not predict the probabilities of collision, it can draw some useful 
conclusions and perspective from the requirements contained in AFI 91-217. 
Notice that AFI 91-217 draws a different requirement to protect manned vehicles than to 
protect unmanned operating vehicles. The acceptable level of probability for collisions with 
manned vehicles is an order of magnitude lower in comparison with unmanned operating 
vehicles. This suggest that the Air regards manned vehicle safety with greater priority than 
unmanned operating vehicle safety. Fortunately, the number of manned vehicles in orbit is much 
smaller than the number of unmanned operating vehicles. 
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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also emphasizes concern for spacecraft 
that maneuver near inhabitable objects. They recommend communicating with the operator of 
that object. 
For satellites that will maneuver at altitudes used by 
inhabitable orbital objects, the applicant should indicate whether 
any measures have been taken to coordinate operations with the 
operator of such object. (Federal Communications Commission, 
2013) 
At present, one particular manned vehicle remains as a fixture in LEO. The International 
Space Station (ISS) has hosted a continuous rotation of manned crews since the year 2000, and is 
expected to remain at least until 2020. The ISS is also the largest occupied object in space, which 
unfortunately improves its chances for collision with other objects. The ISS operates within a 
specific range of altitudes, approximately 330 km to 410 km (International Space Station, 2013). 
Given that information, one could perform a feasibility analysis to determine whether a 
propulsive CubeSat could impinge on that range of altitudes. Any collision or near miss with the 
ISS could cripple the CubeSat industry. However, some precautions could be implemented to 
reduce the hazards associated with such satellites. In order to advise the necessity of such 
precautions, it is useful to establish a feasibility envelope. 
Maneuver Envelope Study 
This study assesses the feasibility for a CubeSat to pass through certain altitudes, given 
initial conditions and propulsion performance. While not every pair of objects that pass through a 
given altitude can collide, this is the first step in ruling out infeasible collisions. Parameters such 
as inclination and Right Ascension of the Ascending Node (RAAN) also affect the feasibility for 
collision. After determining the feasibility for a CubeSat to reach certain altitudes, given initial 
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conditions and propulsive capability, a safety envelope is drawn specifically for collisions with 
the ISS. 
The author hopes that these first-order analyses prove useful to CubeSat developer as 
they seek to evaluate and contain the hazards associated with their mission. The author also hopes 
that this set of analyses lends itself as a starting point for mission specific analysis. 
Before diving into the analysis, it is useful to discuss the relationship between propellant 
quantity, specific impulse (Isp), and velocity change (V). Equation 1 relates these quantities in 
using the Rocket Equation rocket equation, 
Equation 1: The Rocket Equation 




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where g0 is the gravitational acceleration at the surface of the earth and Mf is the mass fraction, 
given as, 
Equation 2: The Rocket Equation 
0
1
m
m
M
f
f   
where mf is the propellant mass and m0 is the total wet mass of the vehicle (including propellant) 
before burn. The contour plot in Figure 27 shows the V generated with various levels of Isp and 
various propellant mass fractions. For example, a CubeSat propulsion system capable of 200 s of 
Isp which burns 10% of its mass in propellant could achieve approximately 0.2 km/s of V. The 
reader may find it useful to come back to this plot while reading the following analysis. 
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Figure 27: Velocity change after an impulsive burn. 
 
 
Figure 28: Visualization of a single-burn impulsive maneuver. 
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Impulsive Maneuvers 
Beginning with the most basic analysis, consider a CubeSat that is capable of performing 
an impulsive maneuver. The model used in this analysis determines the maximum reachable 
altitude, given a range of V. This conservative prediction indicates which orbits could feasibly 
be at risk. The trajectory is modeled as the first burn in a Hohmann Transfer from a circular orbit 
at a range of altitudes between 100 and 2,000 km. 
Several assumptions are made in this analysis. Since orbital inclination and the Right 
Ascension of the Ascending Node (RAAN) are not considered in this preliminary analysis, the 
mathematics can be simplified by limiting motion to two dimensional space. This analysis also 
neglects orbital perturbation, reducing all orbital dynamics to a two-body problem. The pre-burn 
trajectory is assumed to be a circular orbit. In order to analyze the situation as a Hohmann 
Transfer, all maneuvers are assumed to as impulsive burns in a direction tangent to the orbital 
velocity. 
The contour plot in Figure 29 shows the maximum feasible altitude that a CubeSat could 
reach after in impulsive burn starting from a circular orbit at is initial altitude, over a range of V. 
The plot may prove useful for preliminary prediction of the risk of collision. For example, 
consider a spacecraft for which the propellant mass accounts for 1/3 of the spacecraft mass which 
operates with an Isp of 200 s. From Figure 27, one can determine that that the propulsion system 
could generate a maximum ∆V of approximately 0.8 km/s.  Figure 29 shows that if this spacecraft 
started at an altitude of 100 km, it could theoretically reach an apogee above 3,000 km in one 
burn. While such a spacecraft could not intercept satellites in geostationary earth orbit (GEO) 
orbits, it could intersect the trajectory of any spacecraft in low earth orbit (LEO), including the 
ISS. 
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Continuous Burn Maneuvers 
The next analysis does not assume an impulsive burn. Instead, the burn is allowed to 
occur over time with a finite amount of thrust. For a given Iso, continuous burns are generally less 
efficient than impulsive burns. Since the propulsive capabilities are reduced, the number of 
satellites potentially in jeopardy decreases with longer burn times. 
 
 
Figure 29: Apogee change after an impulsive burn. 
 
In this model, the author used an ordinary differential equaion solver to propagate the 
trajectory throughout the burn. After the burn completes, the trajectory simply follows two-body 
dynamics and the resulting apogee and perigee are calculated. 
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Similar to the impulsive burn analysis, this analysis continues to assume that the 
spacecraft begins in a circular orbit. This analsis also continues to neglect any orbital 
perturbations. During the duration of the burn, thrust is assumed to be constant. 
Control Modes 
While thrust is assumed to be constant, the direction of thrust depends on the control 
mode. Figure 30 depicts each of the control modes that were used in this analysis. 
 
Control Mode 1 Control Mode 2 Control Mode 3 
  
  
Figure 30: Thrust direction control modes. 
 
Control Mode 1 models a CubeSat with active attitude control, burning tangentially to the 
velocity vector. Since thrusting in the tangential direction is the most efficient way to raise or 
lower the apogee and perigee, this mode results in the greatest change in altitude for a continuous 
burn. The model also represents the most difficult of the three control modes to implement. The 
left side of Figure 31 shows the initial and final orbit for a sample maneuver and the trajectory 
that the satellite follows while thrusting. On the right is shown the angle between the tangential 
direction and the thrust direction throughout the burn in degrees. In an ideal analysis, there would 
be no difference for Control Mode 1. However, due to the step sizes taken by the solver and other 
computation errors, there is a small variation. 
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Figure 31: Control Mode 1: The thrust vector tracks the velocity vector throughout the burn. 
Trajectories are shown on the left. On the right, the thrust direction is plotted in red, relative to 
the tangential direction throughout the burn. 
 
Control Mode 2 and 3 both model a CubeSat with an inertially fixed attitude. Control 
Mode 2 approximates the most effective case, given that condition. The thrust direction is aimed 
approximately into the average velocity direction throughout the duration of the burn. Since the 
actual velocity direction is unknown at the beginning of the burn, this is estimated by propagating 
the velocity of the original orbit throughout the duration of the burn. The left side of Figure 32 
shows the initial and final orbit for a sample maneuver and the trajectory that the satellite follows 
while thrusting. On the right is shown the angle between the tangential direction and the thrust 
direction throughout the burn in degrees. Notice that near the middle the burn, the thrust direction 
approximates the tangential direction.  
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Figure 32: Control Mode 2: The thrust vector is inertial fixed approximately pointing toward 
the average velocity direction. Trajectories are shown on the left. On the right, the thrust 
direction is plotted in red, relative to the tangential direction throughout the burn. 
As mentioned above, Control mode 3 models a CubeSat with an inertially fixed attitude. 
Unlike Control Mode 2, the direction is not optimized in any way. Thrust begins tangential to the 
velocity vector at the beginning of the burn. Without attitude control during the burn the thrust 
vector deviates away from the velocity vector. Of the three control modes, this is the least 
effective way to change altitudes. Therefore, compared with the two other control modes, this one 
carries the least risk to other satellites since fewer orbits are in range. The left side of Figure 
33Figure 31 shows the initial and final orbit for a sample maneuver and the trajectory that the 
satellite follows while thruster. On the right is shown the angle between the tangential direction 
and the thrust direction throughout the burn in degrees. Notice that in the beginning, the thrust 
direction approximates the tangential direction and then deviates away throughout the burn. 
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Figure 33: Control Mode 3: The thrust vector is inertial fixed toward at the initial velocity 
direction. Trajectories are shown on the left. On the right, the thrust direction is plotted in red, 
relative to the tangential direction throughout the burn. 
Continuous Burn Analysis Results 
Figure 34 through Figure 36 show results for Control Mode 1 through 3, in order. Burn 
duration has a significant effect on the maneuvering capabilities of a CubeSat. For burn durations 
of zero, the burn is simply impulsive and is no different from the first burn of a Hohmann 
Transfer maneuver, as is analyzed previously. As burn duration grows, the spacecraft spends less 
time burning near the apsis of its orbit. The less efficient burn leads to diminished climbing or 
descending capabilities. 
The lower boundary of the surface of the earth is shown in a blue dashed line in Figure 34 
and  Figure 35. Shown in a red dotted line are approximate maximum and minimum altitudes 
for the orbit of the ISS. If a satellite under the lower limit ascends above that limit, the CubeSat 
may intercept the ISS. If a satellite starting above the upper limit descends below that limit, that 
CubeSat may intercept the ISS as well.  
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Figure 34: Maximum altitude range for Control Mode 1. 
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 Figure 35: Maximum altitude range for Control Mode 2. 
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Figure 36: Maximum altitude range for Control Mode 3. 
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Figure 37 is derived from the same model. For each point where the CubeSat crosses into 
the boundaries of the ISS orbit, the burn duration for that point is plotted against the V. The 
resulting lines shown approximate the feasibility boundaries for collision with the ISS. Given an 
Isp and an initial altitude, if a CubeSat lies above and to the left of the trend in Figure 37, it cannot 
reach the altitude limits assumed for the ISS. Such a satellite would lie in a safe zone. Figure 37 is 
plotted assuming Control Mode 1 in which the thrust vector tracks the velocity vector. Since this 
represents the most effective control mode, the plot shows a conservative worst case. 
As an example, a CubeSat that begins in a circular orbit with an altitude of 600 km that is 
capable of generating 70 m/s of V over 40 minutes could theoretically intercept the ISS. 
However, if the same spacecraft could only generate that amount of V over a 60 minute burn, it 
could not intercept the ISS in one burn. 
Note that certain orbital perturbations, such as atmospheric drag, could move a satellite 
out of the safety envelope. This is particularly true for satellites operating at altitudes above the 
ISS. Those operating below the ISS are more likely to drift farther towards the earth, and away 
from the ISS. CubeSat developers should prepare for safe operations throughout their mission 
life, including any period in which the satellite leaves the safety zone. 
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Figure 37: Boundary for safe maneuvers with respect to the ISS for a range of V up to 0.1 
km/s (100 m/s). 
  
130 
 
Pointing Error 
When assessing orbital operations safety, it is important to understand how pointing 
errors might affect the outcome of a maneuver. Analyzing the propagation of pointing error can 
help CubeSat developers to determine attitude pointing requirements for their propulsive 
satellites. This discussion presents a sample analysis showing the impact of in-plane pointing 
error as well as out-of-plane pointing error for Hohmann Transfer maneuvers between two 
circular orbits. 
Analysis 
The model assumes that the CubeSat begins in a circular orbit with an altitude of Alt1. 
The model calculates an ideal Hohmann Transfer trajectory that would place the spacecraft in a 
circular orbit at an altitude of Alt2. The model then introduces pointing error into the first burn of 
the Hohmann Transfer. Figure 38 illustrates the ideal V vector compared with the non-ideal V 
vector (not to scale). After propagating the non-ideal transfer orbit for 180 degrees to the next 
apsis, the second burn occurs. The second burn also incorporates the same amount of pointing 
error as the first. The direction of the pointing errors for the two burns are matched in order to 
maximize cumulative effect in the final trajectory error. Figure 38 also contains a visualization of 
the ideal trajectory compared with a sample non-ideal trajectory. 
The model assumes that the burns are perfectly timed and impulsive. The model does not 
assume any distribution function for pointing error, but calculates the results of discrete pointing 
error values. The results can then be used to determine the maximum trajectory error that is 
feasible within pointing error bounds. 
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Figure 38: Visualization of a trajectory with pointing error. 
 
In order to predict the effects of in-plane pointing error, the model introduces error into 
the thrust direction while preserving the ideal magnitude. The resulting trajectory remains in-
plane but the altitude of the perigee and apogee miss the target orbit. The model performs similar 
analysis for out-of-plane pointing error. This error results in both altitude error and inclination 
error. 
The model considers the results of in-plane and out-of-plane pointing errors, and 
determines the worst overshoot or undershoot for altitude and the worst inclination error. The 
132 
 
feasible errors of any given error bound include the feasible error of each particular angle within 
that bound. For example, suppose that a pointing error of +10˚ were to result in 2 km altitude 
error and a pointing error of +5˚ resulted in a 4 km altitude error. The true worst feasible altitude 
error for ±10˚ would be at least 4km. For this reason, the worst case error accumulates as the 
pointing error bound grows. 
Results 
Figure 39 shows the maximum feasible altitude errors, Alt2, and inclination errors, i, 
due to pointing errors, , from 0° to 10°. The altitude of the initial circular orbit is 500 km with 
target orbits ranging from 600 km to 1000 km. Notice that the maximum overshoot increases as 
the error bounds grow from 0° to approximately 2° and the overshoot remains constant after 
that. The maximum undershoot grows with greater pointing error throughout the range. The 
inclination error grows linearly with pointing error. 
As mentioned earlier, CubeSat developers can implement similar analyses in order to 
determine pointing error requirements for their Attitude Determination and Control System 
(ADCS). In the example shown in Figure 39, a CubeSat maneuvering from a 500 km circular 
orbit to an 800 km circular orbit that needs to stay within 4 km of the desired altitude could meet 
its requirements with a pointing error of 7°. If that same CubeSat, however could only accept an 
inclination error of 0.05°, then the ADCS would need to ensure a pointing error less than 4.5°. 
Note that this analysis assumes perfect timing. Timing error for thrusting maneuvers can 
lead to significant trajectory errors. A CubeSat developer a encouraged to include this in their 
mission-specific analysis. 
Trackability 
CubeSat operators normally rely on the services of the Joint Space Operations Center 
(JSpOC), which is operated by Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE), 
to track their spacecraft in orbit. JSpOC also provides support to help satellite operators to predict 
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and avoid collisions, as discussed in AFI 91-217 Space Safety Mishap Prevention Program (AFI 
91-217, 2010). A brief summary of some important information contained in AFI 91-710 can be 
found in the section titled AFI 91-217: Space Safety and Mishap Prevention Program in Chapter 
III of this document. 
 
 
Figure 39: Feasible altitude error due to pointing error. 
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The services provided by the JSpOC are critical for orbital operations safety. The JSpOC 
tracks spacecraft on orbit using a variety of methods including radar and optical observations. 
The presence of CubeSats in orbit may pose a challenge for the JSpOC due to their size, 
especially if those CubeSats are capable of changing trajectories using propulsion systems. 
Cooperation with the JSpOC is one way in which CubeSat programs can operate as “good 
citizens” while helping the JSpOC to provide them with the important services that they rely on. 
Low V Maneuvers 
As discussed in the section titled AFI 91-217: Space Safety and Mishap Prevention 
Program in Chapter III of this document, maneuvers under a certain V threshold do not require a 
Conjunction Assessment or Collision Avoidance. Also discussed in that section, Richard C. 
Diamantopoulos, who works for the Scitor Corporation  in support of JFCC SPACE, shared that 
“satellites are screened for collision avoidance using a 1 km (X, Y-axes) x 200 m (Z-axis) 
[ellipsoid] around the current [element set]. Any movement from a currently established [element 
set] in the Satellite Catalog without prior coordination with the JSpOC affects their ability to 
predict conjunctions and avoid collisions until the new [element set] is confirmed in the Satellite 
Catalog” (Diamantopoulos, Email Correspondence, 2013). 
CubeSats that use their propulsion systems for drag compensation or other orbital 
maintenance do not likely need to notify JSpOC before every burn as long as they remain within 
that 1 km x 1 km x 200 m ellipsoid. CubeSat operators should work with their launch provider, 
launch integrator, and JFCC Space to establish a mission-specific plan. 
Methods of Improving Trackability 
Communication with JFCC SPACE 
In order to fully benefit from the services that JSpOC provides and in order to improve 
the level of safety for all satellites on orbit, the CubeSat developer should provide certain 
information to JFCC SPACE. Knowledge the transmission frequencies of the CubeSat radios 
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helps the JSpOC to identify CubeSat from one another, especially just after separation before the 
CubeSats have dispersed. By listening on those frequencies, the JSpOC can also distinguish the 
CubeSats from space debris. 
The launch provider often provides this information to JFCC SPACE (Diamantopoulos & 
Quinonez, Meeting to Discuss Orbital Safety, 2013). CubeSat providers should verify with their 
launch provider and launch integrator that this information is given to JFCC SPACE. 
The CubeSat operator will need to work with their launch provider and launch integrator 
to establish direct contact with JFCC SPACE in order to form a plan for safe orbital operations. 
During orbital operations, the CubeSat provider will need to communicate with JFCC SPACE in 
order to notify them of upcoming maneuvers. The CubeSat provider should establish first contact 
with JFCC SPACE by working with their launch provider and launch integrator to submit an 
Orbital Data Request (ODR) form to ODR@space-track.org, or USG_ODR@us.af.mil for 
military requests. This establishes a pipeline for a CubeSat operator to request Conjunction 
Assessments, and to receive conjunction predictions. The ODR and instructions are available 
online at https://www.space-track.org/documentation#/odr. A CubeSat operator should also 
request an account with www.space-track.org (Orbital Data Request, 2013). In most cases, the 
CubeSat operator should not submit the ODR separate from the launch provider. However, if for 
any reason the launch provider does not wish to support this process, the CubeSat operator should 
submit the ODR independently. 
Radio Reflectors and RFID 
CubeSats are more difficult to track compared with larger satellites simply due to their 
size. CubeSats have a smaller cross section, for radar and optical sensors, compared with larger 
satellites. In fact, CubeSats are closer in size to some pieces of orbital debris. Imagine the 
challenge of tracking an object the size of a grape-fruit from hundreds of kilometers away, when 
that object is traveling at speeds near 7.5 km/s. The angular diameter of a 3U CubeSat at 500 km 
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is less than 4 x 10
-5
 degrees when the angular velocity of that CubeSat flying past a ground station 
is nearly 0.9 degrees per second. 
Luckily, there are steps that CubeSat developer can take to help the JSpOC identify and 
track their satellites. First, the developer can help including a beacon in their design and notifying 
JFCC SPACE of their transmission frequencies. The JSpOC can watch for those frequencies. One 
might compare this to a person who, lost in the dark at night, turns on a small flash light which 
helps the search party to locate them. Knowledge of the transmission frequency helps the JSpOC 
to distinguish one CubeSat from another, especially just after deployment before the CubeSats 
have dispersed. Use of beacons should decrease the time it takes to establish determine initial 
orbital parameters. 
Another way a CubeSat developer may help the JSpOC to find their satellite is by 
including a radar transponder in their design. Tracking stations can then ping the CubeSat. This 
helps the JSpOC to pinpoint the CubeSat’s location and to identify one CubeSat from another 
without requiring constant transmission which uses power resources. 
The previous examples are active ways that the CubeSat designer can help the JSpOC to 
identify and track their satellite. However, the CubeSat will likely lose power before de-orbiting. 
After that point, the JSpOC will have little help in tracking the object. To prevent this 
disadvantage, a CubeSat designer can install a passive device to improve their trackability. For 
example, a CubeSat design could include a Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) device which 
reflects a certain frequency. Like a transponder, a passive RFID device could be pinged by a 
ground station. Such a device could be customized to help distinguish one CubeSat from another. 
Since the device would not use onboard electrical power resources, it could help the JSpOC to 
track the CubeSat long past its operational lifetime (Diamantopoulos & Quinonez, Meeting to 
Discuss Orbital Safety, 2013). 
Any way that CubeSat developers can improve their trackability will improve orbital 
safety by allowing the JSpOC to predict conjunctions more effectively. Improved trackability also 
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improves the quality of tracking data the operator receives from the JSpOC. This is a win-win 
situation. 
Command Security 
Steps may be taken by the CubeSat operator to ensure that their propulsive maneuvers do 
not pose unnecessary risk to other spacecraft. A commitment to “good citizenship” on orbit 
greatly improves the level of safety for a CubeSat mission. Suppose, however, that a third party 
with malicious intent were to hijack a CubeSat. If they succeeded in transmitting valid command 
signals, they may send the CubeSat on a trajectory which puts other spacecraft and human life at 
risk. Depending on the CubeSat’s operating orbit and performance limitations, this may 
jeopardize personnel safety aboard manned spacecraft such as the International Space Station 
(ISS). 
Contributing Factors 
Many factors affect the risk that a CubeSat may become hijacked by an individual, 
organization, or foreign entity with malicious intent. Generally, one could expect that CubeSats 
with high levels of performance and poor command security would be at a higher risk of 
hijacking. A benign satellite with poor command security may be of no use to a hijacker. On the 
other end, a highly capable satellite with effective command security may also pose little risk of 
hijacking. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the risk of hijacking as being influenced by 
capability-related factors and security-related factors. 
The necessary level of command security may depend partly on the capabilities of the 
CubeSat. It would be pointless to protect a CubeSat that can do no harm, but CubeSats that are 
capable of intercepting other satellites with little notice need to be protected against hijacking. 
Capability-Related Factors 
In the event of a CubeSat hijacking, the offending party would be relying on the CubeSat 
hardware to accomplish their attack. The outcome largely depends on the capability of the 
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CubeSat itself. The V limitations of the CubeSat, its thrust-to-weight ratio, its orbital 
parameters, and its attitude determination and control system performance can all affect the 
amount of damage the hijacker could inflict and the likelihood that the hijacker could succeed. 
A CubeSat that is capable of impulsive maneuvers that intersect the orbit of the ISS could 
be more dangerous than a CubeSat with the same V limit but with a lower thrust-to-weight ratio. 
The latter CubeSat may need multiple passes in order to enter into an intercept trajectory. Since 
more time would be needed to inflict damage, the rightful CubeSat operator would have more 
time to respond. During that time, the ISS could maneuver to a safe orbit if needed and the 
astronauts could take shelter inside a reentry vehicle and prepare for a possible collision. 
Security-Related Factors 
In order to carry out a hijacking, the offending party would require the following. 
 Technology capable of tracking and communicating with CubeSats on their 
command frequency 
 Access to the command codes 
 Access to any encryption keys that are used 
First, the offending party would need access to the technology needed to command the 
CubeSat. Since many CubeSat ground stations use amateur radio equipment, the offender would 
have very little trouble sending transmissions to the CubeSat. If the offending party were to 
succeed in sending signals to the CubeSat over the correct frequency, they would then need 
access to the command codes in order to send and receive useful commands. Finally, if the 
CubeSat communications are encrypted, the offending party would need access to the encryption 
keys in order to send commands. 
Access to command codes and encryption keys do not necessarily require that the 
hijacker has knowledge of them. The hijacker knows that there exists at least one ground station 
with the right equipment. Similarly, that equipment is likely configured to send commands. When 
this is the case, the hijacker may choose to hack into the ground station remotely or break into the 
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ground station physically rather than searching for the encryption keys for use on their own 
equipment. Physical and cyber security are critical for spacecraft operation control centers. 
According to an article posted on the Infosec Island website, in 2007 and 2008 four cases 
were reported of foreign cyber-attacks on NASA spacecraft. The spacecraft operators of Landsat-
7 and Terra EOS AM-1 experienced interference and sometimes loss of command of their 
spacecraft.  China is believed to be have carried out these attacks. In the attacks on Terra EOS 
AM-1, the “responsible party achieved all steps required to command the spacecraft but did not 
issue commands” (Paganini, 2012). 
Another article noted that the operator’s use of the internet to connect with remote ground 
stations became a vulnerability (Humphries, 2011). The CubeSat community has a history of 
collaborating with other ground stations. This allows CubeSat operators to collect data from their 
satellite more often without building a network of ground stations themselves. However, CubeSat 
operators should be careful to protect their command authority whenever collaborating with 
remote ground stations. Even when the other ground station is secure, the remote connection may 
become a vulnerability as it did with these NASA satellites. 
Potential Methods of Mitigation 
Certain steps could be taken to defend against potential CubeSat hijackers. Some of these 
mitigation methods could be implemented in the satellite design and some would be implemented 
on the ground. Some methods would even call for programmatic security measures. 
Command encryption 
Command encryption would decreasing the likelihood of hijacking. This would require 
that security measures be taken to protect the encryption key. Perhaps only necessary personnel 
should have access to the encryption key. 
Software encryption is simple to implement but may pose significant demands to the 
CubeSat onboard processor. Hardware encryption involves installing a component strictly for the 
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purposes of encrypting and decrypting messages. This may affect the mass budget of the CubeSat 
but saves processing power and generally provides a higher level of security. 
Encryption can be an effective means of preventing hijackers from taking command of a 
spacecraft only if the encryption key on the ground is secured. The CubeSat operator would need 
to dedicate themselves to maintaining secrecy of the key and maintaining control of any hardware 
keys. 
Ground Station 
A ground station could use very advanced encryption techniques or hardware 
requirement that make sending commands to the CubeSat nearly impossible at other ground 
stations. However, if the front door to the ground station were left unlocked routinely, the overall 
level of security would be very poor. With an over-emphasis on command encryption, the 
operator could possibly neglect physical ground station security. Perhaps a hijacker could walk 
in, send commands, and leave unnoticed. 
When the potential hazard exists, the CubeSat operator must implement appropriate 
ground station security measures. Among other things, these may include locking the facility, 
blocking any windows, limiting access to the communications hardware, protecting computers 
with strong passwords, and surveillance. 
Cyber Security 
As discussed earlier, cyber security is essential. The CubeSat ground station and the 
encryption keys may be physically secure, but connections to wireless networks and internet 
connections may leave the door open to hackers. The CubeSat operators should ensure that they 
implement the proper security measures to protect their authority to command their spacecraft. 
The operator should ensure that critical systems are disconnected from any unsecure networks or 
information storage devices. It may be insufficient to only disconnect the hardware during 
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command transmission. Suppose a crafty hacker were to place a file on the computer which sends 
commands at a later time without requiring a link to the hacker. 
Also noted earlier, when remote or partnered ground stations are used, not only do those 
ground stations require a sufficient level of security, but the connection between the stations must 
be secure. Operators should be very careful when connecting command centers using internet 
links. 
Personnel Security 
Personnel that are given access to the hardware should be trustworthy. This may call for 
personnel vetting procedures in certain cases. CubeSat operators may choose to limit access to 
only a portion of their team. In order to prevent any single person from sending commands, the 
operator may choose to implement a “two-man rule.” For example the encryption hardware or 
software could require a secret PIN from at least two authorized personnel before commands can 
be sent. An outsider would then need to acquire the PIN of two team members before sending 
commands. This measure would also reduce the risk of an “inside job.”  
Situational Awareness 
CubeSat operators who regularly communicate with their spacecraft and receive frequent 
tracking updates from the JSpOC can more quickly identify when control of their satellite has 
been compromised. If tracking data shows that the satellite trajectory has changed unexpectedly, 
the operator can begin assessing the situation. This is another reason why communication with 
the JSpOC is very important to orbital safety. 
End-of-Life: Passivation 
Many propulsion architectures rely on the storage of pressurized propellants. Some of 
these propellants also possess significant amounts of chemical energy. One could imagine a 
scenario where such a system undergoes an explosion during orbital operations. Suppose, for 
example, that a piece of orbital debris collides with a CubeSat, impacts the propellant tank, and 
142 
 
causes an explosion. This potential hazard exists throughout the mission as long as energetic 
propellant is stored or as long as any fluids are contained at pressure. Some amount of risk may 
be necessary during the mission, but at the End-of-Life (EOL) there is no use in storing chemical 
and physical energy. Energetic and pressurized propellants carry no redeeming value after the 
mission ends. 
AFSPCI 10-1204 places emphasis on the requirement for “safing” a spacecraft at EOL, as 
discussed in more detail in the section titled Satellite Disposal in Chapter III of this document. In 
particular AFSPCI 10-1204 suggests that “safing the satellite takes precedence over all other 
disposal actions” (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009, p. 13). 
Potential Methods of Passivation 
This potential hazard calls the implementation of passivation procedures to be carried out 
at EOL. There are several ways in which a CubeSat operator may passivate their satellite. The 
procedure used depends on the mission and the propellant. 
Propellant Venting 
First, at EOL the CubeSat could vent all remaining propellant by executing a de-orbit 
maneuver or by venting the propellant directly into space through an un-choked valve. AFSPCI 
10-1204 Section 3.6.3.2.1 requires of Air Force missions, “the [Space Wings] will deplete all 
spacecraft fuel to the maximum extent possible…” (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009, p. 13). 
The CubeSat developer should consider what risk the vented propellant may pose. For 
example, if the propellant is expected to condense or freeze before full dispersion, the operator 
may prefer to burn the remaining propellant rather than allow the frozen or condensed propellant 
to become orbital debris. 
A resourceful CubeSat operator may choose to use the remaining propellant to perform a 
de-orbit maneuver. This would render the spacecraft inert while decreasing its remaining orbital 
lifetime. After all, at EOL the CubeSat becomes orbital debris until reentry. 
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Chemical Inhibition 
The CubeSat developer may consider rendering their propellant inert through the use of 
chemical inhibits. The author is unaware whether this is possible, but wishes to propose the idea. 
Consider mono-propellant propulsion systems which rely on catalysts to induce decomposition of 
the propellant. With sufficient energy dissipated during an orbital debris impact, the propellant 
could theoretically combust without the catalyst. The probability of combustion may be reduced 
if an inhibiting chemical were injected into the reservoir at EOL. The author is currently unaware 
if such a chemical exists for any particular propellant. 
End-of-Life: De-orbit and Re-entry 
Orbital Lifetime Assessment 
Spacecraft can be disposed of in more than one way. First, satellites in Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO) may de-orbit when they succumb to atmospheric drag at the end of a mission. At higher 
orbits, there are more convenient options which require less propellant. As one option, according 
to NASA STD 8719.14 Section 4.6.2, spacecraft can enter a disposal orbit with a perigee greater 
than 2,000 km, but with an apogee that is no greater than 500 km below geostationary orbit 
(GEO). Satellites are required to reenter or to enter a disposal orbit within 25 years of the end of 
mission, and no later than 30 years after launch (NASA-STD-8719.14A: Process for Limiting 
Orbital Debris, 2012). 
NASA’s DAS software, which is available at no cost at 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/das.html, is discussed in more detail in the following 
section. In addition to calculating reentry survivability estimates, the software can also calculate 
orbital lifetimes for spacecraft, given the average cross-sectional area to mass ratio. The software 
even includes a tool which helps to calculate the cross-sectional area of a three-dimensional 
spline defined by the user (Opiela, Hillary, Whitlock, & Hennigan, 2012) 
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Since CubeSat operators have traditionally not possessed the means to change their 
spacecraft’s trajectory, they have had to rely on passive methods of losing altitude to reenter the 
atmosphere. Essentially, this means that CubeSats have been deployed in low enough orbits so 
that atmospheric drag causes reentry to occur within 25 years. This has limited the number of 
acceptable launches for CubeSats. However, with the dawn of CubeSat propulsion systems, 
CubeSat missions may begin to take advantage of launch opportunities at higher altitudes. At 
EOL, the CubeSats can be maneuvered in to disposal orbits or into orbits with shorter lifetimes. 
If a CubeSat operator intends on using their propulsion system to dispose of their 
satellite, they must have the means to manage their onboard resources. Once the propellant 
quantity drops near the amount required for the disposal maneuver, the operator must initiate 
disposal and safing procedures. 
Tank Material and Orbital Debris Assessment Report 
The CubeSat Design Specification (CDS), section 2.2.19, requires that Aluminum 7075 
and 6061 be used for the main CubeSat structure (CubeSat Design Specification Rev. 12, 2009). 
However, Aluminum is often less suitable for pressure-bearing components such as pressure 
vessels, tubing, and valves. Steel and Titanium alloys often carry advantages for propellant tanks. 
Unfortunately, these materials may present a certain hazard during reentry that Aluminum alloys 
generally do not. Aluminum tends to break-up, melt, and vaporize during atmospheric reentry. 
Steel and Titanium alloys, however, may survive reentry and impact the earth with significant 
kinetic energy. If a component survives reentry with enough kinetic energy, the impact may cause 
casualties. 
Non-Federal Spacecraft. 
For non-federal spacecraft operators, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
frequency license application process requires submittal of information concerning orbital debris 
mitigation. According to an FCC public notice, an Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR), as 
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described by NASA standards, should satisfy the information submittal requirements (Federal 
Communications Commission, 2013). However, beyond documentation, compliance with the 
NASA orbital debris mitigation requirements may not fully satisfy the requirements of the FCC. 
NASA-STD-8719.14 Process for Limiting Orbital Debris describes the analysis and 
requirements needed to complete an ODAR. Section 4.7.2 Requirements for the Area, includes 
requirements for limiting the risk of casualty during reentry. Paragraph 4.7.2.1 states, “the 
potential for human casualty is assumed for any object with an impacting kinetic energy in excess 
of 15 joules.” In other words, any object that can strike the ground with more than 15 joules of 
kinetic energy after reentry can cause a human casualty. For uncontrolled reentries, paragraph 
4.7.2.1a requires that the risk of human casualty be no greater than 0.0001, or one in 10,000. 
NASA provides free software, available online, that can be used to calculate the risk of human 
casualty for individual objects and composite objects, as discussed below (NASA-STD-
8719.14A: Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, 2012).While a CubeSat design might satisfy the 
safety envelope described in NASA-STD-8719.14, the FCC may impose further requirements in 
order to handle the risk of components that survive reentry. 
The reader is encourage to download NASA’s Debris Assessment Software (DAS), 
which is available at no cost from http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/das.html. The 
Casualty Risk from Reentry Debris tool allows the user to input object materials, quantities, 
material types, shapes, thermal mass, and dimensions. The orbital inclination angle is also 
required. Given those inputs, the model predicts the demise altitude, total debris casualty area, 
and kinetic energy for each object, and the mission’s risk of human casualty (Opiela, Hillary, 
Whitlock, & Hennigan, 2012). If the software predicts potential non-compliance with the 
requirements given in NASA-STD-7819.14, the developer may use another software package 
called the Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) for a “higher fidelity” assessment 
(Orbital Debris ORSAT, 2009). 
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If a component of a CubeSat survives reentry with at least 15 joules of kinetic energy and 
a probability of human casualty greater than zero, the FCC requires justification and insurance 
appropriate to the risk (Federal Communications Commission, 2013). 
In the event an assessment of the spacecraft re-entry finds 
surviving materials presenting a casualty risk other than zero, the 
applicant should provide in its application a detailed discussion 
of the need for use of high melting point materials, 
demonstrating that mission objectives cannot be met with an 
alternative spacecraft design. The FCC considers insurance 
arrangements as a relevant consideration if the satellite will be 
disposed of by atmospheric re-entry, with portions of the satellite 
expected to survive re-entry. Therefore, the application should 
also identify steps taken or to be taken to obtain an insurance 
policy listing the United States as an insured party or additional 
insured party, and demonstrating that the policy will provide 
adequate coverage. Consistent with NASA Standards, the FCC 
staff considers objects surviving re-entry with less than 15J 
energy as not presenting a cognizable casualty risk. (Federal 
Communications Commission, 2013) 
CubeSat providers should design their systems so that the pieces surviving reentry do not 
impact with greater than 15 joules of kinetic energy. If the mission cannot be accomplished under 
such a requirement, the CubeSat provider will need to apply for a waiver and offer compelling 
rationale for allowing a risk of casualty and the CubeSat provider will need to obtain adequate 
insurance to cover protecting the United States (Federal Communications Commission, 2013). 
The requirements proposed in this document do not permit a reentry casualty hazard. Any 
CubeSat designer that wishes to use high melting-point materials would need to seek a waiver in 
addition to following the steps outlined by the FCC. 
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Federal CubeSats. 
Developers of federal CubeSats, including those funded United States Department of 
Defense, may obtain their frequency license by working with their respective spectrum 
management office and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA), who may or may not require submittal of an ODAR. Having said this, all CubeSat 
operators are encouraged to respect the universal responsibility to never present undue risk to 
human life. 
Again, the requirements proposed in this document do not permit a reentry casualty 
hazard. Any CubeSat designer that wishes to use high melting-point materials would need to seek 
a waiver. 
 
148 
 
VIII. PROPOSED STANDARDS 
Disclaimer 
At this time, any standards or requirements that are proposed in this document are in 
draft form and should not be used for mission planning purposes without consultation 
with the launch provider or the auxiliary payload integrator. The author hopes that the 
reader will find the discussions contained in this document useful as he or she assess 
the risks associated with their particular mission. For updates regarding the release of 
standards and requirements related to the CubeSat Design Specification (CDS), visit 
the Cal Poly CubeSat Program’s website, http://cubesat.org/. 
 
APPENDIX B contains a draft of the proposed safety standards at the time of this 
publication. This chapter summarizes the rationale behind each standard that is proposed. For 
convenience, the text for each standard is given in full throughout the chapter.  
Fault Tolerance and Inhibits 
The standards begin with some guidance on proper assessment of hazard severity and the 
necessary fault tolerance. These particular concepts are discussed in detail in Chapter IV 
CONCEPTS IN SYSTEM SAFETY. These concepts are not unique to propulsion systems and 
are appropriately applied to the containment of all hazards including radio transmitters, electrical 
power systems, deployables, etc. 
First, Standard 1.1 offers a definition for credible and non-credible hazards, as is 
discussed in Chapter IV in the section titled Non-Credible Hazards. A non-credible hazard is 
simply one that is infeasible or one that is contained to a degree that it will not be treated as 
feasible. Any hazard that is contained with dual-fault tolerance is considered non-credible. 
As Standard 1.3 states, the required fault tolerance for containing a hazard depends on the 
severity of that hazard. When a CubeSat designer can protect against a hazard with dual-fault 
tolerance, they may save a significant amount of cost since that hazard, being non-credible, does 
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not need to be evaluated for hazard severity. Dual-fault tolerance sufficiently protects against 
even catastrophic hazards. 
1.1 Any potential hazard that is contained with dual-fault 
tolerance using at least three independent inhibits shall be 
identified as non-credible. Potential hazards that are 
deterministically shown to be infeasible shall also be identified 
as non-credible. All other potential hazards shall be identified as 
credible. 
Hazards need not exist for their own sake. No logical designer would knowingly increase 
risk without a reason. For every hazard, there must be some benefit which requires the additional 
risk. If a potential hazard is to be accepted, the benefit should outweigh the risk. There should 
also be no other less-hazardous options available that is adequate than the one taken. 
1.2 When the mission can be accomplished without imposing a 
hazard, the hazard shall be avoided. The CubeSat provider shall 
be prepared to defend the existence of any hazard that cannot be 
eliminated. The rationale shall match the gravity of the potential 
hazard. 
When a potential hazard cannot be avoided, it still must be contained. As mentioned 
above, the required fault tolerance needed to contain each credible hazard depends on the hazard 
severity, as discussed in Chapter IV. This concept is addressed in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1 
Figure 3.2 (AFSCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1, 2004). Inhibits are devices that interrupt the potential for a 
hazard, as discussed in Chapter IV in the section titled Inhibits. Each additional independent 
inhibit that is added to protect against a hazard increases fault tolerance by one. Inhibit 
independence is also discussed in Chapter IV. 
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1.3 The severity of each credible hazard shall be assessed as 
either negligible, marginal, critical, or catastrophic, according to 
the potential consequences, as defined in AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 1 Figure 3.2.  
1.3.1 All catastrophic hazards shall be contained with dual-fault 
tolerance using at least three independent inhibits. 
1.3.2 All critical hazards shall be contained with single-fault 
tolerance using at least two independent inhibits. 
1.3.3 All marginal and all negligible hazards shall be contained 
with at least one inhibit. 
1.3.4 No structural failure, given an adequate design margin, 
shall be regarded as a single point of failure. 
Propulsion System General Requirements 
Propulsion systems represent a diverse range of hazards which depend on several factors 
such as the system performance and the propellant selected. In order to address safety concerns as 
early as possible, it is important for the CubeSat provider to communicate with the launch 
integrator or launch provider. 
2. Propulsion System General Requirements. The CubeSat 
provider shall provide a Propulsion System Summary Sheet 
(PSSS) to the launch integrator and the launch provider. The 
PSSS shall include a schematic and a description of the system 
performance limits, the propellant and its containment system, 
hazards, inhibits, and inhibit controls. The CubeSat provider 
shall follow the format given below. 
See APPENDIX B for the format and example. The format was consolidated to fit on one 
page in order allow for the initial dialogue to begin without delay. A larger document could delay 
the reception of important information about the propulsion system. More detailed information 
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can be collected later in the process in order to prepare the Missile System Prelaunch Safety 
Package (MSPSP) for Range Safety. 
Range Safety Standards 
Most of the Range Safety standards are derived directly from AFSPCMAN 91-710. An 
effort is made to help the CubeSat developer to understand which sections are applicable to their 
particular mission. Chapter V RANGE SAFETY discusses the concepts that are contained in 
these standards. Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES walks through a set of case 
studies in which the hazards of hypothetical propulsion system architectures are identified and 
evaluated. Each hypothetical system was reviewed by Range Safety and a likely path toward 
flightworthiness, according to these standards, are given. CubeSat developers may find it helpful 
to review the set of case studies in order to gain an understanding of the intent and application of 
these standards. After doing so, the CubeSat developer should be better able to navigate their 
trade space by making realistic predictions of the path toward flightworthiness for the particular 
propulsion systems they may be considering. 
Hazardous Materials 
It is necessary to consider how to handle hazardous material since some propulsion 
systems use hazardous materials as their propellants. The section titled Hazardous Material in 
Chapter V discusses hazardous material in more detail. 
First, it is useful to define hazardous material. Simply, a hazardous material is any 
material that can cause a hazard to exist. Standard 3.1 proposes a definition for hazardous 
material in an attempt to catch every case. 
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3.1 Hazardous Material Requirements. These requirements 
apply to any system that contains materials that are either 
flammable, explosive, energetic, toxic, or otherwise hazardous, 
on their own or in interaction with other materials in the 
expected environments under environmental conditions expected 
from ground operations through CubeSat deployment. 
The following standards provide a starting point. First, Standard 3.1.1 suggests that a 
hazard should be avoided when possible. When a hazard must be tolerated, Standard 3.1.3 
requires that the CubeSat provider notify the integrator, the launch provider, and Range Safety. 
3.1.1 The CubeSat design shall use the least hazardous material 
that satisfies the mission requirements. 
3.1.2 The CubeSat provider shall be prepared to justify the use of 
any hazardous material. The rationale shall match the gravity of 
the potential hazards. 
3.1.3 The CubeSat provider shall declare to the integrator, the 
launch provider, and Range Safety, any potentially hazardous 
material present on their satellite at the earliest time possible in 
order to allow sufficient time to address any concerns before 
integration. This will improve the chances that the CubeSat will 
eventually demonstrate a level of safety acceptable for flight. 
The CubeSat provider shall also provide a Material Safety Data 
Sheet (MSDS) or a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) for each potentially 
hazardous material. 
Standard 3.1.4 speaks to the reality that CubeSats are not accessible after integration to 
the P-POD. The CubeSat designer should take into account the amount of time the CubeSat will 
be in storage prior to launch, without access. 
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3.1.4 All flight materials, including propellants, shall be 
contained within the CubeSat prior to P-POD integration. After 
integration, the CubeSat provider will have no access to their 
satellite. 
While the CubeSat program wishes to be transparent in a way that the primary mission 
operations and schedule are unaffected by the presence of the CubeSats, hazardous materials may 
demand extra care. The CubeSat operator may need to work with the integrator, launch provider, 
and Range Safety to provide provisions such as shipping containers and leak sensors.  
3.1.5 The CubeSat provider shall work with the integrator, the 
launch provider, and Range Safety to coordinate any special 
provisions needed for the safe and legal transport and storage of 
any materials onboard the CubeSat. For example, special 
provisions may include equipment and procedures needed for 
atmospheric monitoring and leak detection or certified shipping 
containers. See AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.2.1.5. 
The presence of hazardous materials affects how pressure systems are treated by Range 
Safety. The following section outlines requirements which are specific to pressure systems 
containing hazardous materials or non-hazardous materials. 
Pressure Systems 
The CubeSat developer is directed to the general requirements from AFSPCMAN 91-710 
which pertain to all systems which include pressure systems or other fluid containment systems.  
3.2 Pressure Systems and Fluid Containment Systems 
General Requirements. Satellites containing pressure systems 
shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.1 and 
12.10. Also see AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Attachment 1 for 
additional guidance in preparing the Missile System Prelaunch 
Safety Package (MSPSP). 
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The Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package (MSPSP) is a document that is submitted 
to Range Safety which documents that the system has met an acceptable level of safety. CubeSat 
providers produce an MSPSP for each CubeSat satellite.  
Propellant and Pressure System Design Requirements 
Pressure vessel design and verification is emphasized in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 
Chapter 12 (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). These requirements are discussed in Chapter V 
RANGE SAFETY in the section titled Pressure Systems. The route toward flightworthiness can 
take several paths depending on the pressure vessel material, the material contained within the 
vessel such as the propellant, and the failure mode of the vessel. The applicability of the 
requirements given in AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Chapter 12 are summarized in Table 4 on in 
Chapter V of this document. 
Standard 3.3.1 directs the CubeSat developer to the general requirements that apply to all 
propellant reservoirs and pressure vessels. 
3.3.1 Satellites containing a pressure vessel or reservoir shall 
comply with AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.1.5.3.1 
which describes the required stress analysis. 
Since CubeSats which fly as secondary payloads must pose no significant requirements 
on the primary mission, CubeSats must be designed for long periods of storage. CubeSats are 
often integrated months prior to launch. In the case where a launch date slips or is scrubbed, 
CubeSats must be prepared to remain safely inside the P-POD until the next launch opportunity. 
Some propellants may decompose during storage, such as hydrogen peroxide (H2O2). 
Standard 3.3.2 intends to prepare the CubeSat designer for the worst case storage duration. When 
the duration of storage is an issue, the mission integrator must be notified of any special 
requirements. A case study on a hydrogen peroxide monopropellant system is given in Chapter 
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VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES in the section titled Case 2: Monopropellant, Hydrogen 
Peroxide. 
3.3.2 Pressure vessels and sealed containers containing a 
propellant that decomposes or otherwise builds up pressure 
during storage shall be designed with a Maximum Expected 
Operating Pressure (MEOP) as the maximum equilibrium 
pressure at which pressure rise ceases or shall be designed for 
the maximum feasible pressure built up after being stored until a 
date 18 months past the latest planned launch date. The launch 
integrator (Cal Poly, for example), shall be notified if any 
components have a limited safe storage life. 
While AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 tends to require a burst factor of at least 1.5 for all 
pressure vessels and sealed container, a more conservative requirements is given in Vol. 6 Section 
11.5.1.3.8-9. That requirement requires pressure vessels which contain hazardous propellant to 
maintain a burst factor greater than 2 “during transportation or ground handling operations.” 
CubeSats are always integrated to the P-POD prior to integration to the launch vehicle. Therefore, 
all CubeSat pressure systems and propellant reservoirs which contain hazardous materials must 
be design with a burst factor of 2 or greater while all other pressure vessels and propellant 
reservoirs may be designed with a burst factor of 1.5 or greater (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 
2004). 
3.3.3 If the contents of a pressure vessel or sealed container may 
pose a hazard to personnel or equipment including flight 
hardware in the event of a leak, burst, or spill, or if the pressure 
vessel or container exhibits a brittle failure mode, it shall have a 
burst factor of ≥ 2.0 
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3.3.4 If the contents of a pressure vessel or sealed container will 
not pose a hazard in the event of a leak, burst, or spill, and the 
failure mode is leak-before-burst (LBB), that pressure vessel or 
sealed container shall have a burst factor of ≥ 1.5. 
Pressure Vessel and Propellant Reservoir Verification Paths 
Standards 3.3.5 through 3.3.7 pertain to the verification of pressure vessels and propellant 
reservoirs. Specifically, the requirements describe the analysis and tests that are needed to prove 
the flightworthiness of pressure vessels and propellant reservoirs. These requirements are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter V in the section titled Pressure Vessel Verification. The 
requirements are also summarized in Table 5 through Table 7 in Chapter V. 
Standard 3.3.5 offers standards for metallic pressure vessels and reservoirs by pointing 
the CubeSat developer to the relevant sections of AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Chapter 12. The 
exact requirements that are applicable depend on the failure mode of the pressure vessel and 
whether a leak would create a hazardous situation. AFSPCMAN 91-710 discusses two paths that 
could be taken. A pressure vessel exhibiting a brittle fracture or when leakage of the contents 
would create a hazardous situation must follow path 2, as described in Standard 3.3.5.3. If a 
pressure vessel exhibits a Leak-before-burst (LBB) failure mode and the contents are not 
hazardous, the pressure vessel may be subject to either path 1, as described in Standard 3.3.5.2, or 
path 2, depending on the preference of the CubeSat provider. (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004) 
3.3.5 Metallic Pressure Vessels and Reservoirs 
3.3.5.1 Satellites containing a metallic pressure vessel or 
reservoir shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 
12.1 and 12.3.1. 
3.3.5.2 Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or 
reservoir that exhibits a LBB failure mode and leakage of the 
contents cannot create a hazardous situation shall comply with 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.2.2 and 12.3.2 which 
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describe the requirements for Verification Approach A, Path 1. 
The satellite provider may choose to follow Path 2 instead by 
complying with Sections 12.2.3 and 12.3.3. 
3.3.5.3 Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or 
reservoir that exhibits a brittle failure mode or where leakage of 
the contents could create a hazardous situation shall comply 
with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.2.3 and 12.3.3 
which describe the requirements for Verification Approach A, 
Path 2. 
3.3.5.4 Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or 
reservoir designed using ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
or the DOT Pressure Vessel Codes shall comply with 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.2.4 which describes 
Verification Approach B. 
As Standard 3.3.5 gives requirements for metallic pressure vessels, Standard 3.3.6 gives 
requirements for Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV). As with metallic pressure 
vessels, COPVs verification requirements also fall into two paths. 
3.3.6 Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) and 
Reservoirs 
3.3.6.1 Any satellite containing a composite overwrapped 
pressure vessel or reservoir shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-
710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.2.5 and 12.2.8. 
3.3.6.2 Any satellite containing a composite overwrapped 
pressure vessel or reservoir that exhibits a LBB failure mode and 
leakage of the contents cannot create a hazardous situation shall 
comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.2.6 which 
describes the requirements for Verification Approach A, Path 1. 
3.3.6.3 Any satellite containing a composite overwrapped 
pressure vessel or reservoir that exhibits a brittle failure mode 
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or where leakage of the contents could create a hazardous 
situation shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 
12.2.7 which describe the requirements for Verification 
Approach A, Path 2. 
3.3.6.4 Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or 
reservoir designed using ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
or the DOT Pressure Vessel Codes shall comply with 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.2.4 which describes 
Verification Approach B. 
Standard 3.3.7 provides a similar treatment for Sealed Containers as for metallic and 
COPV pressure vessels. The requirements in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vo. 3 concerning sealed 
containers are intended for items such as electronics boxes and reaction wheel assemblies. 
However, some propellants with low vapor pressures may be treated as sealed containers rather 
than pressure vessels, as with the hypothetical electrospray propellant reservoir discussed in 
Chapter VI RANGE SAFETY CASE STUDIES in the case study titled Case 7: Electrospray, 
Gallium. In some cases, classification as a sealed container may reduce the verification 
requirements somewhat. However, if the sealed container exhibits a brittle failure mode or 
contains a hazardous material, then that sealed container is subject to the same requirements as a 
pressure vessel containing a hazardous material or exhibiting brittle failure. Indeed, the sealed 
container in the case study cited above contains Gallium and must meet the requirements for a 
pressure vessel containing a hazardous material. 
3.3.7.1 Range Safety may allow certain propellant reservoirs 
which operate at low differential pressures to be treated as sealed 
containers. 
3.3.7.2 Any satellite containing a sealed container that exhibits a 
LBB failure mode and leakage of the contents cannot create a 
hazardous situation shall comply with AFSCPMAN 910-710 
Vol. 3 Section 12.4.6. 
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3.3.7.3 Any satellite containing a sealed container that exhibits a 
brittle failure mode or where leakage of the contents could create 
a hazardous situation shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3 Section 12.4.6.2 and 12.2.3. 
Pressure System Components 
In addition to pressure vessels, all pressure components must be subject to safety 
requirements, as discussed in Chapter V RANGE SAFETY in the section titled Hazardous 
Pressure System Components. Standard 3.4 directs the reader to the applicable sections of 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3.  
3.4 Pressure System Components. Satellites containing 
hazardous pressure system components shall comply with 
AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.5.2. 
Systems Not Currently Supported 
The CubeSat program currently does not foresee any hypergolic nor cryogenic propulsion 
systems in the near future, as is discussed in Chapter V RANGE SAFETY, in the section titled 
Omitted Sections from AFSPCMAN 91-710. It would be challenging to prepare CubeSats to fly 
with monopropellant systems. Hypergolic systems are a step farther than monopropellant systems 
in every hazard category. Cryogenic systems require a significant amount of maintenance that is 
not possible within the CubeSat specification. In order to invest more time in systems that are up-
and-coming, the author did not study hypergolic and cryogenic systems in depth. For 
completeness, the author recommends publishing a standard to declare that Cal Poly does not 
intend to support such systems. 
Cal Poly does not wish to limit progress in the CubeSat community. If a CubeSat 
developer believes they can find ways to safely implement hyperbolic or cryogenic systems, they 
should contact Cal Poly. 
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3.5 Hypergolic and Cryogenic Systems. (Not currently 
supported by Cal Poly)  
3.5.1 Satellites containing cryogenic systems are not currently 
supported by Cal Poly. Contact Cal Poly if you wish to launch 
such a cryogenic system. The CubeSat provider may reference 
AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.8 and 12.5.2 for 
requirements that are generally applied to hypergolic flight 
hardware systems. 
3.5.2 Satellites containing cryogenic systems are not currently 
supported by Cal Poly. The CubeSat provider should understand 
that CubeSats are often integrated to the launch vehicle months 
ahead of the launch date. During this time, the CubeSat provider 
will have no access to their satellite. Contact Cal Poly if you 
wish to launch such a cryogenic system. The CubeSat provider 
may reference AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.9 and 
12.5.2 for requirements that are generally applied to cryogenic 
flight hardware systems. 
Orbital Safety Standards 
The topic of orbital safety is discussed in detail throughout Chapter VII ORBITAL 
SAFETY. The requirements begin with a statement encouraging CubeSat operators to adhere to 
the following requirements for the good of the entire CubeSat community. 
4 Orbital Safety Standards. Adherence to these orbital safety 
standards will support the CubeSat community’s reputation for 
“good citizenship” among the greater space community. 
Deviations from these requirements may jeopardize future 
launch opportunities for the CubeSat community which relies on 
the good will of organizations such as launch providers, primary 
satellite providers, and Range Safety 
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Command Security 
While non-propulsive CubeSats are confined to the free-fall trajectory that results from 
deployment form the CubeSat, those with propulsion systems possess the ability to alter their 
trajectory. CubeSat operators can command their spacecraft to conduct maneuvers. However, 
third party entities with malicious intent may attempt to hijack these CubeSats and to use their 
propulsion systems to do harm to other missions. This calls for CubeSat operators to consider 
options to improve Command Security. The factors which contribute to hijacking as well as 
possible solutions to prevent such events are discussed in Chapter VII in the section titled 
Command Security. 
4.1.1 If the CubeSat contains a propulsion system, the CubeSat 
provider shall establish a Command Security plan which 
provides adequate protection against hijacking of the propulsive 
capabilities, proportional to the capability of the CubeSat to 
intercept another spacecraft.  
4.1.2 The Command Security plan shall protect against the 
transmission of malicious commands by unauthorized ground 
stations, by intruders who gain access to authorized ground 
stations, by hackers operating over unsecure networks such as 
the internet, and potentially by members of the team acting 
alone. 
4.1.3 The CubeSat provider may consider using software or 
hardware encryption for command transmissions, secure and 
monitored entrances to the command center, personnel vetting 
procedures, the “two man rule,” and limited access to encryption 
keys and command protocols. 
4.1.4 The CubeSat operator should exercise extreme caution 
whenever using remote or partnered ground stations. NASA 
spacecraft have historically been hijacked by hackers operating 
over the internet between remotely connected ground stations . 
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Close Proximity Operations with Host Vehicle 
Immediately after separating from the host vehicle at P-POD deployment, a CubeSat 
propulsion system may present a hazard to the host vehicle. Suppose that a propulsion system 
were to burn in such a way that the spacecraft entered a trajectory in which it returned and 
collided with the host vehicle. 
Regardless of the performance of the CubeSat propulsion system, it should be disarmed 
during the first 30 minutes after separation as a minimum. This reduces the probability that any 
thruster plume will damage the host vehicle. 
4.2.1 In order to mitigate the possibility of thruster plume 
impingement on the host vehicle, and in order to improve 
separation from other CubeSats, the propulsion system shall be 
disarmed by at least one independent inhibit for the first 30 
minutes after separation. Note that the launch provider may 
impose a longer delay or other criteria that must be met before 
propulsion systems may be armed. 
In addition to the host vehicle, other CubeSats may contain equipment such as optics, 
which are sensitive to thruster plumes. The CubeSat operator will need to coordinate with the 
launch integrator or launch provider to address this potential hazard. Collision between CubeSats 
is also a concern. In some cases, activation of the propulsion systems may need to wait until 
accurate orbital tracking data becomes available. 
4.2.2. The CubeSat operator shall coordinate with the launch 
integrator or launch provider to determine when the CubeSats 
are sufficiently separated to allow thruster operation. This 
decision shall consider the potential for plume impingement and 
collision between CubeSats. 
After the initial delay time of 30 minutes, the CubeSat propulsion system may be used if 
the performance of the system is insufficient to place the CubeSat in a collision trajectory with 
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the host vehicle. The CubeSat is assumed to be in close proximity operations for the duration of 
one week after deployment. During this time, the CubeSat should not arm its propulsion system 
until it has drifted far enough away that an erroneous burn which uses all of the propellant cannot 
cause the CubeSat to return and collide with the host vehicle. 
4.2.3 Within the first week after deployment, if the CubeSat 
satellite can feasibly return and collide with the host vehicle in 
one pass, the propulsion system shall be disarmed by at least one 
independent inhibit until the CubeSat can no longer feasibly 
return and collide with the host vehicle. 
The criteria which predict the feasibility of a collision are given in Standards 4.2.3.1 
through 4.2.3.3. The section in Chapter VII titled Collision with the Host Vehicle discusses the 
analysis which was used to determine a safety envelope within which a CubeSat cannot return 
and collide with the host vehicle within one pass. The V required to intercept the host vehicle 
increases after each orbit by an amount equal to the portion of the separation velocity that is 
parallel to the orbital velocity. This linear trend is useful during the first 100 orbital periods since 
separation, which corresponds to approximately one week in LEO, and the trend is largely 
independent of separation velocity, the direction of separation, orbital altitude, eccentricity, and 
the orbital location at separation. 
4.2.3.1 In the short term, the V required for the CubeSat to 
collide with the host vehicle is greater than 90% of the product 
of the tangential portion of the separation velocity (~1 m/s) and 
the number of orbits since separation. 
(V for Collision) > 0.9 * (Tangential Separation Vel.) * (Periods Since Separation) 
 
Standard 4.2.3.2 offers a criteria which compares the total feasible V attributed to the 
propulsion system with the V required at a specific time for collision. Once the V required for 
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collision has grown beyond the feasible V, a collision is no longer feasible and the propulsion 
system may be activated. 
4.2.3.2 A CubeSat cannot feasible return and collide with the 
host vehicle within one pass in the short term if 90% of the 
required V for collision, as given in 4.2.3.1, has grown beyond 
the maximum feasible V the propulsion system can generate. 
If the criteria given in Standard 4.2.3.2 has not yet been met, the CubeSat operator may 
activate their propulsion system after 30 minutes from deployment if the thrust to weight ratio of 
the CubeSat is sufficiently small so that the propulsion system cannot overcome the orbital drift 
which drives the CubeSat and host vehicle apart. 
4.2.3.3 A CubeSat cannot feasibly return and collide with the 
host vehicle within one pass in the near term if the satellite 
satisfies this inequality expression. This expression compares the 
maximum feasible acceleration produced by the CubeSat with 
90% of the growth rate for the V required to enter a collision 
course, which is approximately the CubeSat’s separation velocity 
(~1 m/s) in the direction tangent to the orbital velocity of the 
host vehicle. 
(Max. Thrust) 
< 
0.9 * (Tangential Separation Velocity) 
(Min. C.S. Mass) (Orbital Period) 
 
After one week, the CubeSat is considered to be sufficiently separated from the host 
vehicle and the propulsion system can be used, if not previously allowed by Standards 4.2.3.1 
through 4.2.3.3. Throughout orbital operations, the CubeSat operator should follow general 
orbital safety measures and maintain communication with the JSpOC, as will be discussed later. 
4.2.4 After one week has passed since CubeSat separation, the 
CubeSat is be assumed to be adequately separated from the host 
vehicle such that the requirements associated with close 
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proximity operations no longer apply. If not already permitted by 
4.2.3, the propulsion system may be armed and operated 
according to general orbital safety standards. Note that the 
launch provider may impose other criteria that must be met 
before the propulsion system may be used. 
Trackability 
The section titled Trackability in Chapter VII discusses the need for a CubeSat operator 
to be in contact with the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), which provides conjunction 
assessment, collision avoidance, and tracking data for space objects. It is in the CubeSat 
operator’s best interest to collaborate with the JSpOC to determine a safe concept of operations. 
The CubeSat provider should establish first contact with the JSpOC by working with 
their launch provider to submit an Orbital Data Request (ODR). That establishes a direct two-way 
communication pipeline between the CubeSat operator and the JSpOC. 
4.3.1 If the CubeSat contains a propulsion system of any kind, 
including solar sails, the operator shall work with the Joint Space 
Operations Center (JSpOC), operated by the Joint Functional 
Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE), to establish a 
Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance plan. The 
CubeSat operator can establish communication with JFCC 
SPACE by working with their launch provider or launch 
integrator to submit an Orbital Data Request (ODR) form to 
ODR@space-track.org. The ODR and instructions are available 
online at https://www.space-track.org/documentation#/odr. The 
CubeSat operator should also request an account with 
www.space-track.org. For reference, see AFI 91-217, especially 
section 5.9. 
Certain steps can be taken to help the JSpOC to more easily track CubeSats. Active 
transponders can help the JSpOC to easily find CubeSats and distinguish them from space debris 
and from other CubeSats. Passive Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) reflectors are strongly 
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recommended since they do not require battery power. This allows the JSpOC to more easily 
track CubeSats after the end of mission in order to predict collisions with still-operating 
spacecraft. 
4.3.2 If the CubeSat contains a propulsion system of any kind, 
including solar sails, the design shall also include active or 
passive RF identification reflectors or transponders. This will 
help the JSpOC to provide more effective tracking data and will 
aid in predicting orbital conjunctions with other objects. Passive 
devices are preferred over transponders as they do not rely on the 
satellite’s power system 
While the proposed standards require that all propulsive CubeSats implement RF 
identification reflectors or transponders, it is strongly recommended that all CubeSats introduce 
such devices into their designs. The entire orbital community will benefit from the improved level 
of safety. 
4.3.3 All CubeSat developers are encouraged to implement 
active or passive RF identification reflectors or transponders as 
discussed in standard 4.3.2 of this document. This will help the 
JSpOC to provide more effective tracking data to the CubeSat. 
Passive devices are preferred over transponders as they do not 
rely on the satellite’s power system 
End-of-Life (EOL) Safing, Passivation, and Disposal 
In Chapter VII ORBITAL SAFETY, the section titled End-of-Life: Passivation and the 
section titled End-of-Life: De-orbit and Re-entry discusses some important End-of-Life (EOL) 
procedures which help to mitigate the growing problem of man-made space debris. Many of these 
requirements are outlined in AFSPCI 10-1204 (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009). 
It is critical that CubeSats meet their requirement to de-orbit within 25 years of the end of 
their mission, and within 30 years of launch (NASA-STD-8719.14A: Process for Limiting Orbital 
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Debris, 2012). Standard 4.4.1 addresses the importance of disposal. When a propulsive maneuver 
is necessary in order to meet that requirement, the CubeSat operator is responsible for budgeting 
their propellant and other resources so that the maneuver can be executed successfully before the 
propellant is depleted. 
4.4.1 If a propulsive maneuver is necessary to de-orbit within 25 
years, the CubeSat operator shall initiate End-of-Life (EOL) 
procedures when the onboard resources reach the minimum 
required for safe disposal and passivation. 
In order to prevent the generation of orbital debris due to explosions, all pressure systems 
should be vented at EOL. One way of “venting” propellant is to use up the entire propellant 
supply in a disposal maneuver. 
4.4.2 In order to prevent the creation of new space debris 
resulting from explosions, at EOL the CubeSat operator shall 
depressurize all pressure systems and vent all remaining 
propellant. 
While both safing and disposal activities are important, AFSPCI 10-1204 Section 
3.6.3.2.1 prioritizes safing procedures over disposal procedures (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009). 
Standard 4.4.3 in this document communicates the same order of priority as AFSPCI 10-1204. 
4.4.3 In keeping with the priorities given in AFSPCI 10-1204 
Section 3.6.3.2.1, “safing the satellite shall take precedence over 
all other disposal actions.” 
Re-entry Survivability 
Each non-military CubeSats developer must work with the FCC to obtain their frequency 
licenses. As discussed in Chapter VII, FCC policies require that the satellite provider submit a 
document outlining reentry survivability analysis. According to a public notice published by the 
FCC, CubeSat components may not be launched which will survive reentry with kinetic energy of 
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15 J or greater. Impacts of less than 15 J are not expected to result in casualty (Federal 
Communications Commission, 2013). 
4.4.4 Re-entry Survivability: CubeSats providers shall 
coordinate with their frequency license authority to respond to 
reentry hazards. When the FCC is the licensing agency, the 
CubeSat shall contain no components which will survive reentry 
through the atmosphere with a kinetic energy of 15J or greater. 
Compliance with this requirement reduces the possibility of 
casualty due to debris impact. See this public notice from the 
FCC: http://www.fcc.gov/document/guidance-obtaining-
licenses-small-satellites. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The CubeSat community has begun to develop and implement propulsion systems. This 
movement represents a new capability which may satisfy mission needs such as orbital and 
constellation maintenance, formation flight, de-orbit, and even interplanetary travel. With the 
freedom and capability granted by propulsion systems, CubeSat providers must accept new 
responsibilities in proportion to the potential hazards that propulsion systems may present. 
Propulsion systems may carry hazardous materials which can be explosive, toxic, 
flammable, corrosive, etc. Propellant containment systems such as pressure vessels carry the risk 
of burst. Upon separation from the host vehicle CubeSats must be designed so that they cannot 
return and collide with their host. During orbital operations, CubeSat operators must be careful to 
protect against collision with other objects, especially occupied spacecraft such as the 
International Space Station (ISS). Finally, at End-of-Life (EOL), a CubeSat must be placed into a 
safe state in a disposal orbit, or they must safely reenter the atmosphere. 
The Cal Poly CubeSat program publishes and maintains the CubeSat Design 
Specification (CDS). They wish to help the CubeSat community to safety and responsibly expand 
its capabilities to include propulsive designs. For this reason, the author embarked on the task of 
developing a draft of safety standards for CubeSat propulsion systems. 
Wherever possible, the standards are based on existing documents. Chapter III introduces 
some of the documents that were used. These documents are published by entities such as the Cal 
Poly CubeSat program, NASA, and the Air Force. 
In Chapter IV, the author provides an overview of certain concepts in systems safety with 
respect to the classification of hazards, determination of fault tolerance requirements, and the use 
of inhibits to satisfy fault tolerance requirements. Depending on the severity of a hazard being 
contained, a CubeSat design may be required to demonstrate no-fault tolerance, single-fault 
tolerance, or dual-fault tolerance. 
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Chapter V discusses range hazards that could exist from ground operations through 
launch with respect to hazardous materials and pressure systems. Most of the standards relating to 
Range Safety are drawn from AFSPCMAN 91-710. Range Safety, part of the U.S. Air Force 
Space Command, provides very detailed guidance for verifying pressure vessels. Pressure vessels 
designed for leak-before-burst (LBB) which containing non-hazardous fluids can be verified 
using verification path 1. Pressure vessels that exhibit the brittle fracture failure mode or contain 
hazardous fluids, must follow verification path 2. Sealed containers are treated in a similar way 
(AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3, 2004). 
All pressure vessels or sealed containers containing non-hazardous materials must satisfy 
a burst factor of 1.5 or greater. During ground operations such as transportation, pressure vessels 
and sealed containers which contain hazardous materials must satisfy a burst factor of 2.0 or 
greater. Since CubeSats are transported after integration, any CubeSat pressure vessel or sealed 
container containing a hazardous fluid or exhibiting a brittle fracture failure mode must have a 
burst factor of 2.0 or greater (AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6, 2004). 
Having reviewed a set of hypothetical propulsion system architectures with an engineer 
from Range Safety at Vandenberg Air Force Base, the author compiled a case study, which can 
be found in Chapter VI of this document. The hazard level of monopropellant propulsion systems 
can vary greatly. Generally, hydrazine propulsion systems must be protected from leak with dual-
fault tolerance. Green propellants such as AF-M315E, may be safe enough for containment with 
no-fault tolerance. Propellants such as Gallium may seem non-hazardous due to their low toxicity 
and low vapor pressure. However, as is the case with Gallium, leakage could cause a catastrophic 
hazard due to its ability to corrode soft metals such as Aluminum. While a Gallium container may 
be tested and analyzed as a sealed container, it may require dual-fault tolerant containment. Every 
propulsion system offers unique nuances. The author recommends that CubeSat developers 
communicate with Range Safety as early as possible in order to identify and contain hazards 
while design modifications are still possible. Otherwise, a CubeSat provider may find that their 
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propulsion system cannot meet an acceptable level of safety in time to take advantage of a launch 
opportunity. 
In Chapter VII, the author discusses many aspects of orbital safety. The author discusses 
the risk of collision with the host vehicle and with third party satellites along with the trackability 
of CubeSats that use propulsion systems. Some recommendations are given for working with the 
Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE) which operates the Joint Space 
Operations Center (JSpOC), thanks to the input of two advisors who work with the JSpOC. In 
addition to establishing a point of contact with the JSpOC, CubeSat operators can improve orbital 
safety by incorporating Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) devices into their designs. 
Command Security is discussed as an important aspect of a mission which implements a 
propulsion system. CubeSat developers are encouraged to prepare for the possibility of an 
attempted hijacking. They should strive to identify every entry point where someone with 
malicious intent could take control of the propulsive capabilities of a CubeSat. CubeSat operators 
should be very careful if they intend to use remote or partnered ground stations to send 
commands, especially when connecting the ground stations through an internet connection. The 
appropriate degree of protection may depend on the threat level. For example, CubeSats with very 
low propulsive performance may be less capable of causing harm that CubeSats with high thrust-
to-weigh ratios. In some cases, expensive and intrusive Command Security measures may not be 
necessary in order to meet an acceptable level of safety. 
The author discusses End-of-Life (EOL) procedures such as safing and de-orbit 
operations. These safety standards are intended to promote “good citizenship” by minimizing 
CubeSat missions’ contribution to orbital debris hazards. CubeSats which require an EOL 
maneuver to reach their disposal orbit may need to monitor their onboard resources such as 
propellant. Before the resources have depleted below the required amount, the CubeSat operator 
must initiate the EOL maneuver. CubeSats which contain pressure systems should also passivate 
their system, possibly by venting their propellant, as soon as the pressure system is no longer 
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needed. According to AFSPCI 10-1204 Section 3.6.3.2.1, “safing the satellite shall take 
precedence over all other disposal actions” (AFSPCI 10-1204, 2009). 
APPENDIX B contains the current draft of the proposed safety standards at the time of 
this publication. In Chapter VIII the author steps through each standard and offers justification 
with references to other applicable sections within this document. The author is confident that 
these standards will set the stage for a dialogue in the CubeSat community which will lead to the 
formulation of a reasonable and comprehensive set of standards. The author hopes that the 
discussions given throughout this document help CubeSat developers to visualize the path to 
flight readiness so that they can begin on the right foot. 
Next Steps 
Publishing the Standards 
This document only proposes a draft of safety standards. None of the requirements given 
here are binding. In order for these standards to become publishable, they should be presented to 
the CubeSat Standards Committee. After discussions, and perhaps revisions, the standards should 
be reviewed by various launch providers. More input may be needed from Range Safety and the 
JFCC SPACE. 
When the final draft of the standards is complete, the Cal Poly CubeSat program should 
publish them as part of the CubeSat Design Specification (CDS) or as a supplementary document 
referenced by the CDS. After the standards have been published, the Cal Poly CubeSat program 
will be able to support self-propelled CubeSats in general, rather than in a case-by-case basis. 
Notify Launch Providers of Close Proximity Analysis 
The author recommends that launch providers should be introduced to the information 
contained in the section titled Collision with the Host Vehicle in Chapter VII. This information 
could help the launch provider to select an optimum orientation for the host vehicle during 
CubeSat separation. The author recommends deployments in the velocity direction, or the 
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negative velocity direction, in order to maximize the benefits of orbital drift. When a CubeSat has 
a high area-to-mass ratio, the effects of drag should be considered. For example, should a 
CubeSat with a drag sail deploy its sail too early, it may blow the CubeSat back to the host 
vehicle. For certain separation directions the drag will help to separate the CubeSat from the host 
vehicle, while for other separation directions the drag could blow the CubeSat back at the host 
vehicle. 
Recommendations for Research 
With the perspective gained in this research, the author wishes to propose topics for 
future research. 
Develop RFID Devices 
First, as is discussed in the section titled Radio Reflectors and RFID in Chapter VII, 
orbital safety could be improved through the use of Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) 
devices. While each CubeSat provider may be capable of acquiring their own device, cost could 
be saved if a small number of organizations were to mass produce them. Perhaps the Cal Poly 
CubeSat program could take on this responsibility and provide the devices at a reasonable cost. 
Continue Close Proximity Analysis 
Some steps could be taken to build upon the analysis that is described in the section titled 
Collision with the Host Vehicle in Chapter VII. The analysis predicts safety envelopes whether a 
CubeSat could not feasibly return and collide with the host vehicle after separating from the P-
POD. The analysis assumes that the intercept trajectory causes a collision within one pass. Lower 
V maneuvers may be capable of placing the CubeSat into an intercept trajectory that takes two 
passes, three passes, or more. Future research could use a multiple-pass Lambert’s problem solver 
to determine the V thresholds that achieve intercept after range of delay times with varying 
numbers of passes. 
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Another research task could also spin-off from that analysis. The author did not have time 
or computational resources to determine the probability of collision if a CubeSat were to fire in a 
random direction after separation from the host vehicle. Future research could plot the probability 
as a function of delay time. While the deterministic analysis which has already been conducted 
found a safety envelope where no feasible maneuver could place the CubeSat into a single-pass 
collision trajectory, a probabilistic  analysis could find a wider envelope where the probability of 
collision is sufficiently low enough to satisfy the collision probability requirements given in AFI 
91-217 Section 5.2. 
The analysis concerning collisions with the host vehicle also neglects the presence of a 
primary payload which might separate from the host vehicle prior to CubeSat deployment. See 
the section titled Analysis in Chapter VII under the heading Collision with the Host Vehicle and 
Figure 15. The author hypothesizes that that if the CubeSat separates from the host vehicle some 
time after the primary satellite has departed, the initial V required to intercept primary should be 
the tangential separation velocity of the primary times the number of orbital periods since 
separation. 
The V required to intercept the primary should increase after each orbit by the relative 
tangential separation velocities of the primary satellite and the CubeSat. 
Command Security 
More research could be done to determine the level of Command Security that is 
necessary to protect the control authority of propulsive CubeSats. For example, in future research 
one could discern the conditions when hardware encryption is necessary and when software 
encryption suffices. The author and an advisor attempted to obtain input from the National 
Security Administration (NSA). However, this had not been accomplished at the time of this 
publication. 
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Unified Orbital Safety Authority 
During this project, the author noticed a non-ideal situation that exists in the industry. 
Orbital debris mitigation is currently enforced by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) for every non-government spacecraft that requires a transmission license. Government 
spacecraft, on the other hand, can obtain frequency licenses directly through the National 
Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) and their frequency manager. The author 
means no disrespect to either of these organizations, but the primary charter of these 
organizations is not to enforce orbital safety. One could imagine a mission which requires no 
frequency license and slips through the cracks. Perhaps a spacecraft were to launch without a 
frequency license. The lack of a frequency license only prevents the spacecraft from lawfully 
transmitting, but not from launching. One could easily imagine such a possibility for CubeSat 
missions when the flight hardware is integrated months prior to launch with or without a 
frequency license. 
The author proposes that research be done to examine this condition. Perhaps orbital 
safety could be enforced by a different organization, even a new organization that is more directly 
chartered to maintain orbital safety. Perhaps the Joint Functional Component Command for Space 
(JFCC SPACE) or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are reasonable candidates to 
accept this responsibility. The organization would need to be given sufficient authority to enforce 
orbital safety. The FCC is capable of withholding a frequency license for unsafe space systems 
while Range Safety can keep a spacecraft from launching when it poses excessive risk to the 
range. The author is unaware of any authority that can prevent a spacecraft from launching due to 
orbital safety hazards. 
Future research may consider how orbital safety can be ensured for satellites operated or 
launched abroad. Perhaps an international authority should take on the task of enforcing 
international norms of behavior for orbital operations. Perhaps this is a responsibility that could 
be taken on by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs.  
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APPENDIX A. Nomenclature 
1U 1U-sized Standard CubeSat (approximately 10 x 10 x 10 cm cube 
and 1.33 kg) 
3U  3U-sized Standard CubeSat (approximately 10 x 10 x 30 cm cube 
and 4 kg) 
ADCS Attitude Determination and Control System 
AF Air Force 
AFSPC Air Force Space Command 
AFSPCI Air Force Space Command Instruction 
AFSPCMAN Air Force Space Command Manual 
CA Conjunction Assessment 
CDS CubeSat Design Specification, 
available at http://cubesat.org/index.php/documents/developers 
COLA Collision Avoidance 
COPV Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EOL End-of-Life (End of Mission) 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
GEO Geosynchronous Orbit 
H2O2  Hydrogen Peroxide 
Independent Inhibit An inhibit that functions in series, not parallel, with another inhibit 
where the two inhibits are not controlled by the same controller. For 
any two independent inhibits, there cannot be a single-point-of-
failure. 
Inhibit A device that interrupts potential for a hazard to occur. 
Isp Specific Impulse 
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ISS International Space Station 
JFCC SPACE Joint Functional Component Command for Space 
JSpOC Joint Space Operations Center 
LBB Leak-before-burst failure mode. 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
MEMS Microelectromechanical Systems 
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet 
N2 Diatomic Nitrogen 
N2H4 Hydrazine 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDE Nondestructive Examination 
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
ODAR Orbital Debris Assessment Report 
P-POD Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer 
PPT Pulsed Plasma Thruster 
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification 
SCAPE suit Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (for handling 
hazardous materials) 
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SDS Safety Data Sheet 
swim lanes Tiered categories of requirements. The requirements specified for 
each “swim lane” is appropriate to the severity of the potential 
hazards that exist. 
 
TLE Two Line Element 
TOF Time of Flight 
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base, California 
∆V Change in Velocity 
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APPENDIX B. Draft of Standards 
Disclaimer 
At this time, any standards or requirements that are proposed in this document are in 
draft form and should not be used for mission planning purposes without consultation 
with the launch provider or the auxiliary payload integrator. The author hopes that the 
reader will find the discussions contained in this document useful as he or she assess 
the risks associated with their particular mission. For updates regarding the release of 
standards and requirements related to the CubeSat Design Specification (CDS), visit 
the Cal Poly CubeSat Program’s website, http://cubesat.org/. 
 
1. Fault tolerance and inhibits 
1.1. Any potential hazard that is contained with dual-fault tolerance using at least three 
independent inhibits shall be identified as non-credible. Potential hazards that are 
deterministically shown to be infeasible shall also be identified as non-credible. All 
other potential hazards shall be identified as credible. 
1.2. When the mission can be accomplished without imposing a hazard, the hazard shall be 
avoided. The CubeSat provider shall be prepared to defend the existence of any hazard 
that cannot be eliminated. The rationale shall match the gravity of the potential hazard. 
1.3. The severity of each credible hazard shall be assessed as either negligible, marginal, 
critical, or catastrophic, according to the potential consequences, as defined in 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 1 Figure 3.2. 
1.3.1. All catastrophic hazards shall be contained with dual-fault tolerance using at least 
three independent inhibits. 
1.3.2. All critical hazards shall be contained with single-fault tolerance using at least two 
independent inhibits. 
1.3.3. All marginal and all negligible hazards shall be contained with at least one inhibit. 
1.3.4. No structural failure, given an adequate design margin, shall be regarded as a single 
point of failure. 
2. Propulsion System General Requirements. The CubeSat provider shall provide a 
Propulsion System Summary Sheet (PSSS) to the launch integrator and the launch provider. 
The PSSS shall include a schematic and a description of the system performance limits, the 
propellant and its containment system, hazards, inhibits, and inhibit controls. The CubeSat 
provider shall follow the format given below. 
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3. Range Safety Standards 
3.1. Hazardous Material Requirements. These requirements apply to any system that 
contains materials that are either flammable, explosive, energetic, toxic, or otherwise 
hazardous, on their own or in interaction with other materials in the expected 
environments under environmental conditions expected from ground operations through 
CubeSat deployment.  
3.1.1. The CubeSat design shall use the least hazardous material that satisfies the mission 
requirements. 
3.1.2. The CubeSat provider shall be prepared to justify the use of any hazardous material. 
The rationale shall match the gravity of the potential hazards. 
3.1.3. The CubeSat provider shall declare to the integrator, the launch provider, and 
Range Safety, any potentially hazardous material present on their satellite at the 
earliest time possible in order to allow sufficient time to address any concerns 
before integration. This will improve the chances that the CubeSat will eventually 
demonstrate a level of safety acceptable for flight. The CubeSat provider shall also 
provide a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) or a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) for 
each potentially hazardous material. 
3.1.4. All flight materials, including propellants, shall be contained within the CubeSat 
prior to P-POD integration. After integration, the CubeSat provider will have no 
access to their satellite. 
3.1.5. The CubeSat provider shall work with the integrator, the launch provider, and 
Range Safety to coordinate any special provisions needed for the safe and legal 
transport and storage of any materials onboard the CubeSat. For example, special 
provisions may include equipment and procedures needed for atmospheric 
monitoring and leak detection or certified shipping containers. See AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.2.1.5. 
3.2. Pressure Systems and Fluid Containment Systems General Requirements. Satellites 
containing pressure systems shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 
12.1 and 12.10. Also see AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Attachment 1 for additional 
guidance in preparing the Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package (MSPSP). 
3.3. Propellant and Pressure System Requirements 
3.3.1. Satellites containing a pressure vessel or reservoir shall comply with AFSCPMAN 
91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.1.5.3.1 which describes the required stress analysis. 
3.3.2. Pressure vessels and sealed containers containing a propellant that decomposes or 
otherwise builds up pressure during storage shall be designed with a Maximum 
Expected Operating Pressure (MEOP) as the maximum equilibrium pressure at 
which pressure rise ceases or shall be designed for the maximum feasible pressure 
built up after being stored until a date 18 months past the latest planned launch date. 
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The launch integrator (Cal Poly, for example), shall be notified if any components 
have a limited safe storage life. 
3.3.3. If the contents of a pressure vessel or sealed container may pose a hazard to 
personnel or equipment including flight hardware in the event of a leak, burst, or 
spill, or if the pressure vessel or container exhibits a brittle failure mode, it shall 
have a burst factor of ≥ 2.0. See AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.8. 
3.3.4. If the contents of a pressure vessel or sealed container will not pose a hazard in the 
event of a leak, burst, or spill, and the failure mode is leak-before-burst (LBB), that 
pressure vessel or sealed container shall have a burst factor of ≥ 1.5. See 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 6 Section 11.5.1.3.9. 
3.3.5. Metallic Pressure Vessels and Reservoirs 
3.3.5.1. Satellites containing a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir shall comply 
with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.1 and 12.3.1. 
3.3.5.2. Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir that 
exhibits a LBB failure mode and leakage of the contents cannot create a 
hazardous situation shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 
12.2.2 and 12.3.2 which describe the requirements for Verification Approach 
A, Path 1. The satellite provider may choose to follow Path 2 instead by 
complying with Sections 12.2.3 and 12.3.3. Path 2 is described in standard 
3.3.5.3 of this document. 
3.3.5.3. Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir that 
exhibits a brittle failure mode or where leakage of the contents could create 
a hazardous situation shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 
12.2.3 and 12.3.3 which describe the requirements for Verification Approach 
A, Path 2. 
3.3.5.4. Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir designed 
using ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code or the DOT Pressure Vessel 
Codes shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.2.4 which 
describes Verification Approach B. 
3.3.6. Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) and Reservoirs 
3.3.6.1. Any satellite containing a composite overwrapped pressure vessel or 
reservoir shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.2.5 and 
12.2.8. 
3.3.6.2. Any satellite containing a composite overwrapped pressure vessel or 
reservoir that exhibits a LBB failure mode and leakage of the contents cannot 
create a hazardous situation shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 
Sections 12.2.6 which describes the requirements for Verification Approach 
A, Path 1. 
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3.3.6.3. Any satellite containing a composite overwrapped pressure vessel or 
reservoir that exhibits a brittle failure mode or where leakage of the contents 
could create a hazardous situation shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 
Vol. 3 Sections 12.2.7 which describe the requirements for Verification 
Approach A, Path 2. 
3.3.6.4. Any satellite containing a metallic pressure vessel or reservoir designed 
using ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code or the DOT Pressure Vessel 
Codes shall comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.2.4 which 
describes Verification Approach B. 
3.3.7. Sealed Containers 
3.3.7.1. Range Safety may allow certain propellant reservoirs which operate at 
low differential pressures to be treated as sealed containers. 
3.3.7.2. Any satellite containing a sealed container that exhibits a LBB failure 
mode and leakage of the contents cannot create a hazardous situation shall 
comply with AFSCPMAN 910-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.4.6. 
3.3.7.3. Any satellite containing a sealed container that exhibits a brittle failure 
mode or where leakage of the contents could create a hazardous situation shall 
comply with AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.4.6.2 and 12.2.3. 
3.4. Pressure System Components. Satellites containing hazardous pressure system 
components shall comply with AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Section 12.5.2. 
3.5. Hypergolic and Cryogenic Systems. (Not currently supported by Cal Poly) 
3.5.1. Satellites containing cryogenic systems are not currently supported by Cal Poly. 
Contact Cal Poly if you wish to launch such a cryogenic system. The CubeSat 
provider may reference AFSCPMAN 91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.8 and 12.5.2 for 
requirements that are generally applied to hypergolic flight hardware systems. 
3.5.2. Satellites containing cryogenic systems are not currently supported by Cal Poly. 
The CubeSat provider should understand that CubeSats are often integrated to the 
launch vehicle months ahead of the launch date. During this time, the CubeSat 
provider will have no access to their satellite. Contact Cal Poly if you wish to 
launch such a cryogenic system. The CubeSat provider may reference AFSPCMAN 
91-710 Vol. 3 Sections 12.9 and 12.5.2 for requirements that are generally applied 
to cryogenic flight hardware systems. 
4. Orbital Safety Standards. Adherence to these orbital safety standards will support the 
CubeSat community’s reputation for “good citizenship” among the greater space community. 
Deviations from these requirements may jeopardize future launch opportunities for the 
CubeSat community which relies on the good will of organizations such as launch providers, 
primary satellite providers, and Range Safety. 
4.1. Command Security 
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4.1.1. If the CubeSat contains a propulsion system, the CubeSat provider shall establish a 
Command Security plan which provides adequate protection against hijacking of 
the propulsive capabilities, proportional to the capability of the CubeSat to intercept 
another spacecraft. 
4.1.2. The Command Security plan shall protect against the transmission of malicious 
commands by unauthorized ground stations, by intruders who gain access to 
authorized ground stations, by hackers operating over unsecure networks such as 
the internet, and potentially by members of the team acting alone. 
4.1.3. The CubeSat provider may consider using software or hardware encryption for 
command transmissions, secure and monitored entrances to the command center, 
personnel vetting procedures, the “two man rule,” and limited access to encryption 
keys and command protocols. 
4.1.4. The CubeSat operator should exercise extreme caution whenever using remote or 
partnered ground stations. NASA spacecraft have historically been hijacked by 
hackers operating over the internet between remotely connected ground stations 
(Paganini, 2012) (Humphries, 2011). 
4.2. Close Proximity Operations with Host Vehicle 
4.2.1. In order to mitigate the possibility of thruster plume impingement on the host 
vehicle, and in order to improve separation from other CubeSats, the propulsion 
system shall be disarmed by at least one independent inhibit for the first 30 minutes 
after separation. Note that the launch provider may impose a longer delay or other 
criteria that must be met before propulsion systems may be armed. 
4.2.2. The CubeSat operator shall coordinate with the launch integrator or launch provider 
to determine when the CubeSats are sufficiently separated to allow thruster 
operation. This decision shall consider the potential for plume impingement and 
collision between CubeSats. 
4.2.3. Within the first week after deployment, if the CubeSat satellite can feasibly return 
and collide with the host vehicle in one pass, the propulsion system shall be 
disarmed by at least one independent inhibit until the CubeSat can no longer 
feasibly return and collide with the host vehicle. Note that the launch provider may 
impose a longer delay or other criteria that must be met before propulsion systems 
may be armed. 
4.2.3.1. In the short term, the V required for the CubeSat to collide with the 
host vehicle is greater than 90% of the product of the tangential portion of the 
separation velocity (~1 m/s) and the number of orbits since separation. When 
the separation velocity is greater than 80° from the tangential direction, more 
margin may be necessary. 
(V for Collision) > 0.9 * (Tangential Separation Vel.) * (Periods Since Separation) 
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4.2.3.2. A CubeSat cannot feasible return and collide with the host vehicle within 
one pass in the short term if 90% of the required V for collision, as given in 
4.2.3.1, has grown beyond the maximum feasible V the propulsion system 
can generate. When the separation velocity is greater than 80° from the 
tangential direction, more margin may be necessary. 
4.2.3.3. A CubeSat cannot feasibly return and collide with the host vehicle within 
one pass in the near term if the satellite satisfies this inequality expression. 
This expression compares the maximum feasible acceleration produced by the 
CubeSat with 90% of the growth rate for the V required to enter a collision 
course, which is approximately the CubeSat’s separation velocity (~1 m/s) in 
the direction tangent to the orbital velocity of the host vehicle. When the 
separation velocity is greater than 80° from the tangential direction, more 
margin may be necessary. 
(Max. Thrust) 
< 
0.9 * (Tangential Separation Velocity) 
(Min. C.S. Mass) (Orbital Period) 
 
4.2.4. After one week has passed since CubeSat separation, the CubeSat is be assumed to 
be adequately separated from the host vehicle such that the requirements associated 
with close proximity operations no longer apply. If not already permitted by 4.2.3, 
the propulsion system may be armed and operated according to general orbital 
safety standards. Note that the launch provider may impose other criteria that must 
be met before the propulsion system may be used. 
4.3. Trackability 
4.3.1. If the CubeSat contains a propulsion system of any kind, including solar sails, the 
operator shall work with the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), operated by 
the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE), to establish a 
Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance plan. The CubeSat operator can 
establish communication with JFCC SPACE by working with their launch provider 
or launch integrator to submit an Orbital Data Request (ODR) form to 
ODR@space-track.org. The ODR and instructions are available online at 
https://www.space-track.org/documentation#/odr. The CubeSat operator should 
also request an account with www.space-track.org. For reference, see AFI 91-217, 
especially section 5.9.  
4.3.2. If the CubeSat contains a propulsion system of any kind, including solar sails, the 
design shall also include active or passive RF identification reflectors or 
transponders. This will help the JSpOC to provide more effective tracking data and 
will aid in predicting orbital conjunctions with other objects. Passive devices are 
preferred over transponders as they do not rely on the satellite’s power system and 
can improve tracking even after the mission has ended. 
4.3.3. All CubeSat developers are encouraged to implement active or passive RF 
identification reflectors or transponders as discussed in standard 4.3.2 of this 
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document. This will help the JSpOC to provide more effective tracking data to the 
CubeSat. Passive devices are preferred over transponders as they do not rely on the 
satellite’s power system and can improve tracking even after the mission has ended. 
4.4. End-of-Life (EOL) Safing 
4.4.1. If a propulsive maneuver is necessary to de-orbit within 25 years, the CubeSat 
operator shall initiate End-of-Life (EOL) procedures when the onboard resources 
reach the minimum required for safe disposal and passivation. 
4.4.2. In order to prevent the creation of new space debris resulting from explosions, at 
EOL the CubeSat operator shall depressurize all pressure systems and vent all 
remaining propellant. This shall occur at the earliest point when the pressure system 
or propellant is no longer needed, unless factors such as contamination due to 
venting of propellant could negatively impact the remainder of the mission. 
4.4.3. In keeping with the priorities given in AFSPCI 10-1204 Section 3.6.3.2.1, “safing 
the satellite shall take precedence over all other disposal actions.” 
4.4.4. Re-entry Survivability: CubeSats providers shall coordinate with their frequency 
license authority to respond to reentry hazards. When the FCC is the licensing 
agency, the CubeSat shall contain no components which will survive reentry 
through the atmosphere with a kinetic energy of 15J or greater. Compliance with 
this requirement reduces the possibility of casualty due to debris impact. See this 
public notice from the FCC: http://www.fcc.gov/document/guidance-obtaining-
licenses-small-satellites. 
 
